# NEG

## Case

### 1NC---Condit

#### Reject their abstract ideas---the will to act without concrete goals creates failure, far right circumvention, and totalitarianism

Celeste M. Condit 15 (Celeste Condit serves the department and the university as a Distinguished Research Professor at Georgia, 2/4/15, accessed 10/25/21, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change”, T&F)AGabay

Because neither **biology** nor **symbolics** are **deterministic** systems, this fantasy theme is avoidable, even if it is powerfully attractive. Because both biology and symbolics are **material**, however, specific kinds of work are necessary in order to avoid the lure of that **predisposition**. This point is crucial, because it invalidates the twentieth century (idealist) approaches to social change, which envisioned a single (violent) leap away from the social as sufficient to create and maintain better worlds. Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “**Act**” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an **alternative**, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of **imagination** and a failure of **reality**. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to **harmonious cooperation** (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of **totalitarian states** and/or violent **factional strife**. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All sym**bolic movement** has a **trajectory**, and if you have not imagined a potentially **realizable alternative** for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is **biological predispositions**— the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the **most probable outcome** of a **revolution** that is merely against an **Evil**. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9 ). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically **enticing** as the story of the kill: such labor is **piecemeal**, **intellectually difficult**, requires **multi-disciplinary understandings**, and perhaps requires more **creativity** than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a **viable vision** that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a **better offering** (you’ll be free and you’ll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “**terrorists**.”

### 1NC---Pragmatism Good---IR

#### TAG.

Gunther Hellmann, 9 (Gunther Hellmann is professor of political science and a principal investigator in the Cluster of Excellence, "The Formation of Normative Orders," at the Goethe University Frankfurt, September 2009, accessed on 7-15-2022, International Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389158#metadata_info_tab_contents>, HBisevac)

Rhetorical pragmatism helps us reflect on the uses of rhetoric that come naturally to us. Instead of remaining oblivious to the field's pervasive rhetorical dimensions, it puts them under scrutiny, and provides the necessary epistemological qualifications as well as elaborations without which things can go seriously wrong in a rhetorical discipline. First, rhetorical pragmatism embraces a broad range of rhetorical modes of reasoning. This includes, inter alia, the abstract and comparative modes. The abstract mode revolves around Aristotle's enthymeme. The comparative one involves using language that provokes our imagination to think of parallels between phenomena that are usually seen as entirely distinct. There are many variants of both modes. While both allow for - and even demand - a considerable measure of creativity on the part of the scholar, this is especially important for the comparative one. Language, such as figures of speech, captures our imagination. We should make use of this by employing language creatively to defamiliarize ourselves with the taken-for-granted as well as by introducing and discussing novel understandings.

Second, skepticism and adjudication are at the core of rhetorical pragmatism. Scholarly skepticism against truth claims is what initiates and sustains scholarly debates. It prevents truth claims from assuming the status of orthodoxy. Skepticism, of course, does not mean to demolish every truth claim. It simply means to put them under critical scrutiny. Such a critical scrutiny may end up with the—always provisional-agreement that a truth claim amounts to a working truth. The mechanism for reaching such an agreement is adjudication. Yet not any kind of adjudication does the job. In order for knowledge claims to undergo a sufficiently demanding examination, the adjudicating peer group has to be heterogeneous. At a minimum, it has to be recruited from across those contending perspectives in the discipline that pertain to the research problem addressed by the piece to be adjudicated. Ideally, it transcends disciplinary boundaries. And even if truth is generated through such demanding multiperspectival checks and balances, we should remain alert that adjudication is not about settling a truth claim once and for all. It is always—this is the whole point about the metaphor of adjudication-provisional.

Third, there is nothing wrong with intervening into IR per se. Indeed, given the array of global problems, such scholarly interventions, in principle, are warranted. But not any kind of intervention will do. Rhetorical pragmatism pushes students of world politics towards understanding scholarly interventions into political discourses as scholarship writ large. This means first and foremost to critically discuss what is taken-for-granted. Out of these critical discussions, scholars can develop interventions into a constellation of taken-for-granted ideas. They can make innovative interventions that propose novel understandings of the world. They can also make reinforcing interventions that push an already established commonplace higher up the agenda. The benchmark for such interventions, however, is high. They have to survive an even broader discussion, involving multiple scholarly and nonscholarly perspectives. We have to discuss with our fellow scholars but we also have to discuss with decision makers, bureaucrats, activists, and the public at large. We have to stand in the midst of those who we study instead of pretending to stand apart or even above them. After all, the knowledge we produce may have very real repercussions for all of us (Flyvbjerg 2001). Such a broad adjudication makes for a rigorous system of rhetorical checks and balances that reasonably safeguards against the deeply troubling connection between insular scholarship and political malpractice. Even if a scholarly argument does not survive these rigorous rhetorical checks and balances, there is still a good chance for it to make a difference. It may contribute to raising doubts on what otherwise passes as unquestioned orthodoxy. Or it may play its role in shaping a broad discussion that converges on a provisional truth different but perhaps related to the originally proposed argument.

The Added Value of Rhetorical Pragmatism

Rhetorical pragmatism helps us channel the **rhetorical dimensions** of IR into **fruitful directions**. The added value is threefold: First, it broadens our understanding of **theory-building**, **empirical methods**, **empirical research**, and the relationships among them. The often taken-for-granted story of scholarly reasoning in our field - scholars deduce hypotheses from a set of premises and then test them by using a variant of the controlled experiment - is very incomplete. It tells us of a logical form of reasoning but remains quiet about the many other forms of reasoning without which we cannot arrive at assumptions, cannot make inferences based on these assumptions, cannot relate theory and empirics, and cannot relate empirics to theory - in short cannot make theoretical and empirical inferences. The range of practices by which we make inferences is very broad. Rhetorical pragmatism, due to its emphasis on multiple modes of reasoning, helps us examine this range in all its breadth and depth, and encourages us to try out new modes of reasoning to arrive at novel understandings of the world we study.

Second, rhetorical pragmatism helps us uncover overlaps across different perspectives (such as rhetorical forms of reasoning) and develop dialogue out of these overlaps. If we continue to rehash the typical textbook divisions of IR, for example Rationalism versus Constructivism, by emphasizing again and again the same divergences, we blind ourselves of their convergences. Yet if we take these divisions for what they are, that is, the products of rhetorical reasoning, and if we treat them accordingly, that is, not shy away from scrutinizing and reframing them, we move away from an incommensurability assumption-deeply entrenched in our discipline—that is much more absolute than even Kuhn (1977:xi-xii) presented it. Instead, we are very likely to uncover overlaps across clusters of research that have previously been thought of as incommensurable. Out of these overlaps, and driven by the curiosity to learn something new about the world we study, we can develop dialogue (Gadamer 1972; Bakhtin 1986; Bernstein 1991). Such a dialogue across perspectives is of paramount importance. It is the precondition for meaningful adjudication. Uncovering overlaps and initiating dialogue can be performed by focusing on meta-theory, theory and methodology. It can also be carried out-and this may often be easier-by focusing on a shared empirical research puzzle.

Third, rhetorical pragmatism provides us with important clues for how to disseminate knowledge responsibly. The issue of knowledge dissemination is an important one because there is no hiding in the Ivory Tower. Scholarly discourses and political discourses do not stand apart. They crisscross in various ways. Most importantly, many of the commonplaces (for example, appeasement and the democratic peace), based on which political decision makers reason, are shaped by scholarly discourses. As there is no hiding in the Ivory Tower, we need to think hard about how to feed ideas into political discourses in responsible fashion. The currently widespread practice of acknowledging uncertainty in scholarly research on the one hand and pretending that such uncertainty is nonexistent when attempting to diffuse knowledge beyond academia on the other is highly dubious. Understanding scholarly interventions as scholarship writ large is a much more responsible alternative to it.

Conclusion

International Relations is a rhetorical discipline. Rhetoric constitutes key features of our reasoning, processes by which we evaluate knowledge, and mechanisms through which we disseminate knowledge. These rhetorical elements come so naturally to us that we are oblivious to them. The gist of my argument is that we should continue “to do what comes naturally”' (Fish 1989). But we should stop being oblivious to it. Rhetorical pragmatism provides a very promising avenue for shaping the rhetorical dimensions of our discipline. It postulates a rhetoric that is far removed from the trickery and deception that the vernacular associates with the term. For a rhetorical pragmatist, rhetoric ought to be about seeking exposure to different arguments, approaching these arguments with an open mind, creatively composing one's own arguments, and being constantly reminded of and challenged by the shortcomings of the arguments that we exchange with one another. Rhetoric thus understood is an important building block of an intellectually thriving and responsible discipline.

#### Alt fails—abstract ethics don’t produce political results besides violence—embrace the hard work of pragmatic reform

Condit 15 [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

### 1NC---Infrapolitics

#### Reject their academic shifts---they misalign transformative potential that fails to overcome institutions

Adolph Reed 16 (Adolph Reed is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and an organizer with the Debs-Jones-Douglass Institute’s Medicare for All-South Carolina initiative, 11/6/16, accessed 1/20/22, “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left””, <https://nonsite.org/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2/)AGabay>

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “**infrapolitics**,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then **all the rage** in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian **resistance**, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent **politics themselves**. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of **academic trendiness** and the **atrophy** of the **left** outside the academy, which encouraged **flights into fantasy** for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted **group essentialism** underlying claims that esoteric, **insider knowledge** is necessary to **decipher** the “hidden transcripts” of the **subordinate populations**; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, those who romanticize “**everyday resistance**” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements **teleologically**; they presume that those **conditions** necessarily, or even typically, lead to **political action**. **They don’t**. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is **ubiquitous**, developed political movements are **rare**.9

### 1NC---AT: Epistemology

#### Epistemology debate is irrelevant---they don’t create useful knowledge AND material action is inevitable.

Jörg Friedrichs, 9 (Jörg Friedrichs, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, 1-1-2009, accessed on 7-15-2022, International Studies Review, “From Positivist Pretence to Pragmatist Awareness: Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258048564\_From\_Positivist\_Pretence\_to\_Pragmatist\_Awareness\_Varieties\_of\_Pragmatic\_Methodology\_in\_IR\_Scholarship, HBisevac)

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower is strangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The **typical** result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretense and pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes top resenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingenious conjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the much more prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. These are discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, I present various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmatic research strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction are important but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical research unencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodological awareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction. Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁed fundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in a positivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer, however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane, Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or her scholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in their research, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodological position. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links a commonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when he states that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but rather by empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thus to enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways. This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will be enabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In addition to themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription is probably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE. My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions. The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as social scientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for some reason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we do not know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. We therefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applying concepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions from facts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all a more conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learned to solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it is currently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able to achieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimate miracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is **completely** different from**,** and far more efﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well to mimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, and Martha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developed abduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research on international police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way to advance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimate epistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown to themselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a research problem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communities of practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blend them into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role in the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin.

#### Focusing on the politics of scholarship and discourse is bad – prevents a material challenge to the institutional relationships that sustain imperial dominance – vote neg to rematerialize the study of colonialism.

Ulas ’18 -- (Onur Ulas, 2018, "Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism," Oxford University Press, https://www.academia.edu/7895500/Colonial\_Capitalism\_and\_the\_Dilemmas\_of\_Liberalism\_ToC\_Introduction\_Oxford\_University\_Press\_2018\_, accessed 7-11-2022) -- nikki

Liberalism, Capitalism, and Empire The gulf between the self-professed liberalism of the British Empire and the illiberalism of its actual history has been a major leitmotif in the recent “imperial turn” in the field of political theory.3 In the words of two influential theorists, a guiding premise of studying political thought in the imperial fold is that “European constitutional states, as state empires, developed within global systems of imperial and colonial law from the beginning,”4 and consequently, “[e]ven when practical and administrative issues were to the fore, the discussion of what we can broadly call colonial government encompassed disputes over universality, sovereignty, freedom, democracy, property, and justice.”5 Groundbreaking works in this2 vein first appeared with the discovery that canonical liberal thinkers like John Locke and John Stuart Mill were personally and professionally invested in the imperial enterprise.6 Intellectual historians and political theorists expanded on those efforts, adopting imperial history as a critical vantage point for revisionist appraisals of these and other eminent members of the European political theory pantheon. Clustering around the British Empire, such reappraisals evinced a palpable anti-Whiggism in exposing the philosophies of subordination that authorized and justified its systematic violence against non-Europeans. For a growing number of scholars, the juxtaposition of “liberalism and empire” has since come to denote both a specific area of study and its central problematic, that is, a contradictory assemblage that comprised, on the one hand, principles of moral equality, subjective rights, the rule of law, representative government, and ethical pluralism, and on the other, practices of domination, foreign rule, naked coercion, untrammeled power, disenfranchisement, and exclusion. This book sets out to challenge a notable disposition that stamps this scholarship—namely, the penchant to frame the connection between liberalism and empire primarily as a problem of the politics of representation, culture, or identity. Notwithstanding differences of textual interpretation, historical studies in this field frequently concentrate on liberal thinkers’ perceptions of and normative judgments about the colonized peoples, which these studies then construe as an index of liberalism’s relationship to imperial rule. Although the exact nature of the liberalism-empire nexus remains controversial,7 the controversy remains noticeably unified in its occupation with questions of universalism and difference, its heavily intratextual approach, and its attention to the linguistic over the material contexts of the liberal ideas under study.8 By itself, this methodological preference is not problematic. As with any other interpretive lens, it brings into focus certain features of liberalism’s interface with empire, leaving others outside the depth of field. The problem is that among the dimensions that are left blurry is the socioeconomic and institutional materiality of empire, which in turn limits the capacity of this scholarship to analyze and critique liberal imperialism. As I detail in the next chapter, on the critical front, a culturalist focus on universalism and difference commands little firepower against the presentist vindications of the British Empire as the historic protagonist of economic globalization.9 On the analytic side, a blanket politics of universalism cannot adequately elucidate how liberal thinkers parsed and ordered the range of cultural differences between Europeans and non-Europeans, and why they emphasized certain differences over others as being more relevant for imperial justification or anti-imperial critique. This book attempts to address these limits by “rematerializing” the relationship between liberalism and empire. The task involves complementing an account of the semantic context of liberal ideas with an analysis of the socioeconomic context, that is, paying as much attention to the institutional structures and economic practices that constituted the fabric of empire as to the political languages and vocabularies in which liberal intellectuals articulated their assessment of it. There are no doubt multiple ways of rematerializing the imperial context (e.g., gender, ecology, technology, law, governance), each of which would highlight a different aspect of empire’s formative impact on liberal thought. I propose viewing the materiality of empire specifically through the lens of “colonial capitalism,” a notion inspired by critical social theory and colonial political economy. As an analytic framework, colonial capitalism rests on the fundamental premise that capitalism has historically emerged within the juridico-political framework of the “colonial empire” rather than the “nation-state.” It grasps capitalist relations as having developed in and through colonial networks of commodities, peoples, ideas, and practices, which formed a planetary web of value chains connecting multiple and heterogeneous sites of production across oceanic distances.

### 1NC---Policy Debates Create Change

#### TAG.

Derek Hodson, 10 (Derek Hodson, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, 2010, accessed on 7-15-2022, Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, “Science Education as a Call to Action”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14926156.2010.504478>, HBisevac)

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their **values** and **convictions** into action, helping them to **prepare** for and **engage** in **responsible action**, and assisting them in developing the **skills**, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about **change**, and work toward a more **just** and **sustainable world** in which power, wealth, and resources are more **equitably shared**. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A **politicized ethic of care** (caring for) entails **active involvement** in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the **complex sociopolitical contexts** in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest.

FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION

Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote **sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into **four dimensions**: (a) scientific and **technological knowledge** that **informs** the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the **underlying** social, political, and economic **issues**, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating **social** and environmental **problems**; (c) knowledge about how to bring about **changes** in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of **possible actions** and the **desirability** of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need **knowledge** of actions that are likely to have **positive impact** and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the **social**, **legal**, and **political system**(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the **military**. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the mechanisms by which decisions are reached, **intervention is not possible**. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of **political literacy**, including knowledge of how to engage in **collective action** with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action** depends is the **application** of a **social** and **political** **critique** capable of challenging the notion of **technological determinism**. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the **forefront** of discussion during the **establishment** of **policy**.

### 1NC---Legal Change Good

#### Structural changes only arise from the shifting of group interests – not academic discourse --- using the law is critical

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ACADEMIC INJUSTICE DISCOURSE Just law can coexist with unjust practice and both are parts of “empirical law” or what Bendey called “the process of government.” Empirical law is constantly changing and some theorists are optimistic that verbal discourse has the ability to make written law more just, even though the same unjust practices recur or new ones emerge. These theorists, some of whom are or may aspire to become public intellectuals, hope that someday public political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly will have the power to interrupt a cycle of just written law accompanied by continued unjust practice. That is, the “right” discourse perennially holds the promise of changing the beliefs, values, and goals of everyone in the public auditorium, so that the same kind of unjust practices do not perpetually chase the same kinds of just laws.11 This search for “magic words” is futile for academics who are professionally confined to dry and abstract prose. Our verbiage does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it anyway. But even when multitudes are inspired and emotionally stirred by great orators, action that follows is unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests. After the 1960s, academics began a robust practice of liberatory discourse about injustice that seems to grow more impassioned and intense each year. The quest for demographic diversity among students and faculty in higher education has weathered judicial defeat of explicit affirmative action policies, but only partly for the sake of justice. There are pragmatic prizes if the academy can justify itself by producing a racially integrated leadership and managerial class for business, politics, and the military. Top leaders throughout society realize that they need such racial diversity for broad consumption, voter support, and boots on the ground, and the expression of that need is evident in amicus curiae briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court as it has been torturously dismantling affirmative action, piece by piece, since Bakke in 1978.12 Academic political discourse has been deeper than polemics and debate, exactly because of its disciplined intellectual origins in different fields of study (i.e., discipline imposed by distinct “disciplines”). But it has been swimming upstream against a more rarefied and older academic tradition, particularly among many philosophers and their gate keepers outside of the profession. Even Hannah Arendt (see chapter 2) spoke approvingly of the life of the mind as cut off from real political activity that occurred in the realm of “opinion.” In her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif, Arendt addressed the phenomenon of college-stu-dent protestors, noting that they had brought social change through optimistic belief in their ability to make a better world, while at the same time discovering joy in civic participation. Arendt credited such protests with the success of the civil rights movement and progress toward ending the Vietnam War.13 As discussed in chapter 4, it is doubtful that Arendt was correct that student protests caused the success of the civil rights movement. A historical analysis of the end to the Vietnam War is beyond the present scope, but what we already know about empirical Bentleyan analyses would warrant skepticism about Arendt’s causal thesis there as well. In the same interview, Arendt warned that demonstrations by student activists could be self-defeating in democratic Euro-American contexts, because in attacking their universities, they were attacking the very entities that made their protests possible, American universities, especially large state schools that were the sites of the protests Arendt had in mind, have perforce developed very different financial structures since 1970. These schools have become increasingly dependent on private corporate and philanthropic funding, with state government funds now a much reduced part of their budget. While this structural change is not generally viewed as an incursion on academic freedom, it has been coincident with a very flat era of student protest and activism. Still, Arendt's notion of the "life of the mind” remains useful if we consider that the progressive/change-seeking output of professional academics since 1970 has been professionally accepted in the institutions that employ its participants. Also, much of today’s liberatory academic discourse can be viewed as the legacy of earlier student protest, furthering a tradition that may have been founded when some of the 1960s student radicals became professors. This indicates that the connection between academic radicals and the hands that feed them is not as simple as Arendt thought. In the United States, everything now points to both the existence of real academic freedom and its real ineffectiveness. Progressive academic writers ply a craft of formal speech that deals with contemporary injustice through complex theoretical frameworks, with requisite scholarly apparatuses and without translation into more simple views of the world; there is often also a lack of translation from one discipline to another or between subdisciplines in the same field. The audience is other academics and students. Neither specialization nor the limited and partly captive audience should be viewed as problematic because that is the nature of academic work, given broad social divisions of labor. But there is a problem with the delusional nature of so much of this work. The delusion consists of a naive view of the power of academic speech to directly change reality. The rhetorical mode of address used by academics writing cultural criticism, political philosophy, social philosophy, or what is now called social-political philosophy (which combines the other subfield approaches), often proceeds as though its authors are making grand entries in a planetary cabala, where words have the immediate power to become their intended referents. Those who do not write and speak cabalistically may subscribe to the Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory that can be traced from Plato to John Stuart Mill to John Rawls. Subscription to that theory is immediately self-flattering, but it lacks reliable empirical support.16 Although, after the US civil rights movement, there has been an uncanny coincidence of race-blind formal racial equality with the hegemony in political philosophy of Rawls’s requirement that those who plan fundamental social institutions do so in ignorance of their own societal environments. As we saw in chapter 1, Rawls was quite explicit about this: I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.17 Both race-blind racial equality and Rawlsian ideals are compatible with race-based real inequality. There are, of course, counter-examples, such as Katherine MacKinnon’s work on sexual harassment in the workplace as expressed in current law and institutional policy.18 Nevertheless even very good academic political discourse about justice and injustice cannot be relied upon to attract implementation or application in real life. This may be because there has not been sufficient time for the development of training programs for a new profession of “bridgers,” who could translate good ideas in the academy for those who govern and make policy. An internal problem for such translators would be to decide where to anchor their bridges in fields—every humanistic field—where experts disagree. However, the current tradition of progressive academic writing and speech is less than half a century old and if and when such translators emerge, they will develop their own professional criteria for choosing among contending experts. Public media, as a democratic analogue to disagreement within academic discourse, supports the idea that expressing and airing views in day-to-day practices or special “national conversations” also have immediate practical results. It is not evident how there could be such results, when opposing views and opinions are treated with the same respect and have equal access to the same mass auditorium that lacks rules for evidence or valid argument. As with academic discourse, there is no structured connection to official decision processes. The only reliable result of participation in such unbinding referenda is that those who participate are able to express themselves and get attention that may benefit them in the marketplace of their related endeavors. Public expression also serves to, represent and create collective atmospheres of belief, attitude, and opinion. These atmospheres are implicitly known by a majority of people in the culture, even though such knowledge is difficult to validate. Ambiguities cannot be resolved by recourse to public opinion polls, because understanding the results of those polls requires creative interpretive skills that draw on what is already known about relevant atmospheres. For example, suppose that more blacks than whites believe that white privilege is real and that O.J. Simpson was innocent, or that more whites than blacks believe that white American police officers are not, in general, racially biased. Are the views of whites evidence of racial bias or racial oblivion? Are the views of blacks evidence of racial preference or paranoia? Moreover, such polls almost always have a large racial overlap of opinion: If 29 percent of blacks compared to 71 percent of whites believe X, then 71 percent of blacks and 29 percent of whites do not believe X. Does this mean that the percentages of each group that does not contribute to the discrepancy in belief recorded in the polls are in some degree of agreement? Experiments in social psychology could be designed to answer such questions and others like them, but it is important to decide beforehand why the data is important and what it does and does not indicate. For instance, testing the claim that white privilege is a reality of contemporary life requires some prior definition of what is meant by “white privilege,” which can range from injustice to social courtesies. In a widely discussed 2013 experiment conducted in Queensland, Australia, economists Redzo Mujcic and Paul Frijters found that the majority of free bus rides, based on conductor generosity, were dispensed to whites, with blacks least likely to receive this courtesy, compared to all other racial groups among commuters. Journalist Britni Danielle, writing for a general audience on Yahoo News, touted this study as evidence that “white privilege is real,” without distinguishing between an amenity such as a free bus ride and recognition of one’s rights by not being subject to arbitrary stops and frisks by police officers.19 Conservatives reading Mujcic and Frijter’s study might say that the bus driver may have been acting rationally based on past experience with unruly black passengers. From a progressive perspective, more specifics would need to be introduced to defend the claim that this study revealed white privilege, such as controls for the apparent social class and gender of passengers, as well as the preexisting racial climate among bus commuters in Queensland, as well as the broader racial atmosphere throughout Australia in 2013. The 2015 Academy Awards What is racial atmosphere and climate? A US example that is also global could help clarify these vague ideas, provided that it is understood beforehand that in this context, as in most public references to "race," ‘racial” means “pertaining to racism.” From beginning to end, the 2015 Academy Awards ceremony hit racist notes that slid by unchecked, because it was an occasion of celebration. Neil Patrick Harris, the host, began with what might have been a critical remark about the lack of racial diversity among audience members and award winners: “Tonight we honor Hollywood’s best and whitest, sorry, bright est.” For those who were uncomfortable with the lack of robust racial diversity among audience members and award winners, his remark might have validated their unease. But those who would have been uncomfortable with more racial diversity may have been heard “best and whitest” as support for their social values. (The discourse of white privilege as a critique of contemporary anti-nonwhite racism is, as indicated, that kind of double-edged sword.) Midway through the ceremony, Patricia Arquette called for people of color and members of the lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender (LBGT) community to support legislation for equal pay for women and to commit themselves to supporting women, thereby overlooking the women who were either or both people of color and members of the LGВТ community. This kind of oversight may perhaps be excused by Arquette’s ignorance of what academics have been for decades analyzing as “intersectionality.” But Sean Penn’s remark at the grand finale awarding for Best Picture to Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu, the Mexican director of Birdman, was simply, explicitly, racist: "Who gave this son of a bitch a green card?” Inarritu later brushed off the insult by saying he found it "hilarious,” because “Sean and I have that kind of brutal relationship. I think it was very funny.”20 Inarritu attempt at a “save” for Penn does not address the impact of Penn’s insult on other Mexicans and Mexican Americans, including those without green cards who struggle to remain employed in the face of anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination. (That such a moment of maximum recognition was brought so low by a racist crack is not unusual in US culture, where the nastiest forms of racist insult are often let loose on people of color who have succeeded.) As a spectacle watched by almost thirty-four million, the 2015 Oscars, despite ratings lower than recent years, was a global public event.21 Symbolically, it has no peer for the display of beauty, talent, and artistic creativity. Its subtext inevitably has implications about current American race relations, which influence their future. The racial implications of the Oscars replays in millions of minds at countless other public celebrations and entertainment venues, as well as in private interactions (for a year at least). Such spectacles are forms of public discourse and what they represent or fail to represent about US racial demographics and the attitude of the dominant white group creates or augments a specific racial climate that in 2015 is part of a more general racial atmosphere of ambiguity and indeterminacy. At the 2015 Academy Awards, for many critical observers, the issue or subject pertaining to race (insofar as it is understood that subjects of race are subjects of racism), was recognition.22 The beauty, talent, and artistic creativity of people of color was not fully recognized. Some people of color did get awards and some audience members were people of color, so recognition, along with diversity, was not completely absent. But there appeared to be insufficient racial diversity for audience and award winners to be considered racially integrated. And that appearance was symbolic. However, the symbolic meaning is ambiguous: Were there people of color who were deserving of awards but did not get them because they were people of color? Is race a factor in who I becomes a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences? In the future, will the racial makeup of award winners become more or less representative of their proportions in the motion picture industry? If the proportion of people of color in the motion picture industry is not proportional to their presence in the population at large, why is that? The answers to these questions are undetermined in the symbolic spectacle of the 2015 Academy Awards. The observer does not know if recognition of the achievements of people of color in the movie industry will improve, stay the same, or get worse, and she does not know how to find out. The racial (i.e., in regards to racism) climate of the Academy Awards is cloudy, subject to many different interpretations, some of them conflicting. It is an epistemologically unstable racial climate, because people of color do not know what the weather is in that climate, as a basis for prediction, and neither do they know how to find out. The shared judgment throughout the American atmosphere of race in the early twenty-first century is that racism is morally bad. This judgment is a general principle that leaves the nature of racism undefined throughout the atmosphere and most of the climates and subclimates of race. The overriding shared judgment is a bitter and ineffective refuge for nonwhites, because it does not protect them from either First Amendment-protected racist expressions or actions that turn out to be indirectly racist. Energetic self-aware racist whites can try to evade the judgment that they are racist through coded language for racial difference, and the use of intermediate activities and traits as subjects of direct action. That is, something other than race, which nonetheless does a good job of picking out members of a specific racial group, can be used instead of the race of that group to maintain prejudice and legitimize discrimination. The term “racial climate” has a history of meaning “micro-aggressions” based on race, small cuts, insults, and slights that can have a cumulative effect of individual harm.24 In using the term “racial atmosphere,” reference may be made to other issues of harm to people of color, such as ignorance of black history and contemporary racism or discrimination in career advancement.25 The implication of these meanings is that the micro-aggressions add up to what is perceived as a general predisposition of white people to treat people of color in unjust ways. But, at this time, ideas of racial atmosphere and climate also work as metaphors for what is unknown about race relations and attitudes; they capture the vagueness and unpredictability of racial prejudice and discrimination that occur in a society where nonwhites remain disadvantaged, even though there is formal equality. This “vague weather” aspect of atmosphere and climate is an epistemological condition of indecision that may or may not constitute a lasting crisis, although some syndromes of political injustice should be viewed as crises. A crisis is a period of indecision and uncertainty that requires a resolution before life can go on. Will blacks and other people of color achieve more equality with whites, or is the United States—and with it the world, because US racism is exported with business practices, tour-ism, and entertainment products—on the brink of a new era of explicitlу direct oppression of people of color? Are most white Americans, whose race-neutral economic and social activities have racist effects on nonwhites, genuinely ignorant of how the system in which they operate works, or are they secretly but knowingly hearts-and-minds not clear that this indeterminate aspect of present racial atmosphere and climates must be resolved now. We do not know if life can go on if it is not resolved or what it means for life to go on, or not. We do not even know if the putative crisis can be resolved at this time, because there is as yet no systematic and sustained, impassioned, liberatory dis- course for our condition of ambiguity, a time with a black president and police killing with impunity of unarmed black youth, a time of voting rights for everyone but new restrictions and requirements that disproportionately affect African Americans.26 Except for what academics write and say and how important they think their discourse is (among themselves), American discourse of racial liberation is at a standstill. And insofar as academic discourse is uttered and received in a closed system, with a semicaptive audience and no reliable means for it to affect the real world, that standstill remains at the disposal of history, where history is understood to be the unpredictable result of contingent events. However, if academic oppositional political discourse can be related to a longer historical trend, a more coherent and optimistic picture might emerge. Cornel West's ideas about the American black prophetic tradition appears to be a relation to such a trend.

### 2NC---Legal Change Good

#### The interim---focusing solely on your relationship to a structure denies agency and is paternalist to less privileged people of color.

Delgado ‘9 (Richard; 2009; J.D. from UC-Berkeley, B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Washington, Professor of Law at the University of Alabama, acclaimed scholar and civil rights activist; Book, *Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law*, p. 588-590)

2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. **Incremental change**, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to ﬁnd rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is **familiar, imperialistic and wrong**. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples **how they should interpret events** affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a **comfortable academic** working in a warm office. It **smacks of paternalism** to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may **bring revolutionary changes closer**, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants‘ union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars‘ critique of piecemeal reform often **misses these possibilities**, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.

#### The aff’s shift in epistemology can’t create political change – only institutional focus secures it.

Kitchen ’10 (Nicholas; Deputy Director of the London School of Economics IDEAS US International Affairs Program; 2010, Review of International Studies, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation,” pg. 117-143) \*edited for ableist language\*

Fundamentally the state is made up of individuals. Individuals construct systems, institutions and bureaucracies; individuals lead and follow; individuals make decisions. On what basis do individuals decide which ideas to hold? The first is the quality of the idea itself – its internal coherence, its congruence with known realities. The second key to success resides in the speaker himself – his intellectual status, his eloquence of advocacy. Thus the power of an idea to persuade others at any one moment in history resides both in itself, and in the power of those who hold it. The causal effect of ideas on policies has tended to be displaced onto the political effects of individuals in IR theory, so that the persuasiveness of ideas is assumed rather than examined, and treated as constant.77 It is however, important to recognise that some ideas are ‘better’ than others, and are more likely to progress into the policymaking arena, where institutional factors may then come into play. This is not to deny the crucial role of forces exogenous to them that push certain ideas to heart of policymaking. Whilst the degree to which ideas generate popular support may provide them with power mediated through public opinion, ideas can take a shortcut to policy success if they have the backing of individuals and institutions that themselves have power. The character of these ‘couriers’ of ideas that may be as important, if not more so, than anything intrinsic to the idea itself.78 At the individual level then, neoclassical realism understands that the ideas held by powerful actors within the state matter. Whilst the intrinsic power of a particular idea makes its progress into such positions more likely, the ideas that will impact most upon foreign policy are those held by those in decision-making positions in the state and those who directly advise them. Thus as Mead notes, ‘It matters who the President is. If Theodore Roosevelt and not Woodrow Wilson had been President when World War I broke out, American and world history might have taken a very different turn.’79 The second location at which ideas may impact at the unit level occurs when individuals with shared ideas coalesce into groups, organisations, and common practices within the state to form institutions that operate in both formal and informal sectors of the policymaking process. The formation of institutions reflects the fact that ideas that are somehow embedded in particular structures are possessed of greater power. Institutions can act as couriers for ideas in three ways.80 ‘Epistemic communities’ of experts have the policy-relevant knowledge to exert influence on the positions adopted by a wide range of actors. The extent of the influence of such groups is dependent on their ability to occupy influential positions within bureaucracies from where they may consolidate their power, thereby institutionalising the influence of the community.81 However, their ability to infiltrate bureaucratic posts will depend – at least in part – on the receptiveness of the existing bureaucratic order to their ideas.82 A second means by which institutions act as couriers is by the encasing of ideas in formal rules and procedures at the creation of the institution itself. Once they have become embedded in this way, those ideas with which the institution was founded can continue to influence policy even though the interests or ideas of their creators may have changed. Thus, ‘when institutions intervene, the impact of ideas can be prolonged for decades or even generations.’83 In both of these ways, ‘ideas acquire force when they find organizational means of expression’.84 The third way in which ideas can impact is through the structural arrangements institutions create. These structures set up road-blocks and throughroutes which determine the ease with which ideas can gain access to the policy process. Indeed, the structure of the institutional framework may determine the political and administrative ‘viability’ of particular ideas, that is, their ability to appeal to current conditions. Institutional structure therefore ensures that policymakers only have access to a limited set of ideas, whether those are percolated up to them or searched for by them.85 In this way, the ideas that form what some refer to as ‘strategic culture’ may provide a reliable guide to a state’s likely reaction to shifts in the structure of the international system.86 Underlying both individuals and institutions are the ideas contained in the broader cultural context within which the state is located. Ideas that are embedded in social norms, patterns of discourse and collective identities become accepted, ‘instinctual’ parts of the social world and are experienced as part of a natural objective reality.87 In this way cultural variables subconsciously set the limits and terms of debate for both individuals and institutions, and so have ‘a profound effect on the strategic behaviour of states.’88 Mediated through institutions and individuals who are [ignore] ~~blinded~~ to potential alternatives, ideas embedded in national culture therefore have the potential to explain ‘why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of the international system.’89 The power of ideas therefore rests on ‘the ability of believers in ideas to alter the costs and benefits facing those who are in a position to promote or hinder the policies that the ideas demand.’90 In the process of foreign policy ‘engineering’, organisations and the ideas they espouse or represent vie with one another for dominance and autonomy.91 Decisions taken reflect the process of formulating the choices to be presented.92 Throughout the process of making foreign policy powerful ideas – whether that power resides in their couriers or is internal to the ideas themselves – are prevailing over weaker ideas.93

### 1NC---Narratives Fail

#### Personal narrative is not the corrective to technocrats

David **Levasseur 01**. West Chester University communication studies professor. 2001. “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 4.3, project muse

While the personal narratives from participants in the study certainly seemed to spark enthusiasm, such engagement came at a significant cost. As with other forms of egocentric argument, narratives that focus on the self are largely unable to steer the conversation towards more transcendent communal outcomes. A group discussion in Ohio reveals this characteristic of personal narratives. In this particular discussion, participants actively debated the issue of whether government should support labor unions: M1: I don't think the unions are going to be wiped out, first of all. And I'm not a proponent of unions. I'm basically anti-union, okay? . . . However, by the same token, unions have got to work the same way in being fair to companies, and I've seen situations where unions, because of some of the things they did, were a disgrace. Perry Power Plant--I know people who were told to go hide--I have nothing to do--go hide. That's WRONG! Okay, I've seen situations where a person, because he's in the union and he has this job classification, then he can't do anything else and he's sitting there for six and a half of his eight hours because he's only needed to do these two things, but he's got to be there because nobody else can do it because the unions state that you've got to have a person to do this and a person to do this and so on. M2: Well, that's his trade though. What do you do? M1: I'm an accountant but I do a lot of other things other than just accounting things. M2: Well, what if somebody came in and tried to take your job--take your livelihood? Something you've trained for, you're second, third generation of this particular . . . M1: Yeah, but I can't be allowed to sit around for six and a half hours out of the eight hours when I could be doing something else but I can't do it because . . . M2: No, that's not my point. [End Page 414] M1: Well, that's my point! If I could do something productive to help the company to help me to help the workers the other six and a half hours, but I'm not allowed to do that because that's not my job classification. Then I'm qualified, I can do it, but I'm not allowed. . . . M2: What about prevailing wage with unions? M1: What do you mean? M2: Well, usually non-union companies are--they gauge their pay scale to union companies with prevailing wage. So if one day, if the prevailing wage with union companies--if it falls and it's gone, then what do you think will happen to the rest of the wages? When the union prevailing wage is wiped out? In this discussion, participants actively debated the issue of whether government should support labor unions; however, they reached no mutual conclusions on the value of labor unions. Divergent opinions were shared, but no attempt at consensus building regarding the role of unions in the economy occurred. Consensus was difficult because when one focuses on self-experience, it is difficult to transcend those experiences. While the conversation raised a number of points on behalf of unions, the anti-union storyteller continued to return to his story. Habermas argues that the public sphere should constitute a discursive space where individuals "transcend the provinciality of their spatiotemporal contexts"--a space where citizens engage in "context transcending validity claims." 39 When citizens ground public policy discussions in personal narratives, they generally fail to transcend the limitations of their personal lives and move to a broader social outlook. It is also interesting to note that in this exchange about unions the personal narrative goes unchallenged. Rhetorical theorists have long recognized that narratives are susceptible to the charge of ungeneralizable evidence. For instance, Richard Whatley observed that one must take care in constructing arguments from examples, because examples are perceived as "exceptions to a general rule" and "will not prove the probability of the conclusion. While such a perception may prove fatal in debates between experts in the technical sphere, they do not seem to have much impact in the deliberative practices of ordinary citizens. In the foregoing exchange, one participant recounted his personal experiences with union workers at the Perry Power Plant. He told the story of union workers who spent endless hours in idleness or in hiding. While one could certainly challenge the generalizability of such a story, the other group members did not offer such challenges. Instead, a pro-union participant shifted the ground of the debate to the alternative issue of "prevailing wage," where the discussion died. Perhaps such personal narratives are difficult to challenge because they establish expertise. Recent scholarly outcry suggests that experts have usurped the public [End Page 415] sphere. 41 Such lamentations are grounded in the fear that technical expertise undermines citizen deliberation by devaluing citizens' views. While this incursion by technical expertise did find its way into the group discussions (citizens citing outside "expert" sources), personally grounded expertise, such as the credibility established in the following exchange from a group in California, appeared far more often: M1: I think they should really look into the military spending. That is just amazing. I was in the military, and it's just a waste. People just rot in the military. It's just amazing how much unnecessary money is used in the military, and how many people that shouldn't have jobs are in the military. M2: That's the Republican job program. M3: I think you can say that about any government organization. In this exchange, a participant recounted his personal experience in the military. With the simple statement, "I was in the military," he established expertise in this realm of public affairs. Just as technical expertise quells discussion, personal expertise has similar effects. In this case, the assertion that "people rot in the military" went unchallenged, and the discussion of military spending quickly came to an end. Such personal credibility may also be less assailable than technical expertise because of its deeply personal nature. Arguments grounded in technical expertise can be challenged for their failure to satisfy certain argumentation standards within a specialized argument field. For instance, a social scientist's findings could be challenged based on a flaw in experimental design. Such a challenge takes issue with the findings; it does not fundamentally take issue with the individual. On the other hand, a challenge to one's lived experience is easily perceived as a challenge to one's life or to one's character. Such challenges can only suggest that one is disingenuous in his or her storytelling or that one's lived experience falls outside the norm. Such challenges seem out of place in a culture grounded in a liberal political tradition that suggests that one should not judge others. 42

#### Focusing debates on personal narratives makes them stupid and crowds out solution-driven discussion by forcing personal confrontation and making the process of updating belief systems more precarious.

Friedrich **Kratochwil 18**. Professor of International Relations @ EUI. 08/16/2018. “11 - Judging and Communicating.” Praxis: On Acting and Knowing, 1st ed., Cambridge University Press. Crossref, doi:10.1017/9781108557979.

How little these narcissistic preoccupations with the presentation of the self are able to create an engagement with others or a meaningful exchange wrestling with problems is amply demonstrated by the slew of sitcoms where the “lonely” individuals “kvetch” about their unhappiness, the lack of available women (or men), or their boredom, which they try to self-analyze by a vocabulary picked up from self-help books or sessions with a “therapist.” The captive audience is treated to the silliest hurts of their childhood, such as when mother did not let them make mud pies, or took away a toy from them to give it to their brother. While this might come across in a comedy as funny if it is well presented, as a “self-advertisement” or an offer for genuine communication it is just silly and boring. The point here is not so much that the “themes” which are offered for conversations are mundane but that the form of the communication does not lend itself to establishing a genuine exchange. As one of the first reports on Facebook noted, taking issue with the official version of “bringing people together”: While Thefacebook.com [the original name of the platform created at Harvard in 2004] isn’t explicitly about bringing people together in romantic unions, there are plenty of other primal instincts evident at work here: an element of wanting to belong, a dash of vanity, and more than a little voyeurism.56 In a way these observations seem to corroborate some of the earlier criticism made by the historian Christopher Lash57 and the sociologist Richard Sennett, who both noticed a growing narcissism in modern culture and saw in this change one of the reasons for the decline of the public. As Sennett avers with regard to codes which privilege private experiences as templates for understanding social and political life: We see society itself as meaningful only in converting it into a grand psychic system. We may understand that a politician’s job is to draft or execute legislation but that work does not interest ... us until we perceive the play of personality in political struggles. A political leader running for office is spoken of as “credible” or “legitimate” in terms of what kind of man he is, rather than in terms of the actions or programs he espouses. The obsession with persons at the expense of more impersonal relations is like a filter which discolors our rational understanding of society; ... it leads us to believe community is an act of mutual self-disclosure, and to undervalue the community relations of strangers ... Ironically, this psychological vision also inhibits the development of personality strengths, like respect for the privacy of others, or the comprehension that, because every self is in some measure a cabinet of horrors, civilized relations between selves can only proceed to the extent that nasty little secrets of desire, greed or envy are kept locked up ... As a result, confusion has arisen between public and intimate life; people are working out in terms of personal feelings public matters, which properly can be dealt with only through codes of impersonal meaning.58 This becomes particularly obvious when the narcissistic display is “answered” by the members of the audience with a “shit-storm,” victimizing the original sender, particularly if s/he displayed some weakness or flaws. Here the offer and the response seem more to be a sign of dovetailing neuroses rather than the transmission of actual information that establishes a common concern with the potential of leading to a communicative engagement. Meaningful communication needs not only give-and-take among different positions, it also requires the ability to listen and reflect and thus presupposes a distancing from one’s own notions and prejudices. Here the notion of “interest” becomes crucial in the two meanings of the term. First, in the sense of mihi interest, i.e. I communicate that I am committed to something and want to send a signal as I find myself in a situation that creates some unease or puzzlement; this is why I address others. But such a stance also entails that I have to be willing to be led by my own reflections and those of others in order to “go on” by correcting my original “hunch” 59 or fears, and tackle a genuine problem rather than persist in my vague mood. This is why Hume pointed out the importance of “commerce and conversation” with others, as it opens a new space between the interlocutors which is constituted by that which is “in-between” them (interesse). It not only implies the imaginative taking of different positions in the interaction, but, above all, the presence of other, different perspectives, as suggested by Aristotle. In short the intimacy which the virtual availability of everybody “out there” conjures up – and which narcissistic preoccupations reinforce – is not just a pious hope but counter-productive to developing good judgment and finding viable solutions for one’s individual or social projects. As in the case of “confirmatory research,” looking right away for approval rather than criticism and help, is choosing the wrong tools and strategies for orienting ourselves in this world. The point here is that finding those who are in sync with our feelings and moods is not only difficult practically – which explains why we are so easily seduced by our own “projections” – there is also the conceptual impossibility of bringing everybody and everything under one tent. After all, we cannot but notice that every inclusion requires exclusion, since concepts have meaning only when they relate to other concepts and that means that boundaries – even if not fixed once and for all, as the old ontology suggested – need to be drawn. This realization cuts against the rationality of trusting a solution which relies on the undifferentiated feeling of “togetherness,” but also against the “privatism” (idiocy) of opting for simple value-maximizing strategies, which are bound to have unintended consequences. Thus a moment’s reflection discloses that e.g. not all actors can maximize e.g. their security at the same time, as the security dilemma indicates. Attempts to do so will court disaster in virtually all cases, so that we have to learn to live with certain insecurities and we must rather find a common, intersubjective understanding that can mediate those tensions.60

### 1NC---Liberalism Good

#### Liberalism is the *only* set of values capable of meaningfully criticizing oppression *and* creating a normative theorization of justice. Democratic idealism at the expense of black folks is a perversion of liberalism’s basic values. Their criticism is of *dominant varieties* of liberalism, *not* its core tenets.

Mills 12 (Charles, PhD from the University of Toronto, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, City University of New York; “Occupy Liberalism! Or Ten reasons why Liberalism Cannot Be Retrieved for Radicalism (And Why They’re All Wrong),” Radical Philosophy Review, 15(2), 305-323, 2012)

2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—I (Macro)

The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. (So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post-"primitive communism") was class-dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the key claim is that a liberal frame-work cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships. But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage—viz., that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another—is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression: the absolutism it opposed in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism's failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism's conceptual apparatus. In the preface to her recent Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd makes a striking point: that hers is the first book-length treatment of the subject in the analytic tradition.' Philosophy, the discipline whose special mandate it is to illuminate justice and injustice for us, has had very little to say about injustice and oppression because of the social background of the majority of its thinkers. In political theory and political philosophy, the theorists who developed the dominant varieties of liberalism have come overwhelmingly from the hegemonic groups of the liberal social order (bourgeois white males). So it is really not surprising that, given this background, their socio-political and epistemic standpoint has tended to reproduce rather than challenge group privilege.

Consider Rawls, famously weak on gender and with next to nothing to say about race. Rawlsian "ideal theory," which has dominated mainstream political philosophy for the last four decades, marginalizes such concerns not contingently but structurally. If your focus from the start is principles of distributive justice for a "well-ordered society," then social oppression cannot be part of the picture, since by definition an oppressive society is not a well-ordered one. As Cudd points out, A Theory of justice "leaves injustice virtually untheorized," operating on the assumption "that injustice is merely the negation of justice."9 But radically unjust societies—those characterized by major rather than minor deviations from ideality—will be different from just societies not merely morally but metaphysically. What Cudd calls "non-voluntary social groups" will be central to their makeup, so that a conceptualization of such groups must be central to any adequate account of social oppression: "without positing social groups as causally efficacious entities, we cannot explain oppression:' Contra the conventional wisdom in radical circles, however, she is insistent that the ontology of such groups can be explained "[using] current social science, in the form of cognitive psychology and modern economic theory, and situat[ing] itself in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal political philosophy."9 Identifying "intentionalist" and "structuralist" approaches as the two broad categories of competing theorizations of social groups, she recommends as the best option

a compatibilist position, holding that while all action is intentionally guided, many of the constraints within which we act are socially determined and beyond the control of the currently acting individual; to put a slogan on it, intentions dynamically interact within social structures.... My theory of nonvoluntary social groups fits the description of what Philip Pettit calls "holistic individualism," which means that the social regularities associated with nonvoluntary social groups supervene on intentional states, and at the same time, group membership in these and voluntary social groups partly constitutes the intentional states of individuals.

If Cudd is right, then, such a theorization can indeed be developed with-in a liberal framework, using the resources of analytic social and normative theory. But such a development of the theory is not merely permissible, but should be seen as mandatory, given liberalism's nominal commitment to individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism. These values simply cannot be achieved unless the obstacles to their realization are identified and theorized. Social-democratic (left) liberalism, feminist liberalism, black liberalism, all historically represent attempts to take these structural realities into account for the purposes of rethinking dominant liberalism." They are attempts to get right, to map accurately, the actual ontology of the societies for which liberalism is prescribing principles of justice. What Cudd's book demonstrates is that it is the ignoring of this ontology of group domination that is the real betrayal of the liberal project. A well-ordered society will not have nonvoluntary social groups as part of its ontology. So the path to the "realistic utopia" Rawls is supposedly outlining would crucially require normative prescriptions for eliminating such groups. That no such guidelines are offered is undeniably an indictment of ideal-theory liberal-ism, which is thereby exposed as both epistemologically and ontologically inadequate. But that does not rule out a reconceptualized liberalism, a non-Ideal-theory liberalism that, starting from a different social metaphysic, requires a different normative strategy for theorizing justice.

3. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology-11 (Micro)

But (it will be replied) liberalism suffers from a deeper theoretical inadequacy. Even if it may be conceded that liberal theory can recognize oppression at the macro-level, it will be argued that its individualism prevents it from recognizing how profoundly, at the micro-level, individuals are shaped by structures of social oppression. Class, race, and gender belongings penetrate deeply into the ontology of the individual in ways rendered opaque (it will be claimed) by liberalism's foundational individualism.

But what those seeking to retrieve liberalism would point out is that we need to distinguish different senses of "individualism." The individualism that is foundational to liberalism is a normative individualism (as in the Gray quote above), which makes individuals rather than social collectivities the locus of value. But that does not require any denial that individuals are shaped in their character (the "second nature" famously highlighted by left theory) by oppressive social forces and related group memberships. Once the first two criticisms have been refuted—that liberal individuals cannot be "social;' and that the involuntary group memberships central to the social in oppressive societies cannot be accommodated within a liberal frame-work—then this third criticism collapses with them also. One can without inconsistency affirm both the value of the individual and the importance of recognizing how the individual is socially molded, especially when the environing social structures are oppressive ones. As already noted, dominant liberalism tends to ignore or marginalize such constraints, assuming as its representative figures individuals not merely morally equal, but socially recognized as morally equal, and equi-powerful rather than group-differentiated into the privileged and the subordinated. But this misleading normative and descriptive picture is a function of a political agenda complicit with the status quo, not a necessary implication of liberalism's core assumptions. A revisionist, radical liberalism would make the analysis of group oppression, the denial of equal standing to the majority of the population, and their impact on the individual's ontology, a theoretical priority. Thus Cudd's book, after explicating the ontology of involuntary groups, goes on to detail the various different ways, through violence, economic constraint, discrimination, group harassment, and the internalization of psychological oppression, that the subordinated are shaped by group domination. But nothing in her account is meant to imply either that they thereby cease to be individuals, or that their involuntary group memberships preclude a normative liberal condemnation of the injustice of their treatment.

### 1NC---IR Debates Good

#### Debating IR is key to challenge its excesses---IR is reflexive, but will be co-opted by the right absent debate over policy details.

Reiter 15, PhD, Professor of Political Science at Emory University (Dan Reiter, August 2015, “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>)

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s. But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome. Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets. Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians? Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings. Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies. Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations. Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions. Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

### 2NC---IR Debates Good

#### Debating IR is valuable.

Lantis 4 [Jeffrey S. Lantis is Chair of the International Relations Program and Associate Professor of Political Science at The College of Wooster. He is author of Domestic Constraints and the Breakdown of International Agreements, and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective. Ethics and Foreign Policy: Structured Debates for the International Studies Classroom. International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2004). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44218873.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A3276219e5a7f3bad3e332f8cbe491fd8>]

Structured debates for international relations courses represent a synthesis of the active teaching methods described here. They draw on the role-playing dynamics of simulations, the narrative foundation of the case method, and a system for debate and critical analysis grounded in the argumentation literature.

Structured debates force students to define and defend policy positions that are assigned in advance. In this way, debates demand a level of personal engagement in the process, a measure of group collaboration on debate points, and a willingness to participate in a critical dialogue with the larger group about theoretically significant policy questions. Classroom debates are built on the foundation of a common narrative or background material similar to the case method. For example, students who are assigned to support the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have reviewed similar materials and issues as have those who must oppose it. Furthermore, they are encouraged to define the issue, interpret it through theory frameworks, and prescribe policy options to address specific, real-world problems.

These exercises are structured according to guidelines found in the argumentation literature. Students are sometimes assigned roles for debates in advance, and other times they are forced to defend a position assigned minutes earlier. Debates run according to the systematized format of some forensics programs, and discourse is structured in a way to achieve educational objectives. Students may be motivated by “winning” some of these debates, but they achieve important educational objectives in the process (Wood and Rowland-Morin, 1989). Argumentation in this form can serve as a medium for both engaged citizenship and critical thinking about potential solutions to contemporary challenges. But Cox rightly cautions that political argumentation should be seen as a “normative sphere” where there is less absolute truth than issues subject to interpretation (1981:127).

The literature on active teaching and learning stresses that exercises should be designed and implemented to fulfill a set of educational goals. While objectives may vary, these techniques are generally designed to help students move from theoretical discussions in the classroom to real-world experience. The incorporation of active teaching and learning exercises into international relations courses should also take into account the time requirement and intensity of the exercise, the amount of student preparation needed, and related resource concerns. Finally, most successful active teaching approaches include a period for reflection on theory applications and lessons learned from the experience. In Kolb’s experiential learning preference model, for example, particular attention is devoted to the importance of reflective observation about the exercise (Kolb, 1976, 1984; Fox and Ronkowski, 1997; Brock and Cameron, 1999). On a more practical level, debriefing can provide necessary closure and encourage students toward further discoveries.

The study of ethical dilemmas in foreign policy can achieve important educational objectives in courses on international relations. First, ethical dilemmas can be used to illustrate the complexities of contemporary global politics. Perennial themes like the struggle for state sovereignty, identity, and globalization may be viewed through the optic of ethical debates. Second, collaborative learning projects with defined objectives allow students to explore many avenues in relating theories to case studies in a highly systematic format. Debates with assigned roles also provide students with greater understanding of diverse perspectives on major issues. They learn more about the background and orientation of key players involved in political discourse, and this may promote a widening of their worldviews. Finally, students can increase their communications skills through interactions with their peers in the context of structured debates. These and other objectives are described in practical application below.

#### Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant

Sus 20—Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator [Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed (Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance), February 2020, “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”, Contemporary Security Policy, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight. The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars. Confronting enduring assumptions As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments. The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up. Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259). Bringing forward new research questions Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely. Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1). Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381). Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character. Stepping out of the ivory tower Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas. We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups. Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11 We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

### 1NC---Alt Fails

#### You can’t just talk your way out of capitalist desires.

Fleming and Banerjee, 16—Professor of Business and Society and Director of the Modular Executive MBA programme AND Professor of Management and Director of the Executive PhD program at Cass Business School, City University London (Peter and Subhabrata Bobby, “When performativity fails: Implications for Critical Management Studies,” human relations, 2016, Vol. 69(2), 257–276, dml)

In their influential analysis of Critical Management Studies (CMS), Fournier and Grey (2000) argue that CMS scholarship is driven by three basic principles: denaturalization, reflectivity and non-performativity. Denaturalization deconstructs the seemingly immutable ‘realities’ and ‘rationalities’ of managerialism while exposing the wealth of alternatives that reside in the shadows of organizational life. Reflectivity challenges the dominance of positivism in the methodologies of mainstream management research, revealing how all social scientific investigation is underpinned by political assumptions. Drawing on Lyotard’s (1984) notion of instrumental performativity, the principle of nonperformativity rejects the means-ends rationality that governs many organizational situations, especially under neoliberal capitalism characterized by a brazen cost-minimization/ profit-maximization logic (Fournier and Grey, 2000).

The principle of non-performativity has recently been questioned in a number of articles published in this journal and elsewhere. These authors suggest that by critically distancing themselves from the concrete activities of managers, researchers may miss opportunities to intervene and make a difference for the better. For example, in their influential article, Spicer et al. (2009: 538) argue that the principle of non-performativity needlessly isolates CMS from organizational practitioners. This in turn fosters a corrosive ‘cynicism and negativism’ whereby scholars ply grand critical theories that have little relevance to everyday organizational challenges. Others similarly maintain that the principle of non-performativity fails to offer ‘practical’ guidelines for managers (King and Learmonth, 2014); misses crucial opportunities to ‘collaborate’ with middle-managers and stubbornly objects to becoming ‘more relevant to practice’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 7); is elitist in how it ignores practitioner management texts in favour of ‘canonical perspectives’ associated with Marx, Foucault and the Frankfurt School (Hartmann, 2014: 619, also see Clegg et al., 2006).

These scholars recommend a renewed commitment to performativity so that critical knowledge can have an impact on the practices of managers and lead to emancipatory change. Most assertive in this regard are Spicer et al. (2009) and Wickert and Schaefer (2014) and their respective notions of critical performativity and progressive performativity. Both articles draw upon wider philosophical studies of performativity to discern its potential for CMS researchers hoping to make meaningful interventions. In particular, they apply Austin (1963) and Butler’s (1990, 1993) influential insight about the way language creates reality (rather than just describe it). Armed with this insight, it is claimed that CMS researchers can change organizational practice (for the better) by altering how language is used by managers. Modified speech may lead to modified and thus emancipatory behaviour. Such critical performativity ‘involves active and subversive intervention into managerial discourses and practices’ (Spicer et al., 2009: 538). Instead of worrying about emancipation on a grand scale, more modest microemancipatory practices might ‘stimulate the performative effects of language in order to induce incremental, rather than radical, changes in managerial behaviour’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 1). This means getting closer to managers rather than critiquing them from afar.

We agree that CMS scholars should be reflecting on how their critical findings might translate into concrete change. Otherwise why bother being critical in the first place? Moreover, we applaud recent efforts – including the advocates of critical and progressive performativity – to rethink how CMS research might make a difference to organizational practices. Our motivation for entering this discussion, however, derives from a nagging doubt. We are concerned that the emphasis on discursive performativity as a change mechanism risks presenting an overly optimistic view of (a) the power of language to alter institutionalized organizational practices associated with neoliberal capitalism and (b) the capability of CMS scholars alone to reorder in situ how managers make sense of governing imperatives like profit-maximization, shareholder value, consumer responsiveness and so forth. While there may be situations in which critical and/ or progressive performativity may ‘talk into existence new (counterbalancing) behaviours and practices’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 3), we also propose that, realistically speaking, such attempts would just as likely fail given the preponderant pressures of economic rationality in many business contexts. Missing in the aforementioned calls for a wider appreciation of (discursive) performativity, therefore, are the strict boundary conditions that Austin (1963) and Butler (1990, 1993, 2010) themselves place around the notion.

Our article contributes to the ongoing discussion about the challenge of making CMS performative by addressing two central questions. First, rather than automatically assume their success, how might discursive performative approaches (such as critical and progressive performativity) fail to enact desired material changes and for what reasons? Answering this question will provide a better understanding of the practical contingencies that can determine whether these new performativities are the best method for endeavouring to influence organizations. Second, in light of the constraints on the performative potential of language, what other possible avenues are available to the CMS community for having an impact (however modest) on organizational practices and routines?

The article is structured in four parts. First, we provide an overview of the founding CMS principle of non-performativity and analyse recent calls for critical research to become more performative, giving particular attention to the two articles that have recently appeared in this journal. Second, we identify the circumstances under which it is more realistic to expect discursive performativity to fail rather than succeed. Corporate Social Responsibility (or CSR) is here highlighted as a failed performative in managerial and mainstream discourses. Third, the article posits alternative methods that the CMS community might use to help make organizations less exploitative and more equitable. Fourth, we conclude by discussing the broader role of critique in management studies at this juncture. Our overall aim is to continue the ongoing dialogue about performativity in the CMS community and hopefully inform new avenues to achieve its stated objectives in business and society.

Critical Management Studies and the question of performativity

We will not provide a detailed overview of CMS as that has been done extensively elsewhere (see e.g. Adler et al., 2007; Alvesson et al., 2009; Banerjee, 2011a; Fournier and Grey, 2000; Spicer et al., 2009). CMS is characterized by a diversity of theoretical and philosophical perspectives. For instance, the 2013 Critical Management Studies conference held in Manchester comprised of 25 streams involving a wide range of topics such as critical perspectives on strategy, globalization, international business, diversity, feminism, race theory, human resource management, marketing, accounting, postcolonialism, sexuality, gender, postmodernism and environmentalism. CMS was established as a division in the Academy of Management in 2008. The domain statement of the CMS division describes its mission:

CMS serves as a forum within the Academy for the expression of views critical of established management practices and the established social order. Our premise is that structural features of contemporary society, such as the profit imperative, patriarchy, racial inequality, and ecological irresponsibility often turn organizations into instruments of domination and exploitation. Driven by a shared desire to change this situation, we aim in our research, teaching, and practice to develop critical interpretations of management and society and to generate radical alternatives. Our critique seeks to connect the practical shortcomings in management and individual managers to the demands of a socially divisive and ecologically destructive system within which managers work. (CMS, 2014)

Thus, CMS challenges the fundamental normative assumption that managerial notions of efficiency are universally desirable, and that pursuing profit motives can only lead to positive outcomes for the workforce and society. Moreover, CMS is driven by the desire (even if it does not always articulate the means) to transform existing power relations in organizations with a view to encouraging less oppressive practices that do not harm social and environmental welfare. As Fournier and Grey (2000: 16) argue, ‘to be engaged in critical management studies means, at the most basic level, to say that something is wrong with management, as a practice and body of knowledge, and that it should be changed’.

Along with de-naturalization and reflexivity, Fournier and Grey (2000) suggest that the principle of non-performativity is crucial to the CMS project: What exactly do Fournier and Grey (2000) mean by non-performativity? Let us imagine a CMS researcher studying changing employment practices in the United Kingdom. S/he gains access to a subsidiary of a multinational enterprise that has started to use zero-hours employment contracts to maximize profits for its parent company. These contracts have been widely condemned as exploitative and unjust since they insist employees always be on call but guarantee zero-hours of paid work (see Guardian, 2013). Our non-performative orientated CMS researcher would not be interested in generating knowledge that enables the efficiency and instrumentalization of this new employment system. Nor would s/he be overly sympathetic to the operational manager’s ‘point of view’ because employees are so obviously disadvantaged and suffering as a result. So what is our CMS scholar seeking to achieve in undertaking this research? Generally speaking, change hopefully. But here is the nub of the problem. How can critical researchers make an effective intervention while tenaciously remaining aloof (both ideologically and practically) of the concrete activities being described? What aspects of performativity, whether critical or progressive, can engage with this clearly exploitative practice to create a fairer outcome? If zero-hours contracts are practices created by the language of neoliberal capitalism, what other utterances have the power and agency to counter these practices?

Towards a performative Critical Management Studies?

Recent commentators have addressed questions like these by suggesting that CMS scholars must stop being so negative about the idea of working with managers to help bring about practical change. In their strident critique of Fournier and Grey (2000), Spicer et al. (2009) maintain that,

. . . a potential consequence of holding strong to the credo of anti-performativity is that CMS withdraws from attempts to engage with practitioners and mainstream management theorists who are at least partially concerned with issues of performativity . . . an anti-performative CMS satisfies itself with attempts to shock the mainstream out of its ideological slumber through intellectually ‘pissing in the street’. (Spicer et al., 2009: 542)

Critical scholars should instead become actively involved with everyday practitioners and engage with the language they use in an attempt to construct new realities and opportunities.

Following Spicer et al. (2009), Wickert and Schaefer (2014: 20) also implore the CMS community to have ‘greater impact on what managers actually do’. They are concerned that critical scholars fail to provide ‘knowledge for dealing with those aspects of managerial life that have been identified as problematic . . . and overlooks potential points of engagement with managers’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 5). Middle-managers in particular ought to be enlisted by CMS researchers because they are likely to be less aligned with organizational elites and potentially more sympathetic with frustrated subordinates to trigger progressive social change. For this reason too, Hartmann (2014: 626) argues the CMS community could also engage with managerial texts that are often dismissed in favour of critical theory, Marxism and feminism, in an attempt to subvert mainstream approaches and shift the discourse towards more emancipatory objectives instead. At least managerial texts provide a non-alienating ‘vocabulary to think progressively about alternatives without setting itself against the goals of organizations (i.e. it is not directly opposed to performative ends)’.

Critical and progressive performativity

To rectify the pitfalls of non-performativity, Spicer et al. (2009) posit ‘critical performativity’ as a practical alternative for CMS scholars. This model of impact can be achieved through an affirmative stance (getting close to the object of critique to reveal points of revision), an ethic of care (providing space for management’s viewpoint and collaborating with them to achieve emancipatory ends), pragmatism (being realistic about what can be achieved given structural constraints), engaging potentialities (leveraging points of possibility for changing managerial practices in an incremental rather than radical ‘revolutionary’ manner) and asserting a normative orientation (ideals for ‘good’ organizational practice).

Three implications of this approach are noteworthy. First, Spicer et al. (2009) move beyond Fournier and Grey’s (2000) Lyotardian conceptualization of performativity (i.e. input/output maximization) by drawing on other philosophical traditions that highlight how language/speech might count as social action (see Gond and Cabantous [2015] for an extended overview of this literature in the social sciences and philosophy). Austin (1963) and Butler’s (1990, 1993) notion of performative utterances (i.e. words that are also deeds) is considered especially important in this regard. Rather than functioning only as a secondary descriptor, language can also perform reality, as when a judge utters ‘I sentence you to . . .’ CMS researchers might thus create equitable organizational practices by intervening in management discourse and experimenting ‘with metaphors that might be floating around in the organization’ (Spicer et al., 2009: 547). Second, an ethic of affirmation and care implies that CMS ought to listen to management’s side of the story and engage in a ‘loving struggle’ (p. 548) with their language rather than simply criticize: ‘CMS needs to appreciate the contexts and constraints of management . . . from this follows some degree of respect and care’ (Spicer et al., 2009: 545). Third, CMS must be less ‘utopian’ in its emancipatory ambitions. Incremental and piecemeal change is more doable given the economic pressures managers confront in their daily routines and practices.

A similar set of reforms are outlined by Wickert and Schaefer (2014) in their notion of ‘progressive performativity’. The weakness of CMS for them is that it ‘provides only limited guidance on how (counterbalancing) values could be embedded into organizational practices and procedures in collaboration with, rather than in opposition to, managers’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 7, emphasis in original). They too advance a broader understanding of performativity related to language: ‘The performative element, we suggest, requires researchers to “activate” the language that managers use . . . In that way, CMS scholars may support managers to “talk into existence” new (counterbalancing) behaviours and practices’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 3). Two elements of progressive performativity follow from this proposition. First, through micro-level engagement CMS researchers can actively ally themselves with selected managers (preferably middlemanagers) to raise awareness and identify alternative speech acts. Second, this may lead to reflexive conscientization, whereby scholars help create discursive spaces ‘in which managers are gently “nudged” to reflect on their actions and the organizational processes to which their actions relate . . . [it seeks to] raise the critical consciousness of managers’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 3).

This can only be credibly achieved, according to Wickert and Schaefer, if scholars put aside the classical emancipatory ideals of CMS since they discourage micro-collaborations with managers, introduce concepts that alienate practitioners and ultimately make progressive change seemingly impossible. Utopianism, in particular, according to Wickert and Schaefer, introduces ‘complex problems [that] fill people with anxiety and limit their capacity to think and act creatively’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 14). They recommend non-utopian and ‘small-win’ initiatives instead, ‘moving forward by actively working towards incremental, rather than radical transformation of unfavourable social conditions’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 9–10).

Limitations of the new performative turn in Critical Management Studies

Space does not permit a full elaboration of the critical and progressive models of performativity being recommended to CMS researchers. But it is no exaggeration to suggest that the argumentation involved presents a rather caricatured image of the CMS community when exhorted to ‘overcome its often hypocritical and unproductive claims that its output has no performative intent whatsoever’ (Spicer et al. 2009: 554). As Alvesson et al. (2009: 10, emphasis in original) argue, non-performativity ‘emphatically does not mean an antagonistic attitude to any type of performing’. CMS only refrains from instrumentally contributing to the mean-ends rationality of corporate managerialism. It is not against all impact, since that would render its criticism something of a self-serving exercise that rightly ought to be admonished. Having said that, advocates of a new performativity do have a good point when they highlight the vagueness and ambiguity around what mechanisms of impact CMS actually does favour. How can the community help make a practical difference to organizational life so that they are less exploitative and more equitable?

Critical and progressive performativity may hold promise in this regard. However, we feel these models of influence carry overtly optimistic assumptions about the power of language to change certain structural realities as well as the capabilities of CMS scholars to perform emancipatory change through discourse and micro-level engagement. There may certainly be some cases where getting close to managers, empathizing with their constraints and manipulating their language may indeed yield the (micro) fulfilment of aspects of the CMS mission. For example, scholars have engaged with managers in developing critical perspectives on leadership (Cunliffe, 2009; Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011) and promoting reflexivity in managerial practice (Barge, 2004). However, we are concerned that the conceptualizations of performativity proposed lack a realistic appreciation of the accumulated social forces guiding organizational behaviour in these institutionalized contexts, including the profit motive, shareholder value, cost externalization, means-ends efficiency and so forth. While these forces are no doubt social and linguistically constructed too (e.g. see Callon [2010] in relation to the economy), they have also been politically and institutionally embedded over time and cannot simply be talked away. It is these conditions, we argue, that need to be taken into consideration when assessing the impact of CMS scholarship. Without a wider political analysis of organizations, institutions and markets, the capacity to perform economic rationality differently will be limited, which in turn restricts the scope for politics, political subjectivity and dialogue (see Cochoy et al., 2010). Hence, we would expect the mechanisms recommended by critical and progressive performativities to frequently fail rather than succeed.

#### Policy entrepreneurs change structures with embedded agency –individual dissent outside or against structures can’t produce new ideas or ideological fissures – turns the alt and justifies our methodology

Stacie **Goddard 09**, Wellesley political science professor. 2009. “Brokering change: networks and entrepreneurs in international politics”, International Theory, 1.2.

Using network theory, scholars can identify the conditions for both emergence of entrepreneurs and their success. A third theoretical question concerns the mechanisms of political change: how is it that entrepreneurs affect significant structural change? In IR, most scholars look to the individual level of analysis to explain entrepreneurial change. Rational choice theorists and realists often assume that entrepreneurs succeed when they introduce ideas and information that help others pursue their interests. Many constructivists use cognitive mechanisms to explain how entrepreneurs transform political systems: entrepreneurs persuade other actors to accept new ideas; eventually, these norms are internalized, leading to structural change. In contrast to this emphasis on individual-level mechanisms, network theorists argue that entrepreneurs, by deploying inventive ideas, can produce autonomous and unanticipated structural effects in political networks. An entrepreneur's actions, in particular, can have switching effects: depending on how an entrepreneur's ideas resonate within a network of coalitions, they can make certain ties stronger by resonating with particular coalitions, and sever ties by appearing dissonant to others.38 Once this switching process occurs, it alters political networks, and entrepreneurs produce different set of ties, changing actors, strategies, and issues. In particular, network theorists have identified three switching mechanisms - mobilization, polarization, and yoking - that alter political networks, strengthening some ties, severing others, and even creating entirely new identities. First, under some conditions, a broker's ideas lead to mobilization. When a broker's ideas resonate within a network, they activate and strengthen ties between actors. For example, theorists such as Snow and McAdam show how mobilization facilitates social movements.39 Similarly, Bismarck's manipulation of the 'political equilibrium' idea mobilized unlikely alliances, persuading Britain and Russia that Prussian expansion was legitimate.40 Mobilization is likely under three conditions. First, a broker's idea must be culturally harmonious. As argued above, networks are not only material; they are imbued with different understandings, symbols, and collective memories, and ideas are far more likely to mobilize when they incorporate the cultural content shared within a political network.41 Second, mobilization depends on degree centrality: the more dense, or numerous and stronger, the broker's ties, the more likely ideas will activate ties.42 Increased density, as argued by network theorists, creates social capital, trust, and generally increases an actor's influence over her audience. Finally, a broker's between-ness centrality in the network affects mobilization.43 If an actor has exclusive ties with a network, it is more likely her ideas will transform the structure of the game; in contrast, if multiple brokers compete within a network, then countervailing appeals can undermine the ideas. In addition to mobilization, theorists such as Tilly, McAdam, and Sydney Tarrow argue that entrepreneurs can polarize networks as well. When a broker's ideas fail to resonate with a coalition, this destroys network ties, causing the 'gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors towards one, the other, or both extremes' (McAdam et al., 2001: 321). They use this approach to explain why some ethnic communities polarize and others do not. For example, rhetorical competition between communal identities in Switzerland so polarized ties that by 1845 conservative Catholics and liberals were facing a civil war (2001: 322). Similarly, after 1916, Sinn Fein's revolutionary rhetoric appeared illegitimate to several audiences, and thus severed the party's ties with British Liberals and moderate nationalists within Ireland (Goddard, 2006). Not surprisingly, the conditions that produce polarization are practically the opposite of those that cause mobilization. First, a broker's ideas will polarize networks if they are culturally dissonant. If a broker use unfamiliar or illegitimate cultural symbols the new norm will be unlikely to resonate and be accepted. Second, network sparity makes polarization more likely. When ties between a broker and other actors are few, sporadic, and informal, it is likely that dissonant ideas will undercut these ties. At first glance, these two switching mechanisms may sound similar to basic coalition theory. Yet there are fundamental differences (Abbot, 1996: 879, 880). Whereas conventional coalition theories emphasize interests as the motor of political outcomes, network theory provides a structural explanation of how ideas change political interactions. Moreover, network theorists emphasize the transformative capacity of entrepreneurs. A third switching mechanism is identity creation, known in the sociological literature as yoking (1996: 879, 880). With yoking, a broker's ideas do not simply resonate with existing actors. An entrepreneur's idea provides a focal point around which new identities can form and coalesce: actors themselves can be created and transformed during the course of strategic interaction. For example, Tilly argues that claims can reconfigure social ties, demarcating new fault lines of ethnic identity and collective violence. Similarly, Nexon and Jackson propose that rhetorical performances both reproduce and change the boundaries of modern states.44 Through yoking, entrepreneurs change political networks, creating new boundaries between self and other, and at the same time 'producing, reproducing, or destroying the representations that make groups visible for themselves and for others' (Bourdieu, 1994: 126). These identities are not produced by shifts in interests or beliefs (although certainly structural shifts affect cognitive processes); rather, yoking is possible under two structural conditions. First, the broker must be an identity bridge: the actor must have extremely strong ties to otherwise disparate elements, and thus be able to affect the identities of his audience. Without these strong ties, the broker will have little influence, and inventive ideas are likely to fall on deaf ears. But position is not enough: to achieve yoking, the content of the ideas must also be boundary-shifting, invoking a new basis of identity that destroys old boundaries and encapsulates multiple networks. It is this combination of ideas and their switching effects that explains why Bismarck succeeded and Napoleon III failed in introducing conservative nationalism to Europe. In the 1860s, Napoleon III abandoned his multivocal strategy, which combined dynastic and nationalist elements, for purely nationalist rhetoric. In a speech to the Corps Législatif in Paris, he famously proclaimed 'The Treaties of 1815 have ceased to exist'.45 Not surprisingly, this rhetoric proved culturally dissonant to the conservative powers, so much so that it dramatically polarized network ties. While Napoleon III had long been a central mediator in Europe, his ties, relations, the Great Powers, were now all but severed.46 In contrast, Prussian rhetoric - especially Bismarck's but also the language of other Prussian elites - mobilized multiple networks in their favor.47 Internationally, Bismarck's rhetoric mobilized actors who might otherwise have opposed territorial revision. Britain and Russia's failure to halt Prussia's expansion into Denmark in 1864, for example, has long been noted as a classic case of 'underbalancing': why did these two great powers fail to intervene on Denmark's side, and put a stop to the first stages of German Unification?48 Explanations that focus on power and interests are unconvincing. Not only did Britain and Russia believe containing Prussia was in their interest, they had overwhelming power over Prussia, so much so that a threat to intervene could have prevented Prussian action.49 What can explain these coalitions are the ideas used to justify Prussian expansion: Prussian rhetoric mobilized both Russia and Britain. Conservative Prussian rhetoric resonated with Russia, mobilizing that state. Indeed, it ensured Russia would not align with Denmark, even though they considered it in their strategic interest to do so.50 Likewise, despite public outcry against Prussian expansion, Britain aligned itself with Prussia. With Bismarck arguing it only hoped to uphold Concert principles, Palmerston concluded the Prussians were acting legitimately, and England would not intervene to balance their intervention.51 Perhaps most notably, Bismarck's rhetoric produced domestic switching effects, yoking together nationalist and conservative networks into a powerful new German identity. National-Liberals in Prussia and throughout the Confederation had long considered the conservative Junker aristocracy, their sworn enemy: no imaginable ties could exist between these networks. Bismarck's bridging position allowed him to strategically combine nationalist and conservative rhetoric that bridged the identities of these two groups. As Pflanze argues, 'Bismarck's synthesis became a revolutionary instrument'.52 The boundaries of German nationalist identity literally shifted: conservatives now embraced a concept they once abhorred, while nationalists all but abandoned their liberal ideology. And 'combined with the Prussian traditions of autocracy and militarism, German cultural and racial nationalism became the most potent threat to the stability of the European order which Western civilization had yet produced' (Pflanze, 1955: 565). In sum, network theory emphasizes structural mechanisms in its theory of social construction. Such causal processes cannot be fully reduced to the actions of the individual; indeed, switching effects are often unintentional and unpredictable. While Bismarck's brokerage position might have allowed him to introduce ideas of conservative nationalism, for example, the new identity this created would eventually turn against him. Indeed, it is by capturing these unintended consequences that network theory can capture how the micro-action of entrepreneurs translates into macro-outcomes. Construction is, in essence, a reconfiguration of social and cultural ties, which switches the rules, outcomes, and even the identities involved in the bargaining process. I have argued that network theory produces powerful insights into entrepreneurs and international change. But whenever a 'new approach' is proposed, it is worth questioning the real value added - what does network theory tell IR scholars that they could not already discern from existing theories? This conclusion considers the substantive, methodological, and ontological implications of a network approach to entrepreneurial politics. Substantive implications. An entrepreneur's power to produce change comes from her position as a broker, a bridge between structural holes in networks. This conception of entrepreneurial power is unique, and enables network theory to produce novel hypotheses about entrepreneurs and political change. Some of network theory's hypotheses compete with traditional accounts of entrepreneurs in international politics. As noted above, a network approach challenges those who reduce Bismarck's entrepreneurial success to material power and interests. While Prussia's accomplishments are considerable, this traditional account engages in retrospective history. By the 1870s, Prussia was a powerful actor and Bismarck an experienced diplomat. At the beginning of Prussia's adventures in the 1860s, however, it was materially weak, both internationally and domestically, and Bismarck's performance so abysmal it was assumed he would soon become a footnote to history.53 From a network perspective, Prussia's source of power was its position. Bismarck's brokerage position gave the state access to multiple networks, which in turn allowed for strategic flexibility, the ability to invent new ideas, and the capacity to diffuse the ideas throughout political networks and induce political change (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Not all of network theory's hypotheses about entrepreneurs compete with traditional accounts, however. Some complement existing explanations of entrepreneurs and international change. For example, as noted above, Moravscik argues that in most cases of international bargaining, actors have enough information to create effective institutions, and do not need an entrepreneur's assistance. Successful policy entrepreneurship is likely only when actors face severe information asymmetries, and thus entrepreneurs must 'intervene to overcome bias or inefficiency in the domestic and transnational coordination of information and ideas' (Moravcsik, 1999: 283). Network theory would further specify Moravscik's account, positing that brokers are better positioned to exploit these information asymmetries: brokers' ties to several networks give these actors more information than other actors in the network, and thus more capacity to act as successful entrepreneurs. Likewise, network theory augments constructivist theories of entrepreneurship. Theorists such as Sikkink and Keck have proposed that an entrepreneur's success depends on the content of the norm introduced.54 Using network theory, constructivists could better specify the conditions under which the content of a norm matters. As argued here, while content is critical - an actor's ideas must resonate if they are to be accepted throughout the network - whether or not a norm is salient depends as much on who is promoting it as the content of the norm itself. Applications of network theory, thus, cross traditional theoretical boundaries. Indeed, network theory might be useful precisely because it is agnostic about several divisive issues in IR. The theory here does not mandate that action be strategic or norm-driven: a broker may act strategically, or her actions may follow a 'logic of appropriateness'. It may be the case that IR theorists will find certain strands of network theory more appealing than others. While rationalists and realists might prefer approaches that emphasize the material ties among actors, constructivists will identify with 'structural constructionist' variations of network theory, which detail how discourse and ideas remake existing network structures (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994). In any case, network theory can produce novel explanations of entrepreneurial behavior and international politics. Methodology and methods. Because the goal of this paper is theory development, the evidence used here is only illustrative. While this limitation is necessary, given the essay's scope, it also raises some serious methodological questions regarding network theory. For instance, can network theory truly identify potential entrepreneurs ex ante? Would network theory identify Bismarck or Napoleon as entrepreneurs if they had not engaged in entrepreneurial behavior? Likewise, is the 'fragmentation' discussed in this paper really a network measure, or does it simply reflect the fact that entrepreneurs were active during the late nineteenth century? More generally, is network theory too complex to be tested empirically? There is much at stake in these critiques. If entrepreneurs cannot be identified apart from entrepreneurial behavior, then it falls victim to the same tautology that plagues other theories of entrepreneurs. If network theory is too complex, then researchers risk a 'kitchen sink' approach to history, and the theory itself will prove unfalsifiable. There is no doubt that the methodological challenges confronting network theory are daunting - but no more so than those that confront traditional theories. IR scholars have long attempted to measure 'intentions' without much certainty about what is really in people's heads, and have proposed concepts of 'structure' and 'culture' that fall prey to the same criticisms above. In other words, the obstacles network theorists face are not unfamiliar; they are endemic in social science. And like other approaches, network theorists must carefully develop stringent data collection and testing in order to avoid tautological and unfalsifiable theories. In particular, identifying brokers will require moving away from conventional measures and data collection in international politics. Network theory relies not on traditional measures of material power, actor's interests, or norms, but instead seeks to map network positions and structural holes. There are studies in IR that have already done this, and thus provide a template for developing rigorous research designs. Some scholars proceed qualitatively, using documentary evidence to map networks in precise detail. Nexon uses an extensive secondary literature to model European dynastic networks, and in his study of imperial rule, Paul MacDonald (2007) draws on primary documents - in particular colonial correspondence - to map concrete relations between core and periphery. Some quantitative studies use proxies to indicate relations. For example, Emilie Hafner-Burton and Alexander Montgomery (2006) use intergovernmental organization membership as a proxy for relations among actors, using this membership data to map structural equivalence and prestige effects in the international system. In sum, while the challenges confronting a network approach might be daunting, the payoffs are new measures of power and influence, and new hypotheses about how position affects action in international politics. Ontological: the agent-structure problem revisited (again). Finally, network theory has implications for how IR theorists address the agent-structure problem in IR. At the heart of entrepreneurial action is a paradox: if structures influence actors' interests, even their identities, how then do actors introduce new ideas, and get others to adopt them (Garud et al., 2007: 961)? As argued above, the answer network theory offers to this paradox is one of 'embedded agency': it sees agency as 'not opposed to, but constituent, of structure'.55 The possibility of agency inheres within structures: network structures provide actors with the resources to transform their own environment. Certainly network theory is not the only way in which to conceptualize embedded agency. Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, which Wendt invokes in his influential 1987 article, argues that structures 'are both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute social systems' - agency is conditioned by structure, even as agents reproduce and transform their environment.56 Likewise, some IR theorists use Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus to conceptualize embedded agency - actors may improvise, even act strategically, but they are constrained by structures instantiated in mental schema.57 Network theory embraces this same 'non-reductionist' approach to agent-structure issues. Yet, unlike Giddens, network theorists suggest mapping out abstract structures as the concrete relations among actors. Likewise, unlike Bourdieu, network theorists propose that actors in particular positions can, if not escape 'habitus', at least take advantage of the friction inherent in contradictory networks. While embedded agency might sound agreeable, there are costs to adopting this approach. Because it takes into account agency and structure, a network approach is less parsimonious than other theories of international politics. Because of this, some network theorists have returned to reductionism (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994). For example, some theorists do abandon agency, treating their actors as automatons responding to structural constraints. Similarly, there are theorists who examine only material attributes of networks, while others analyze cultural relations (1994). But while parsimony is tempting, reductionism would inhibit an analysis of entrepreneurs.58 It is not just that structure and agency are both important; they are absolutely necessary to explain how entrepreneurs operate. Without an account of structure, there can be no understanding of how entrepreneurs emerge, and why some actors are better entrepreneurs than others. Without agency, the entire meaning of 'entrepreneur' disappears, and entrepreneurs become mere echoes of structural constraints.

### i <3 u nikki

#### Globalization is immensely beneficial for improving quality of life in the Global South---it’s also widely supported which proves their epistemic skepticism is from an ivory tower.

Horner et al. 18 (Rory, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK, “Globalisation, uneven development and the North–South ‘big switch’,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2018, 11, 17–33 doi:10.1093/cjres/rsx026)

Citizen surveys further reveal dramatic changes in attitudes to globalisation across and within the global North and South. While such surveys have methodological limitations,1 the results indicate distinctive trends that support the thesis of the ‘big switch’. Among people in the global South, polls have consistently found quite positive attitudes towards globalisation. In 2007, the Times of India claimed that ‘Indians believe globalisation benefits their country’, citing a poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Public Opinion that 54% of Indians answered ‘good’ compared to 30% ‘bad’ to the question of whether increasing economic connections ‘with others around the world is mostly good or bad’. More recently, Stokes (2016) reported on Pew Research Surveys from 2016 which found that 60% of Chinese think their country’s involvement in the global economy is good (compared to 23% who think it is bad), while 52% of Indians surveyed thought it was good compared to 25% who said it was a problem. A recent YouGov survey of 20,000 people across 19 countries found a majority believed that globalisation has been a force for good. That survey found the most enthusiasm for globalisation in East and South-East Asia, where over 70% in all countries believed it has been a force for good. The highest approval, 91%, was in Vietnam, a relative latecomer to globalisation (Smith, 2017).

By contrast, public support for globalisation in the global North has plummeted. Bhagwati (2004) cited an Environics International Survey presented at the 2002 World Economic Forum Meetings to argue that disillusionment with globalisation was not universal; ‘anti-globalisation sentiments are more prevalent in the rich countries of the North, while pluralities of policy makers and the public in the poor countries of the South see globalisation instead as a positive force’ (2004, 8). Although Bhagwati suggested this was an ‘ironic reversal’, it proved to be in line with a 2007 BBC World Service poll that found 57% of people in G7 countries thought the pace of globalisation was too rapid, whereas the majority of those in ~~developing~~ countries surveyed thought it was just right or too slow (e.g. IMF, 2008; Pieterse, 2012). A 2007 Pew Global Poll similarly found a decline in the percentage of people in many Northern countries who believed trade had a positive impact. In its analysis of the survey results, Kohut and Wilke (2008, 6–7) commented that ‘it is in economically stagnant Western countries that we see the most trepidation about globalisation’. Almost 10 years later, The Economist (2016) reported on a YouGov survey of 19 countries, which found that fewer than half of people in the USA, UK and France believed that globalisation is a ‘force for good’ in the world. This broad change in attitude toward globalisation is playing out in national electoral politics as well as gatherings such as the World Economic Forum and the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The ‘big switch’ and the geography of uneven development

The ‘big switch’ seemingly confounds the predictions of the most vocal proponents and critics of globalisation alike. Uneven development is dynamic and relates to differences both within and among countries (Sheppard, 2016). Naïve claims that the world is flat or that economic globalisation is ‘win-win’ have rightly been dismissed (Baldwin, 2016; Christopherson et al., 2008; Turok et al., 2017), yet it is also insufficient to suggest that globalisation simply leads to a reproduction of existing inequalities, overlooking how that unevenness may be changing as a result of new macroeconomic geographies (Peck, 2016). While trade theory could predict that there would be ‘losers’ in the global North from international economic integration, proponents of economic globalisation have asserted that they would be few in number and could be compensated. More recently, it appears that a large group of people feel more forsaken than compensated. Similarly, for those who embraced Marxian political economy, and warned of its negative consequences in the South, the apparent optimism and support for globalisation in the South may have been unexpected. The sceptical internationalists (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006) should be acknowledged, however, for forecasting downsides in the global North. As we outline below, many people in the global North have experienced relative stagnation, whereas, albeit from a very low starting point and amidst considerable inequality, many people (but not all) have experienced improved development outcomes in the global South. We then explore what this apparent ‘big switch’ may tell us about contemporary economic globalisation.

The new geography of global uneven development

Significant portions of the population in the USA and other countries in the global North have experienced limited, if any, income gains in an era of globalisation. Milanovic’s (2016) ‘elephant graph’ (Figure 1) has quickly become a popular way to demonstrate the relative stagnation experienced in North America and Europe in recent decades. Exploring changes in real incomes between 1988 and 2008, he showed that those who particularly lost out on any relative gain in income were the global upper middle class (those between the 75th and 90th percentiles on the global income distribution) and the poorest 5% of the world population. Of these least successful percentiles, 86% of the population were from mature economies in the global North (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 23). Considering these contrasts more widely, a growing body of evidence shows that the global North’s dominance in the global economy is receding, with the share of high-income countries in global GDP having fallen from 76.8% in 2000 to 65.2% in 2015 (see Figure 1).

A different picture emerges in the global South. In Figure 1, it was Asians who comprised 90% of the population in the percentiles which did best in terms of relative income gains from 1988 to 2008 (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 223). The UNDP has remarked that

A striking feature of the world scene in recent years is the transformation of many ~~developing~~ countries into dynamic economies…doing well in economic growth and trade … they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other ~~developing~~ economies, reducing poverty and increasing wealth on a grand scale. (UNDP, 2013, 43)

The share of global GDP of low and middle income countries increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 34.1% in 2015 (Figure 2). Much of this increase is accounted for by China, as well as India and Brazil. Their share of global GDP, only 4.6% in 1960, 6.6% in 1990 and 9.3% in 2000, had almost doubled in the 21st century to 18% by 2015.

The development context of the global South has changed significantly since the turn of the Millennium, across a variety of important indicators. The total number of people in the world living on less than $1.90 per day (i.e. extreme poverty) has more than halved from 1.69 billion in 1999 to 766 million in 2013. At least by official estimates, the share of the population in the global South who are living in extreme poverty has fallen considerably this century. Whereas the percentage of the population in the global South with a daily consumption level of less than $1.90 was 33.4% in 1999, it was just 13.4% in 2013.2 The percentage of the world’s countries classified by the World Bank as low-income, albeit a very low threshold, more than halved within the first 15 years of the 21st century. Moreover, the total number of countries which are highly dependent on aid (having a net ODA > 9% of GNI) has fallen considerably, from 42 in 2000 to 29 in 2015, or from 34.1% to 23.2% of all low and middle-income countries with data available over that period.3

Considered overall, in comparison with the 1990s, the global South, in aggregate, now earns a much larger share of world GDP, has more middle-income countries, more middleclass people, less aid dependency, considerably greater life expectancy and lower child and maternal mortality. Table 1 provides some summary indicators for high-income countries (HICs) and low and middle-income countries (L&MICs), as somewhat imperfect approximations for global North and South.

After two hundred years of a ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett, 1997) between developed and ~~developing~~ countries following the Industrial Revolution, recent measurements suggest a change in the pattern of global inequality across a number of indicators (Horner and Hulme, 2017). The Global GINI of income distribution across all individuals in the world has fallen from 69.7 in 1988 to 66.8 in 2008 and 62.5 in 2013 (World Bank, 2016, 81). Analysis presented in the World Bank’s Taking on Inequality (2016) suggests that, in 1998, 26% of global income inequality was related to differences within countries, with the remaining 74% relating to differences among countries. By 2013, these shares were 35 and 65%. Two hundred years of a great divergence between global North and South now seems to have had some reversal, although more than half of an individual’s income can be accounted for by the country where he/she lives or was born (Milanovic, 2013). Inter-country inequality, rather than intra-country inequality, is still dominant, but it accounts for a diminished share of income-based and other inequalities (World Bank, 2016).

#### Capitalism is economically decolonizing now.

Smith 21, \*Noah Smith, Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He was an assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University, and he blogs at Noahpinion; (April 2nd, 2021, “Against Hickelism”, https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/against-hickelism)

What Hickel gets wrong is his idea that Western powers, libertarian ideology, and international institutions have conspired to keep poor countries from adopting mixed approaches to their economies. In fact, activist state policies are quite common, and have contributed substantially to the poverty reduction documented above.

For example, take India. Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, in [a 2004 paper about India’s growth surge](https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2004/00-00/rodrik.pdf), write the following:

Most conventional accounts of India’s recent economic performance associate the pick-up in economic growth with the liberalization of 1991. This paper demonstrates that the transition to high growth occurred around 1980, a full decade before economic liberalization. We investigate a number of hypotheses about the causes of this growth—favorable external environment, fiscal stimulus, trade liberalization, internal liberalization, the green revolution, public investment—and find them wanting. We argue that growth was triggered by an attitudinal shift on the part of the national government towards a pro-business (as opposed to pro-liberalization) approach. We provide some evidence that is consistent with this argument. We also find that registered manufacturing built up in previous decades played an important role in influencing the pattern of growth across the Indian states.

In other words, India didn’t just liberalize things; it implemented its own version of a development state, and prospered as a result. The same is true of Southeast Asia, where Malaysia, Thailand, and to a lesser degree Indonesia have emerged as success stories and [have relied thoroughly](https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/303071859.pdf) on development states and industrial policy. See Vietnam’s recent growth for another example.

In Latin America, it’s true that the Washington Consensus [slowed down structural change and productivity growth](https://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2010/06/the-most-telling-chart-i-have-seen-in-a-long-time.html). But that doesn’t mean Latin American governments had no role in reducing poverty. Bad advice may have held back the development state in Latin America, but governments there have engaged in extensive redistribution and better education.

A [series](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304715) of [papers](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226538) by Nora Lustig, Luis F. Lopez-Calva, and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez documents these policies. Inequality in Latin American countries fell substantially during the 2000s:

Lustig et al. find that roughly half of this was due to government transfers and pension policies, while the other half was due to increasing incomes for workers at the bottom of the distribution — which in turn was due to better education. So Latin American governments, though they didn’t pursue the kind of manufacturing-intensive, export-led development policy used by many Asian countries, did manage to cut poverty with government action.

## T -- FW

### FW -- Epistemic Accountability

#### Epistemic commitments should be tested – beliefs should be responsive to a wide range of argumentative perspectives that their interpretation precludes

Festenstein ’21 -- (Matthew Festenstein, 10-29-2021, "Spotlight: Pragmatism in contemporary political theory," University Of York, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14748851211050618, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

The political lesson they draw is that ‘the requirements of genuine belief show that we must, broadly speaking, be democratic inquirers’ (Misak, 2000: 106). A true belief is one that is responsive to, and best fits with, all reasons, arguments and experience. If we want true beliefs, we should test epistemic claims against as wide a range of different experiences as possible, rendering beliefs responsive to reasons and evidence, and anyone genuinely committed to having true beliefs is committed to exercising the epistemic virtues this requires. Since we need access to evidence, arguments, other forms of information, and processes of reason-exchange, it follows that we need to live in a social and political order that protects and promotes this openness for all: just ‘as the physicist who refuses to take seriously the results from, say, Finnish labs is betraying that his beliefs are not aimed at truth, the citizen who refuses to take seriously the experience of a minority is betraying that his beliefs are not aimed at truth’ (Misak, 2019: 1066). In this way, the commitment to arriving at and sustaining true beliefs entails that we should support a democratic ethos and institutions and is meant to have a critical force: in Talisse's words, ‘each person has compelling epistemological reasons – simply in virtue of the fact that [they hold] beliefs – to embrace social and political norms best secured within a democratic order’ (Talisse, 2009: 37). The alternative is to admit that we are only specious believers.

### FW -- Fiat Good

#### Fiat is militant utopianism – enables the radical imagination of alternative decolonial futures and draws on the productive tension between the problems of the status quo and the possibility of a liberated future to generate revolutionary tactical energy.

Bell et al ’19 -- (Deanne Bell, Hugo Canham, Urmitapa Dutta, Jesica Siham Fernández, Nottingham Trent University, University Of The Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, University Of Massachusetts Lowell, Santa Clara University, CA, Corresponding Author, 6-28-2019, "Retrospective Autoethnographies: A Call for Decolonial Imaginings for the New University," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077800419857743, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

Privacy “Why am I compelled to write? Because the world I create in the writing compensates for what the real world does not give me. By writing I put order in the world, give it a handle so I can grasp it. I write because life does not appease my appetites and anger. To become more intimate with myself and you. To discover myself, to preserve myself, to make myself, to achieve self-autonomy. To dispel the myths that I am a mad prophet or a poor suffering soul. To convince myself that I am worthy, and that what I have to say is not a pile of shit. Finally, I write because I’m scared of writing, but I’m more scared of not writing.” – Gloria E. Anzaldúa (2015, p. 169) We begin by locating our work within the autoethnographic tradition. We are four black, Indian, Chicanx scholar activists with transnational histories that span India, Jamaica, México, South Africa, North America. and the United Kingdom. We write from these identities. Ellis and Bochner (2000, p. 733) defined the term auto- ethnography as “an autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural.” Among the multiple ways of understanding autoethnography then, we align ourselves with Stacy Holman Jones (2005, p. 765) who defines the concept thus: Autoethnography is a blurred genre . . . a response to the call . . . it is setting a scene, telling a story, weaving intricate connections between life and art . . . making a text present . . . refusing categorization . . . believing that words matter and writing toward the moment when the point of creating autoethnographic texts is to change the world. (emphasis added) Our utopian desires demand a break from the imprisonment of categorization, the centering of the personal in relation to the social, and the desire to change the world. As minoritized and marginalized beings in the world, we find little resonance with ameliorative change and methodological approaches that valorize the old. Brutalized in the past and present, our hope can only be in a radically altered future where our full humanity can find expression and affirmation. Autoethnography therefore suits our purpose for radical dreaming in the traditions of Sylvia Wynter and Audre Lorde. It allows us to center ourselves, not as marginal and fractured but as whole and important. As a methodological approach for telling stories, refusal, and creative expression, autoethnography is a viable time machine that we can fashion for our needs for a different future. In this paper, we propose retrospective autoethnography as a methodology for decolonial moves, in critical solidarity with student movements around the globe pushing for decolonizing the university. While we are inspired by autoethnography, our proposed methodology is distinct. Instead of situating the autobiographical past into the present, we insert ourselves into a utopian future to create the conditions for rewriting and hence re-experiencing the present. We do not ask whether there is a place for us in the neoliberal academy where knowledge is instrumentalized in the pursuit of capital accumulation. Instead, we engage in a mindful and intentional exercise of militant utopianism (Denzin, 2009) – struggling to visualize ourselves in the New University, and writing from a place of emotional and intellectual emancipation. We engage in a politics of militant utopianism through the daring, defiant act of not only writing our lived experience into ongoing conversations about the academy, but also decolonially dreaming and reimagining the university-as-public-good (Santos, 2010). We ask, what will it mean to be part of an academy that does not demand unwavering institutional and disciplinary allegiance, that does not invisibilize at the same time as it surveils, audits, and disciplines us? Together, as people raised in the post-colony and within coloniality (the neoliberal university as an iteration of colonialism), our decolonial intervention begins at this negative affect but then strives to imagine a New University characterized by radical hope. We recognize that the desire to heal from the wounds of the neoliberal university via radical imaginings is a collective project. Therefore, rather than enumerating guidelines or prescribing solutions, we exhort readers to join us in our aspiration to dream a New University into place. Together, we hope to build our capacities to listen and to think with our stories, to envision, imagine, and enact alternatives to oppressive paradigms that reduce human life and meaning to economic transactions. We endeavor to step outside the parameters of what and who is valued and counted. We refuse to be restrained by colonial anchors of what is “practical” (for whom?) and to be assuaged by the ameliorative politics of incremental progress. Even as we allow ourselves to imagine the New University, radical hope and decolonial dreamings are difficult in the face of our fraught everyday lives and liminal existence in neoliberal institutions and disciplines. We ask, is it possible to reclaim what the neoliberal university has wrenched away from us? What would it mean to rewrite ourselves and the academic spaces we inhabit, however precariously? The productive tension between experiential “problems” and the imagined utopian university, mirrored in the ebb and flow of this paper, is integral to radical imagination. In the section that follows, we journey back to autoethnography, to further detail its implications for the radical dreaming that defines our proposed methodology – retrospective autoethnography. We then share our stories: fleeting images of the New University and the desire it sparks; the pain of being “the other” even as we resist and leverage our liminality; naming “private” pain in a deliberate move towards healing and imagining a decolonial reality. Finally, we share some fledgling ideas on how to invent the New University. We honor our stories and struggles and recognize the time and labor this project entails. Therefore, we envision this article as part one – an invitation to come together in critical solidarity, armed with compassion, care, love, and the desire to heal from the wounds of the neoliberal academy. Our hope is that we will return with part two – where we would not only share our utopian imaginations of the new university but also elaborate, illustrate, and simultaneously trouble retrospective autoethnographies as a method of utopian imagining and decolonial action.

### FW -- Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning is good – a model of dialectical negation enables the transcendence of entrenched political ideologies and trains debaters to imagine radical alternative worlds guided by pragmatic strategy – their author concedes we’re right.

Ossewaarde ’17 -- Associate professor in governance, society and technology, University of Twente (Marinus Ossewaarde, 7-21-2017, “Unmasking scenario planning: The colonization of the future in the ‘Local Governments of the Future’ program”, Futures, Volume 93, pg. 80-88, <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.futures.2017.07.003>, accessed 7-4-2022) -- nikki

Scenario planning can be understood as a dialogical enterprise or ‘dialectical negotiation’ (Bowman 2016: 90). It therefore involves the ‘art of friendly dispute’ or ‘clash of minds’, which in turn enables the critique, negation, and transcendence of established ideologies, imaginaries and frames that determine the present and future. Scenario planning is a quest for alternative, still to be decided, open futures, in which different understandings of the world are reconciled through compromises. Chosen courses of actions informed by various (conflicting) possible scenarios reflect such compromises. As Habegger (2010: 51) emphasizes, in scenario planning ‘there is no such thing as “the future”.’ Clashes between ideologies, imaginaries and frames, accordingly, are not problems a scenario planning must get rid of; instead, they must be embraced as a sine qua non for advancing the knowledge of futures, if only because such contradictions or different intellectual orientations increase the awareness of possible future worlds (cf. Mannheim 1954: 241). There is no one necessary or inevitable path to one future. A scenario planning is a dialectical process involving the creative quest for futures (Barber 1998). Contemporary scholars therefore draw a parallel between scenario planning and the writing of futuristic stories (Korte and Chermack 2007). Science fiction, for instance, is widely recognized as a valuable asset for envisioning undetermined or undecided futures and stimulating utopian (or, dystopian) enquiries (Birtchnell and Urry 2013). Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984 are examples of literary works that provide the imaginative component of scenario planning (cf. Schulz, 2015: 133). The purpose of scenario planning is, of course, not to produce science fiction-like stories as such; ‘scenarios are far more than stories’ (Chermack and Coons 2015: 189). Instead, scenario planning generates scenarios that are not simply linear extrapolations of the present. It involves reckoning with – imagining – unpredictable or possible events. The resulting scenarios, in turn, entail and demand a wide range of policies hitherto unheard of (Volkery and Ribeiro 2009; Habegger 2010). The imaginative part of scenario planning is therefore intimately connected to world-making, to decisions and strategic actions, which are directed to changing the course of history (Korte and Chermack 2007; MacKay and McKiernan 2010; Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Along this line, scenario planning always involves and requires (1) new imagination of future worlds, (2) debate about alternative futures, and (3) the creation of manoeuvring room for strategic actions that correspond to different scenarios (Chermack 2004; Korte and Chermack 2007; Volkery and Ribeiro 2009). The imagination of future worlds is enabled by literary methods that evoke distrust of fixed images and iconic representations (Shapiro 2016). Hence, parables, the articulation of paradoxes, allegories, symbolisms, and metaphors make it possible to understand and reckon with ambiguous, elusive, or latent (not yet fully manifest) phenomena in scenario planning (Levine 1985: 29; 218). Literary methods, and writers (poets in particular) can inspire truly new insights and strengthen the belief in different possible worlds, past, present and future. In other words, in these works, the reader comes to the realization that what is, or what has passed, could have been different; or what possibilities have been missed (MacKay and McKiernan 2010; Dufva and Ahlqvist 2015; Shapiro 2016). From such literary angle, futures unfold when events – which may be the results of strategic decisions – rupture ongoing trends and disrupt established patterns. In contrast with trends, events happen suddenly and can evoke shocks (MacKay and McKiernan 2010; Schulz 2015). A scenario planning has to include the possibility of such surprising historical moments through organizing so-called ‘what if’ scenarios, and must, accordingly, be organized in ‘an atmosphere detached from daily routines’ (Dufva and Ahlqvist 2015: 265). In this way, the enthusiasm for and openness to unexpected events, for ungrounding the present and the emergence of newness and radical transformations, is not stifled. The imagination of futures beyond current trends require a particular kind of radicalism from participants in the scenario planning process, namely, the transcendence of their current assumptions regarding the world. In other words, their capacity to invent new futures depends on their willingness and capacity to critically re-examine what they conceptualized as trends that would continue into the future (Chermack 2004; Korte and Chermack 2007; Van Wijck and Niemeijer 2016; Bowman 2016). They must, accordingly, abandon any pretence of knowing the ’laws’ of the world, thereby leaving open the possibility that the world might have been very different if other power constellations had been in place. Concretely, such attitude requires giving up biases, dogmas, ideological distortions, and compulsive identifications with a particular (well-known) order, stereotypes, and clichés. Indeed, it is only through the critique, negation and transcendence of established conceptual frameworks, practices and current policies that it is possible to generate new ways of seeing the world, and hence to envision alternative worlds (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Ideological discourses freeze (reify) established patterns (typically described as ‘progress,’ ‘development,’ or ‘transformation’) and obscure ambiguities. Scenario planning results in increased scope for strategic action to realize undetermined possible futures. Though it tends to limit itself to descriptions of alternative futures (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013; Van Wijck and Niemeijer 2016; O’Brien 2016), without prescriptive claims, it is a powerful instrument that can serve or undermine democracy and its future (Barber 1998). Its liberating potential depends on the range of different accounts of the world and of possible future worlds that is taken into account during the process. The exclusion of alternative images of the future on the basis of current assumptions and beliefs – for instance, the salvation of the world lies in technology – from scenario planning makes the latter a sham. Since the inclusion of conflicting worldviews is the hallmark of democracy, a pseudo-scenario planning that presumes and legitimizes one desirable future clearly undermines the democratic ideal of debate or of the publics (cf. Ravetz, 2011).

### FW -- IR Scenario Planning Good

#### IR scenario planning and probabilistic forecasting is pedagogically valuable — it’s accurate, breaks down biases and solves any Ks of non-rigorous approaches.

Scoblic & Tetlock ’20 — Peter J. Scoblic; Co-Founder of Event Horizon Strategies, a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at New America, and a Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School. Philip E. Tetlock; Leonore Annenberg University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. October 13, 2020; "A Better Crystal Ball: The Right Way to Think About the Future"; *Foreign Affairs*; [edited for gendered and ableist language] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/better-crystal-ball; //CYang

Every policy is a prediction. Tax cuts will boost the economy. Sanctions will slow Iran’s nuclear program. Travel bans will limit the spread of COVID-19. These claims all posit a causal relationship between means and ends. Regardless of party, ideology, or motive, no policymaker wants ~~his or her~~ [their] recommended course of action to produce unanticipated consequences. This makes every policymaker a forecaster. But forecasting is difficult, particularly when it comes to geopolitics — a domain in which the rules of the game are poorly understood, information is invariably incomplete, and expertise often confers surprisingly little advantage in predicting future events.

These challenges present practical problems for decision-makers in the U.S. government. On the one hand, the limits of imagination create blind spots that policymakers tend to fill in with past experience. They often assume that tomorrow’s dangers will look like yesterday’s, retaining the same mental map even as the territory around them changes dramatically. On the other hand, if policymakers addressed all imaginable threats, the United States would need so large and expensive a national security establishment that the country could do little else. By many measures, it is nearing this point already. The United States has military bases in more than 70 countries and territories, boasts more than four million federal employees with security clearances, and fields 1.3 million active-duty troops, with another million in reserve. According to one estimate, the United States spends $1.25 trillion annually on national security. When it comes to anticipating the future, then, the United States is getting the worst of both worlds. It spends untold sums of money preparing yet still finds itself the victim of surprise — fundamentally ill equipped for defining events, such as the emergence of COVID-19.

There is a better way, one that would allow the United States to make decisions based not on simplistic extrapolations of the past but on smart estimates of the future. It involves reconciling two approaches often seen to be at philosophical loggerheads: scenario planning and probabilistic forecasting. Each approach has a fundamentally different assumption about the future. Scenario planners maintain that there are so many possible futures that one can imagine them only in terms of plausibility, not probability. By contrast, forecasters believe it is possible to calculate the odds of possible outcomes, thereby transforming amorphous uncertainty into quantifiable risk. Because each method has its strengths, the optimal approach is to combine them. This holistic method would provide policymakers with both a range of conceivable futures and regular updates as to which one is likely to emerge. For once, they could make shrewd bets about tomorrow, today.

PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY

Although widely used in business today, the first element of this duo — scenario planning — grew out of post–World War II national security concerns, specifically the overwhelming uncertainty of the nuclear revolution. Previously, martial experience was thought to offer some guidance through the fog of war. Nuclear weapons, however, presented a novel problem. With the newfound ability to destroy each other as functioning societies in a matter of minutes or hours, the United States and the Soviet Union faced an unprecedented situation. And unprecedented situations are, by definition, uncertain. They lack any analogy to the past that would allow decision-makers to calculate the odds of possible outcomes.

Still, early U.S. efforts at nuclear-war planning sought to turn that problem into a calculable one. During World War II, the Allies had great success with the new field of operations research, the application of statistical methods to improve the outcome of tactical engagements. After the war, the RAND Corporation — a “think factory” that the U.S. Air Force established as a repository for leading researchers — hoped to parlay this success into a new, more rational approach to war, based less on the intuition of generals and more on the quantification afforded by models and data.

Unfortunately, methods that worked at the tactical level proved nearly farcical at the strategic level. As the historian David Jardini has chronicled, RAND’s first attempt to model a nuclear strategy ignored so many key variables that it nonsensically called for deploying a fleet of aging turboprop bombers that carried no bombs because the United States did not have enough fissile material to arm them; the goal was simply to overwhelm Soviet air defenses, with no regard for the lives of the pilots. In the wake of such failures, it became clear that analysts could not entirely banish uncertainty. In 1960, even Charles Hitch, a man predisposed to calculation by dint of being RAND’s top economist and president of what was then the Operations Research Society of America, cautioned, “No other characteristic of decision-making is as pervasive as uncertainty.”

That, of course, raised the question of how to formulate sensible strategy. Unexpectedly, it was a RAND mathematician and physicist, Herman Kahn, who offered an answer. If the lived past could not shape strategy, perhaps the imagined future could. Frustrated with RAND’s attempts to scientize war, Kahn devoted himself to crafting scenarios in the pursuit of “ersatz experience” that would prepare the United States for the future through what were essentially thought experiments. Policymakers could use these scenarios as “artificial ‘case histories’ and ‘historical anecdotes,’” Kahn wrote, thus making up for a lack of actual examples or meaningful data. They would provide analogies where there were none.

Early methods of generating scenarios were often freewheeling and discursive. But after scenario planning migrated to the business world, it took on more structured forms. The most recognizable is a two-by-two matrix in which planners identify two critical uncertainties and, taking the extreme values of each, construct four possible future worlds. Regardless of the specific shape they take, rigorous scenario-planning exercises all involve identifying key uncertainties and then imagining how different combinations could yield situations that are vastly different from what mere extrapolation of the present would suggest. By then “backcasting” — taking one of these imagined futures as a given and asking what conditions produced it — scenario planners derive both a story and a system. They come up with a plausible narrative of how a future happened and an internal logic that describes how it operates. Scenarios are not supposed to be predictive. They are meant to be provocative, challenging planners’ assumptions, shaking up their mental models of how the world works, and giving them the cognitive flexibility to better sense, shape, and adapt to the emerging future.

The pandemic has occasioned a renaissance in the use of scenarios, as organizations from think tanks to technology companies grapple with the question of what a “new normal” might look like and how soon it might arrive. But the national security community has long used scenarios to address some of its most wicked problems — particularly high-stakes issues that are in flux, such as the U.S.-Chinese relationship. This past summer, RAND released a report on Chinese grand strategy. It concluded with four scenarios that offered brief vignettes of China’s possible place in the world 30 years from now. “Triumphant China” dominates the world stage in most domains, with a modern military and an innovative economy. “Ascendant China” is the preeminent power not only in Asia but in other regions, as well. “Stagnant China” has suffered from low growth and faces social unrest. And “Imploding China” experiences a crisis of existential proportions, in which domestic instability undercuts the country’s international influence.

Although comprehensive, the wide range of these scenarios highlights the chief challenge of the method: If China’s potential futures encompass rise, fall, and everything in between, how can they aid in the formulation of strategy and policy? Although this cornucopia of scenarios could lead policymakers to develop strategies that would improve the United States’ position no matter which future comes to pass, in practice, having too many different versions of the future can make it nearly impossible to act. Good scenario planning puts boundaries on the future, but those limits are often not enough for decision-makers to work with. They need to know which future is most likely.

TURNING UNCERTAINTY INTO RISK

Probabilistic forecasting — the second element of the duo — tries to address that shortcoming. Forecasters see scenario planning as maddeningly vague or, worse, dangerously misleading. They not only point to the lack of consistent evidence to support the alleged benefits of scenario planning; they also argue that the compelling nature of a good story can trigger a host of biases. Such biases fuel irrationality, in part by tricking decision-makers into making basic statistical errors. For example, even though a detailed narrative may seem more plausible than a sparse one, every contingent event decreases the likelihood that a given scenario will actually transpire. Nevertheless, people frequently confuse plausibility for probability, assigning greater likelihood to specific stories that have the ring of truth. They might, illogically, consider a war with China triggered by a clash in the Taiwan Strait more likely than a war with China triggered by any possible cause.

In contrast to scenario planning’s emphasis on imagination, forecasting tends to rely on calculation. Deductive approaches use models or laws that describe the behavior of a system to predict its future state, much like Newtonian mechanics allows astronomers to anticipate the position of the planets. Inductive approaches do not require such understanding, merely enough data and the assumption that the future will in some way reflect the past. This is how Netflix anticipates what you might like to watch or Amazon what you might want to buy, based purely on your previous actions. Increasingly, thanks to advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, analysts use hybrid approaches. Meteorology is a good example, in which researchers combine sophisticated models and big data collection, which feed into each other and enable ever-better weather forecasts.

International politics poses a challenge for these methods because the laws governing the system are elusive or highly debatable, relevant data points are often unavailable or unprecedented, and thousands of variables interact in countless ways. History functions as a series of unfolding events, with highly contingent branching paths sometimes separated by mere happenstance. Tectonic shifts can hinge on seemingly mundane occurrences. That makes it hard to deduce future events from theoretical principles or to induce them from past experience.

As a result, historians and foreign policy experts are often bad forecasters. In 2005, one of us, Philip Tetlock, published a study demonstrating that seasoned political experts had trouble outperforming “dart-tossing chimpanzees” — random guesses — when it came to predicting global events. The experts fared even worse against amateur news junkies. Overconfidence was the norm, not the exception. When experts expressed 100 percent certainty that events would occur, those events materialized only 80 percent of the time. Yet there were pockets of excellence amid this unimpressive performance. Those who were surest that they understood the forces driving the political system (“hedgehogs,” in the philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s terminology) fared significantly worse than their humbler colleagues, who did not shy from complexity, approaching problems with greater curiosity and open-mindedness (“foxes”).

This distinction caught the eye of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, which set up a geopolitical “forecasting tournament,” in which Tetlock participated. He recruited a team of volunteers to provide probabilistic answers to sharply defined questions, such as “Will the euro fall below $1.20 in the next year?” or “Will the president of Tunisia flee to exile in the next six months?” By measuring the difference between estimates and the actual occurrence of events, Tetlock and his colleagues could calculate a score showing how “well-calibrated” the expectations of any given forecaster were with reality. By analyzing these data, Tetlock discovered that the key to more accurate geopolitical forecasting was to take people who were naturally numerate and open-minded, train them to think probabilistically and avoid common biases, and then group them so they could leverage the “wisdom of the crowd.” The best forecasters would approach seemingly intractable questions by decomposing them into parts, researching the past frequency of similar (if not precisely analogous) events, adjusting the odds based the uniqueness of the situation, and continually updating their estimates as new information emerged. By the end of the tournament, Tetlock’s top performers had achieved scores that were 30 percent better than those of career CIA analysts with access to classified information. Somehow, they had transmuted uncertainty into measurable risk.

The advantages of being able to put realistic odds on possible futures are obvious. It gives you a peek into the future. But even the best forecasters have their limits. If asked to predict events three to five years out, their performance becomes increasingly indistinguishable from random guessing. Still, many critical policy questions are short term: perhaps the most famous recent example concerned whether Osama bin Laden was in the Abbottabad compound in May 2011. Highly consequential short-term questions now include when a COVID-19 vaccine will be widely available. As of this writing, the smart money (68 percent probability) is on or before March 31, 2021.

But to the extent that leaders need to make consequential, difficult-to-reverse decisions that will play out over the long run — the strategic choices that will give the United States an advantage over time — it becomes more difficult to link forecasts to policymaking. Well-calibrated forecasters, for instance, can estimate the likelihood that a skirmish with the Chinese navy in the South China Sea will result in at least two American deaths by December 31. But what policymakers really want to know is the extent to which China will threaten U.S. interests in the coming years and decades.

Answers to that type of inquiry are beyond the reach of forecasters because it is impossible to define precisely what constitutes an interest or a threat. To provide forecasts, questions must pass the “clairvoyance test,” which is to say that were it possible to pose the question to a genuine clairvoyant, that omniscient seer must be able to answer it without having to ask for clarification. “Will I fall in love?” is not a forecasting question. “Will I marry Jane Smith by this time next year?” is.

From a policy perspective, then, the greatest challenge to forecasts is that although they can clarify slices of the future, they do not necessarily provide enough information to inform decision-making. Indeed, making a decision based on one specific forecast would be a mistake: the estimated probability of an event is a poor proxy for the significance of that event. “Will Vladimir Putin relinquish power within the next two years?” is a far different question from “What would Vladimir Putin’s abdication of power mean for U.S.-Russian relations?” The problem with forecasting is thus the exact opposite of the problem with scenarios: if the latter often provide too panoramic a view of the future to be useful, the former provides too narrow a glimpse.

AN ANSWER FOR THE FUTURE

How should these different approaches to anticipating the future be linked? The answer lies in developing clusters of questions that give early, forecastable indications of which envisioned future is likely to emerge, thus allowing policymakers to place smarter bets sooner. Instead of evaluating the likelihood of a long-term scenario as a whole, question clusters allow analysts to break down potential futures into a series of clear and forecastable signposts that are observable in the short run. Questions should be chosen not only for their individual diagnostic value but also for their diversity as a set, so that each cluster provides the greatest amount of information about which imagined future is emerging — or which elements of which envisioned futures are emerging. As a result, the seductiveness of a particular narrative will not tempt decision-makers into mistaking plausibility for probability. Instead, preliminary answers to specific questions can provide a simple metric for judging in advance how the future is most likely to unfold — a metric that analysts can then refine once the event in question takes place or not.

Consider the scenarios RAND produced as part of its analysis of China’s grand strategy. The four scenarios envisioned for 2050 — “Triumphant China,” “Ascendant China,” “Stagnant China,” and “Imploding China” — can be roughly placed on a classic two-by-two matrix, with the strength of China’s political leadership on one axis and the strength of China’s economy on the other. A cluster of questions that would give a heads-up that history is on a “Triumphant China” trajectory might include “On December 31, 2020, will China exercise de facto control over Itu Aba (or Taiping Island) in the South China Sea (which is currently under the de facto control of Taiwan)?” “Will China’s GDP growth in 2023 exceed ten percent?” and “Among African audiences, when will the China Global Television Network have a higher weekly viewership than Voice of America?”

These questions are useful both individually and collectively. Knowing that top forecasters see an increased chance of China controlling the island (from, say, a ten percent probability to a 20 percent probability), for instance, would provide immediate tactical value to the U.S. Navy. It should not necessarily tip the balance in the debate over whether China will be “triumphant,” but if all the forecasts resulting from the question cluster are trending in the same direction, the United States may want to recalibrate its strategy. As forecasts change and individual questions are answered by the course of events, the view of the far-off future becomes a little bit clearer. Analysts can then update their scenarios and generate new clusters of questions. They can thus develop a continually evolving sense of plausible futures, as well as a probabilistic estimate of which policies will yield the most bang for the buck today.

This method resembles the U.S. defense and intelligence community’s use of indications and warnings. In the early 1960s, for example, the National Intelligence Council developed a list of actions — large troop maneuvers, for instance — that might precede an attack by the Sino-Soviet bloc. The idea was that tactical changes might provide an early warning of future strategic shifts. Indications and warnings have come to play an important role in many national security scenarios. Unfortunately, there are potential problems with scouring today’s environment for hints of tomorrow. For one thing, as psychological research shows, having envisioned a particular scenario, humans are not only inclined to consider it more likely; they are also more prone to see evidence of its emergence—a form of confirmation bias that U.S. intelligence has battled for decades. For another, analysts are not particularly good at discerning in real time which events matter—which signposts are actually indicative of a particular future. Developments initially considered to be earthshattering may turn out to be significantly less important, whereas a story buried well beneath the day’s headlines can end up changing the course of history. In a statistical analysis of nearly two million State Department cables sent in the 1970s, for instance, one recent study demonstrated that U.S. diplomats were often bad at estimating the historical importance of contemporaneous events.

Linking scenarios to clusters of forecasting questions mitigates these problems. First, because the questions must be precise enough to pass the clairvoyance test, there is no wiggle room about what constitutes, say, large troop maneuvers. Second, because questions that disprove hypotheses often yield the greatest information, selecting questions for their diagnostic value decreases forecasters’ susceptibility to confirmation bias. Third, much as diversified stock portfolios spread risk through multiple, uncorrelated investments, the diversity of question clusters prevents forecasters from overweighting a potentially unimportant signpost and mistakenly concluding that a particular scenario is coming to pass. Finally, and most important, because question clusters yield forecasts, one can attach meaningful probabilities to the likelihood that particular events will occur in the future. This provides a sort of advance early warning system. An event does not need to actually transpire for the United States to have actionable information. That, more than anything else, gives question clusters an advantage over traditional indications and warnings.

PLANNING IN PRACTICE

To be useful, any vision of the future must be connected to decisions in the present. Scholars and practitioners often claim that scenario planning and probabilistic forecasting are incompatible given their different assumptions and goals. In fact, they mesh well. A scenario planner’s conviction that the future is uncertain need not clash with a forecaster’s quest to translate uncertainty into risk. Rather, the challenge lies in understanding the limits of each method. Question clusters make it possible to leverage the strength of each approach, transforming the abstract long term into the concrete short term so that leaders can understand the future quickly and act to stave off danger, seize opportunity, and strengthen national security.

The greatest barrier to a clearer vision of the future is not philosophical but organizational: the potential of combining scenario planning with probabilistic forecasting means nothing if it is not implemented. On occasion, the intelligence community has used forecasting tournaments to inform its estimates, but that is only a first step. Policymakers and consumers of intelligence are the ones who must understand the importance of forecasts and incorporate them into their decisions. Too often, operational demands — the daily business of organizations, from weighty decisions to the mundane — fix attention on the current moment.

Overcoming the tyranny of the present requires high-level action and broad, sustained effort. Leaders across the U.S. government must cultivate the cognitive habits of top forecasters throughout their organizations, while also institutionalizing the imaginative processes of scenario planners. The country’s prosperity, its security, and, ultimately, its power all depend on policymakers’ ability to envision long-term futures, anticipate short-term developments, and use both projections to inform everything from the budget to grand strategy. Giving the future short shrift only shortchanges the United States.

#### Nuanced debates about the merits of hegemony are uniquely valuable — creates effective advocates to counter public apathy.

Brands 18 — (Hal Brands, PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; “AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP”; Brookings Institution Press; D.A. July 5th 2020, [Published 2018]; <https://www.brookings.edu/book/american-grand-strategy-in-the-age-of-trump/>)

Fifth and finally, sustaining America’s post–Cold War strategy entails persuading the American public to recommit to that strategy and the investments it requires. The state of American opinion on that subject is currently ambiguous. Polling data indicates that public support for most key aspects of American internationalism has recovered somewhat from where it was in 2012–13, and is again at or near postwar averages.[32](javascript:void(0)) But the 2016 election cycle and its eventual outcome revealed strong support for candidates who advocated rolling back key elements of post–Cold War (and post–World War II) grand strategy, from free trade to U.S. alliances. This atmosphere reflects discontent with the failures and frustrations of U.S. grand strategy in the post–Cold War era, no doubt, yet it also reflects the fact that American strategy seems at risk of becoming a victim of its own success.[33](javascript:void(0)) By helping to foster a comparatively stable and congenial environment, American policies have made it more difficult for Americans to remember why significant investments in the global order are needed in the first place.

Today, this ambivalence is becoming increasingly problematic, for the simple reason that properly resourcing American strategy requires making politically difficult trade-offs with respect to entitlements and other ballooning domestic costs. It is also becoming problematic, of course, because even if the American public seems to support particular aspects of American grand strategy, the public has shown itself willing to elect a president who appears to care little for the successful postwar and post–Cold War tradition, even if he has, so far, maintained more aspects of that tradition as president than his campaign rhetoric might have led one to expect. In the future—and indeed, looking beyond Trump’s presidency—sustaining American grand strategy will thus require more intensive political efforts.

American leaders will need to more effectively make the case for controversial but broadly beneficial policies such as free trade, while also addressing the inevitable socioeconomic dislocations such policies cause.[34](javascript:void(0)) They will need to more fully articulate the underlying logic and value of alliances and other commitments whose costs are often more visible—not to say greater—than their benefits. They will need to remind Americans that their country’s leadership has not been a matter of charity; it has helped produce an international order that is exceptional in its stability, liberalism, and benefits for the United States. Not least, they will need to make the case that the costs that the country has borne in support of that order are designed to avoid the necessity of bearing vastly higher costs if the international scene returned to a more tumultuous state. After all, the success of American statecraft is often reflected in the bad things that don’t happen as well as in the good things that do. Making this point is essential to reconsolidating domestic support now and in the future—and to preserving a grand strategy that has delivered pretty good results for a quarter century.

#### Researching and debating IR is good.

Ettinger, 20—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University (Aaron, “Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives (2020) 0, 1–24, dml)

The first benefit is generating a well-trained pipeline of future IR scholars and practitioners. Today’s students are the scholars and practitioners of tomorrow, and sparking curiosity in students, especially undergraduates, has the potential to rejuvenate the field from within. As Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 292–293) argue, IR scholars should “take a more direct interest in how world politics is explained to students in everyday schooling practices.” This is eminently sensible. International relations’ preoccupation with “the cult of research intensivity” (Nossal 2006, 737), and to a lesser extent political practice, misleads the professoriate into believing that the very people who sustain universities as institutions and who are the future of the discipline—student subscribers—can be ignored. It has also led the IR professoriate to undervalue the contribution that the taught discipline makes to disciplinary renewal through the training of international relations’ next generation.

For future practitioners, whether in government or elsewhere, an IR education provides the conceptual architecture needed to make decisions about policy and its place in the world. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger emphasizes this point: “The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect” (as quoted in Desch 2019, 153). While Kissinger is talking about the highest level of elected office, it is equally true that policymakers throughout government come in equipped with the intellectual capital and technical skills learned in the classroom (Biswas and Paczynska 2015). For future scholars, early lessons have downstream effects on the very content of IR knowledge. After all, the classroom is where IR theory gets reproduced “for the first time” to future generations of IR scholars. As Newsom (1995, 64–65) put it, “[t]eachers plant the seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world’s most lasting contribution.” It is also a place where the durability and centrality of the field’s major theories are reinforced as a matter of course and not necessarily for the better (Vitalis 2015, 6). Early undergraduates carry the assumptions they are taught throughout their undergraduate and graduate careers, and beyond. A discipline that cannot connect with students or is inward-looking and esoteric risks putting off its next generation. Thus, the classroom needs to be treated with greater regard as a site of knowledge production and dissemination in the intellectual life of the field. In this sense, curiosity can be provoked among students that may continue beyond an undergraduate career. Take, for example, the observation of one student on her intellectual awakening in the classroom:

Despite a Eurocentric and male-dominated ethos, what ultimately convinced me to stay in IR was my exposure and inability to detach from what was first described to me as the politics of the “postcolonial.” A lecturer holding up a roughened paperback copy of Edward Said’s 1979 acclaimed work Orientalism originally introduced me to postcolonialism…Hearing Said’s words being reiterated back to me in my predominately white and conservative-leaning lecture theater was a defining moment in my education. Orientalism provided an experience that I could finally connect with: one where political power was not about who had the most weaponry or democracy, but instead about who held political control over the reality of the racialized person (Abu-Bakare 2017).

The moment captured in this tableau is the intellectual awakening that is possible when pedagogy is carefully considered. From the student perspective, well-taught courses prepare them better for the next stage in their education, starting with superior foundational training at the early undergraduate levels and progressing to improved research capabilities and substantive knowledge at the higher undergraduate levels, and then to advanced skills training in graduate school. Well-trained cohorts coming up the ranks will be highly proficient in a wider range of IR topics, theories, ideas, and methods and will be well prepared to make the jump to fluency. Similarly, future practitioners will be equipped with superior substantive and technical training. This is especially true with “experiential learning.” Done in purposeful ways, learning through experiences outside the classroom generates employable skills for students.

Social and Institutional Context of Teaching and Disciplinary Reproduction

Directly related to the question of the future of international relations is the social context of teaching and the discipline’s reproduction in the classroom. IR scholars must recognize that the IR classroom is the site of ideational preferences, clashes of favored or disfavored paradigms, of personal authority, generational difference, social privileges, and prejudices. At every point in professional international relations, there are implications for how knowledge is produced, taught, and passed on (Ettinger 2016; Colgan 2017; Fattore 2018; Knight 2019). Indeed, the intellectual output of IR scholars does not exist independent of the lived context in which it is produced. Gaining insight into the social context of international relations’ taught discipline can help begin to correct the pathologies that are affecting the way the next generation of IR scholars are being taught right now and how future scholars and practitioners will be taught next year and beyond.

It begins by addressing the social identity of the instructor and how it contributes to the reproduction of IR knowledge. After all, the instructor does not speak from a position of nowhere and an account of IR pedagogy should address the personal features of the instructor, her place within the discipline’s division of labor, and its effect on the delivery of course content (Biswas and Deylami 2017). For international relations especially, it is the site of entrenched male and Euro-Atlantic dominance with cascading implications within the classroom and beyond. The 2014 TRIP survey shows that the global IR professorate is two-thirds male (Maliniak et al. 2014). In the United States and British IR “core” and in the Anglo “noncore” (Cox and Nossal 2009), the professoriate is overwhelmingly white and male. Australia is 72.11 percent male and 76.87 percent white. Canada is 70.83 percent male and 83.4 percent white. The United Kingdom is 64.83 percent male and 85.23 percent white, while the United States is 68.33 percent male and 85.21 percent white non-Hispanic. New Zealand, a slight outlier, is 81.82 percent male but only 34.78 percent identifying as NZ European (Maliniak et al. 2014). Given what has been shown about the American dominance of the discipline, the insularity of national IR communities, and the gender gap in citations, it is reasonable to conclude that the bulk of the most influential IR scholarship is produced and disseminated by white men in the West (Maliniak et al. 2018; Maliniak et al 2013).

Understanding this relationship can improve IR pedagogy by recognizing how diverse student populations interact with an overwhelmingly white Euro-Atlantic intellectual tradition and by remedying some of the attending limitations such as geohistorical narrowness, state-centrism, epistemological positivism, and phallocentric authorship (Fonseca 2019). In this regard, the taught discipline of international relations should be intellectually responsive to a diversifying discipline and to a diversifying student population. Such circumstances call for a broader approach to teaching courses in a field whose heavy Euro-American centrality can alienate students when their backgrounds are not reflected in the course material. This is not simply a matter of curriculum design that tries to mirror or “look like” the students (Appiah 2019, SR7). Rather, it is one that balances disciplinary foundations with broadened ontological scope of what “matters” in IR in order to generate betterinformed teaching. It is widely recognized that international relations is a very traditional field of scholarship, but this should not preclude perspectives beyond the canon or case studies from outside the empirical mainstream. More ambitious and, especially, diverse content helps adapt teaching to changing student audiences. This is especially true at the undergraduate level. What is important to avoid is the “pipeline problem” that has discouraged women and minorities from progressing through the scholarly ranks in STEM fields (Brown et al. 2016; Branch 2016). By the same token, bringing more and more diverse young students into the discipline of international relations and encouraging their growth can bear intellectual fruit down the line. At very least, we avoid artificially restricting the development of the next generation of scholars.

By no means is this a call to jettison the classics. To the contrary, the field’s canon is irreplaceable as a foundation, as the intellectual inheritance of the present, as the prevailing ideas of foreign policymakers, and as points of disagreement for critical traditions. However, the scope of IR pedagogy can be expanded to make it relevant for a twenty-first century classroom. Primarily, this means expanding the theoretical and empirical scope of international relations beyond its traditional Eurocentric and male-dominated parameters (Acharya 2016). This is discussed below. Granted, there will be no singular population to which an IR curriculum will be pitched. Variation in student population profiles based on race, gender, class, geography, and other identity markers complicate the decisions that an instructor has to make. The point is that there are intellectual gains to be had when the taught discipline takes seriously the social context of international relations’ disciplinary reproduction. With a more diverse pedagogy in place, it is possible that, with more eyes on the subject matter and more minds from different backgrounds at work, the IR classroom can generate greater interest in fundamental theoretical questions for the next generation of scholars to solve.

Institutional context of teaching matters too. The vast majority of IR practice takes place in university institutions. Therefore, the material institutional setting must enter in as a condition of international relations’ intellectual life. Consider first, the matter of basic institutional survival. In an era where public universities around the world face funding problems, there are immediate economic imperatives for taking the taught discipline of international relations seriously. In the short term, survival in unforgiving economic times requires student enrollment and retention (Conley 2019). Systematic accounts of US undergraduate enrollment since the Great Recession of 2008 show majors in the “traditional disciplines” declining by 21 percent (philosophy) to 30 percent (history). Political science and international relations fare less badly, declining “only” by 11 percent and 15 percent over ten years (Schmidt 2018). Put differently, the classroom is on the front line in the battle for resources. Student recruitment and retention are essential to the economic viability of academic departments including political science and international relations. Turning students off the subject matter through an unreflexive pedagogy, boring classes, or mediocre lecturers has real economic implications for the future. Without students prepared to part with tuition dollars, or governments prepared to unlock activity-based funding, no department can thrive, even with a roster of productive researchers. Concretely, this means no new hiring and reduced budgets— a recipe for contraction. In this context, the systematic neglect of the classroom by IR stocktakers is entirely inexplicable given the parlous financial state of most public universities. Trends in expanded enrollment compound or create new problems. Universities that pack classrooms with hundreds, if not thousands, of more students—many of whom are international and pay exorbitant tuition fees—put revenue generation above pedagogy (Schulmann 2019).

The disciplinary division of university labor must be factored into an understanding of the context of IR teaching and its implications for the intellectual life of international relations. In this sense, debate about the taught discipline must grapple with question of resources, division of university labor, teaching assignments, pressures of the tenure track, the precarity of contract faculty, and other aspects of university governance as conditions that influence the classroom. One of the most striking trends in university governance is the increasing role of contingent instructors. In the United States, some 73 percent of instructional positions were nontenure track in 2016 (AAUP 2018). This is consistent with longer-term trends. The percentage of postsecondary instructional positions filled by contingent faculty increased from 57.6 percent in 1995 to 71.6 percent in 2011. In that time, the number of full-time tenure-track positions increased by 10 percent while the number of full- or part-time contingent positions doubled (GAO 2017, 8–9). This is not to say that contingent faculty are worse teachers, but the contingent nature of the work creates impediments to teaching. Fewer institutional resources, the constant need to reapply for jobs, and the need for part-time work outside the university are all matters that detract from time dedicated to students, improving pedagogy, or learning new content. Downstream, the design of an IR class or the delivery of an IR curriculum may not be nearly as effective as it could be.

Intellectual Reflection and Renewal from the Inside Out

Taking teaching seriously as part of the intellectual life of international relations can lead to intellectual renewal and self-reflection for individual professors and for the discipline as a whole. At the individual level, teaching has the ability to catalyze an intellectual renewal in the mind of the individual professor. The intellectual challenges of the classroom can provoke new avenues of research for the instructor. The classroom is a much more permissive intellectual environment than academic publishing. It affords the professor a degree of freedom to explore topics, ideas, and arguments, outside of their research expertise. Making use of the opportunity to teach beyond one’s comfort zone permits thinking out loud, working through ideas, and entanglement in analytical puzzles. Doing so is demanding, and it is much easier to fall back on existing teaching content. But an ambitious teaching agenda can lead to new research questions, new and unexpected intellectual horizons, and better background context for existing expertise. Indeed, there is truth to the aphorism that there is no better way to learn than to teach.

This kind of renewal turns on the “eureka” moment when research ideas flows directly from classroom activities. A more systematic approach to renewal that is less reliant on serendipity begins by asking discipline-wide questions. The first is this: what is the purpose of teaching international relations? It is a variation on a core concern to the discipline and one that remains unresolved (Dyvik, Wilkinson, and Selby 2017)? Is it for disciplinary self-reproduction, to train future practitioners, or more broadly, citizens and knowledge workers in the twenty-first century economy (Darling and Foster 2012; Szarejko and Carnes 2018; Zartner et al. 2018)? Arriving at an official “purpose” for international relations is probably pointless, and it is best left to the decentralized community of scholars to decide. IR scholars have debated this question widely within the published discipline but far less so in the taught discipline. This is a shame because the answers matter for the nature of the design of individual courses and entire degree programs.

Just like the published discipline, the taught discipline is radically decentralized in universities around the world, subnational variations, department-level programs, and individual scholar’s preferences. Thus, it is incumbent on individual professors to give an answer in their own teaching programs. At the individual level, answering the question about the purpose of teaching international relations should outfit students with an answer to what they are about to encounter and why this topic, course, or degree program is worth pursuing. Students, especially early undergraduate students, need to know why they are about to be presented with the complicated theory and obscure events that are core (or peripheral) to the IR discipline. Answers are generously supplied in the introduction chapters to IR textbooks but the suite of options betrays a lack of focus that is symptomatic of the wider field (Albert 2010). However, this permissive intellectual environment is beneficial for wide-ranging intellectual pursuits, teaching styles, and pedagogical agendas. It may, though, come at the cost. The institutional underpinnings of the discipline—faculty administrators, editorial boards, funding agencies, hiring committees, and so on— may end up doing as much to shape the boundaries of the discipline as the substantive output (Albert and Buzan 2017, 908). The alternative, though, is subjecting intellectual and academic freedom to an institutionalized orthodoxy. In teaching, decentralization may be intellectually permissive but may come at the expense of disciplinary coherence.

This concern, though, may be overstated. TRIP data on curriculum design gives an indication of the competing and sometimes overlapping pedagogical priorities among the IR professoriate. In a question on introduction to IR classes, respondents were asked whether their introductory courses are designed more to introduce IR scholarship within the discipline or to prepare students to be informed about foreign policy and international issues. The result favors a mix of both with 80.83 percent incorporating scholarship and issues in some balance. The remaining 19.17 percent come down in favor of one to the exclusion of the other. At the master’s level, the ratio is a bit narrower (73 to 27 percent) but still overwhelmingly embraces a mixture of academic scholarship and international issues (Maliniak et al. 2014). Respondents are a bit more divided on what undergraduate courses should be mandatory in an IR program. They overwhelmingly agree (73.25 percent) that IR theory should be a required subject. However, they differ on other options. The next most popular candidates for a required course are international/global political economy (45.37 percent), international security (38.87 percent), and research methods (35.22 percent), followed by international organizations (27.59 percent), comparative foreign policy (22.86 percent), home country foreign policy (19.95 percent), international law (19.85 percent), diplomatic history (19.11 percent), and international economics (15.17 percent) (Maliniak et al. 2014). The point is that resolving what IR teaching is supposed to accomplish is hardly settled, but there is some convergence on certain issues.

So, what then, is the purpose of teaching international relations? Ultimately, it is up to the individual instructor to answer and to enact a program accordingly. But it is up to the community of scholars to debate. It may well be that the enormous variation in the purpose of teaching international relations and the radical decentralization is an inescapable feature of the taught discipline. Though IR teaching may be wildly divergent around the world, there is always some purpose to it, and, however defined, this is an intrinsic feature of an international relations education. Here, Cox’s (1981, 128) famous admonition that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” serves as the anchor concept for such pedagogical framing. It frames IR theories as political things and not just abstractions to be memorized or an analytical template to be applied uncritically. Similarly, it helps to frame thematic and empirical cases in the classroom so that course material is not merely a reflection the professor’s unexamined preference. In the classroom, it is up to the professor to articulate. Beyond the classroom in administrative meetings, academic conferences, and in print, it is up to the field to debate.

The next question asks what is the proper scope of IR teaching? This question has also been asked before of the field but not directly about the IR classroom (Albert and Buzan 2017, 898). The answer to this question connects different themes of this article: intellectual rejuvenation and disciplinary renewal, diversity, and the future of international relations as an intellectual project. In substance and in design, the scope of IR teaching should embrace pluralism in paradigm, empirical remit, and criticism. A great deal has been made of pluralism in international relations (Levine and McCourt 2018; Eun 2016), but pluralism in the taught discipline is far different from pluralism in the published discipline, where differences accrue over the merits of accumulation and diversity. Here, the scope of possibility in the classroom is far more intellectually permissive. Teaching international relations can be theoretically and empirically promiscuous. It can respect the canon, its inner logic, and its external life, as well as contemporary alternatives (Ferguson 2015). This is an “integrative pluralism” (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 416) that embraces diversity as a means of “providing more comprehensive and multidimensional accounts of complex phenomena” and a pedagogical engagement with the world that includes, but hardly limited to the Euro-Atlantic theater, that has dominated generations of IR thinking (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 416).

Pedagogical pluralism in international relations flows from intuitions about balancing theory and empirics, the canon and its alternatives, being current while eschewing presentism, being “useful” without being instrumentalist, and drawing on instructor expertise without being constrained by the hyperspecialized knowledge attendant to the published discipline. Of course, this is easy to say. But operationalizing these intuitions into a pluralistic teaching program is much more difficult. Complicating the matter is the relative absence of explicit theoretical guidance for making IR pluralism work in the classroom. The insights of proponents of a “Global IR” can help, including some critiqued above for their neglect of the classroom. In particular, Acharya and Buzan’s (2019, 300–308) program for developing a Global IR provides concrete steps toward curriculum design as much as is does for research.

Regarding the IR theoretical parts of their program, Acharya and Buzan (2019, 301) say that Global IR respects existing theories while “giving due recognition to the places, roles, and contributions of non-Western peoples and societies,” which entails “pluralization within theories, rather than just between them.” There are issues here. First, pluralization between theories requires expanding the remit of IR theory beyond the grand IR paradigms to include non-Western contributions to international thought (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Acharya 2011). But this is not easy. Tickner and Wæver (2009) make it clear that Anglo-American IR looms impossibly large around the world. Without jettisoning this intellectual inheritance, Thinking International Relations Differently (Tickner and Blaney 2012) provides a route to pluralism. That volume interrogates alternative meanings to some of international relations’ central concepts—security, state, sovereignty and authority, globalization, secularism, religion, and the international. A professor committed to this kind of pluralism can expand the conceptual vocabulary of international relations in a way that encourages undergraduate conversancy in multiple IR vernaculars within and beyond the Anglo-American core.

There is also the matter of what do with the existing, Western-centric canon. Acharya and Buzan (2019, 301) also say that a global international relations would subsume rather than supplant existing IR theories and methods. The purpose here is not to displace Western-dominated IR knowledge but to situate it within the global context. This is an entirely attainable objective for an IR theory instructor. IR teachers should have full command of some IR theories while being conversant in nearly all anyway. Integrating a fuller slate of intellectual content into teaching IR theory permits a cognitive pluralism that is rarely available in the published discipline. The point here is that teaching narrowly and to the expertise of professors may suit their interests, but it puts blinders on the students. Upper-year and graduate studies can explore specific pathways, but only after international relations’ map has been presented. This likely means instructors must venture out of their preferred intellectual comfort zones and teach to their weaknesses as well as their strengths. Doing so, however, requires breaking through disciplinary walls and should not be underestimated. It requires breadth of knowledge, disciplinary literacy beyond the scholar’s training, and language skills (usually beyond English) that can take many years to develop, while the imperatives of the published discipline stress specialization.

Regarding the empirical subject matter, a pluralistic IR agenda would ground its empirics in world history rather than just Western history (Acharya and Buzan 2019, 301) This is demanding on an instructor whose subject-matter expertise will be narrow (by dint of academic training) and whose time will be short given other professional and personal commitments. Without considerable effort, this is more of an ideal than a reality. But a good start would be to follow Acharya and Buzan’s (2019, 303) admonition to integrate the study of regions, regionalism, and area studies into the curriculum. In particular, this means offering case studies, examples, and illustrations drawn from parts of the world outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. To this we can add Buzan and Lawson’s (2015) case for expanding the temporal remit of international relations to the nineteenth century. This would break free of the apocryphal founding myths (Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson 2011) and temporal myopia of the orthodox discipline (Buzan and Lawson 2014) in order to draw upon a richer and more global context for the emergence of the modern world. A worldly curriculum will likely begin rather thin, but over time become much deeper and more inclusive. Perhaps more attainable in the short-term is a pluralistic pedagogy that recognizes multiple forms of agency beyond the state and material power. Such an approach would entail a pedagogy addressing a diverse constellation of actors in world politics that offers a faithful representation of an overwhelmingly complex environment without reducing it exclusively to a handful of Western powers.

#### IR Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases

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Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

#### Perm solves best – prioritizing postcolonial theories of IR above realist predictive models reproduces the binaristic logics they criticize.

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Conclusion: the paucity of ‘better’ It seems appropriate to conclude by commenting on why it would be futile to attempt to provide a justification for why postcolonial approaches offer a “better” explanation of world politics in comparison to other IR theories. The analysis has shown that traditional IR theories, and even critical theories such as poststructuralism and Marxism, operate within the limitations of an epistemology that is inherently Eurocentric and attached to a vision of world politics that is excessively temporal, with ontological categories that reflect this point of view. Even when the European vision of modernity is criticised from within, this criticism is prone to falling back on these same categories in order to do so. Instead, a decolonial epistemology can create space for a universal that incorporates rather than excludes difference, while ontological concepts derived from this epistemology and the non-Western experience can elaborate a vision of world politics that is more holistic and nuanced. Yet to say that such an explanation is “better” seems to negate the very purpose of postcolonial approaches to IR; to draw attention to the hierarchies embedded in the international sphere through the past and ongoing practices and discourses of colonialism and imperialism. Describing these approaches as “better” merely engages in the same tendency towards hierarchy, binaries, and reductionism critiqued in other approaches. It is for this reason that this essay has argued strongly for the importance of postcolonial approaches to explaining world politics but refuses to reduce these attributes to a better or worse distinction. Suffice it to say that postcolonial approaches encourage an understanding of world politics that truly merits the name.

#### Bridging the gap between postcolonial theorizations of IR and normative ones produces a comprehensive analytic of power -- that solves best.

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Bull notwithstanding, there have been attempts in international re- lations to address the cultural realm.32 Ali Mazrui confronts interna- tional relations head-on by claiming that "culture is at the heart of the nature of power in International Relations. "33 Mazrui sees ideol- ogy, political economy, and technology as deeply rooted in the cul- tural realm, and views the North-South divide as an increasingly cultural one. Cultural identity is held to be an issue of increased sig- nificance in the contemporary world - so much so that, according to Mazrui, we may be witnessing the "gradual unravelling of identities based on the state, a declining of identities based on political ideol- ogy - and the revival of identities based on culture."34 Peter Worsley's earlier account of world development makes similar claims.35 The in- ternationalization of culture - youth cults, religious revivalism, con- sumerism, feminism - are seen as "powerful evidence that a sense of common identity and a shared culture can give rise to social move- ments that quickly transcend the boundaries of any particular soci- ety."36 Both Mazrui and Worsley thus see culture as a key determinant of political and economic processes. Even the generally econocentric Immanuel Wallerstein has shifted ground to view culture as "the key ideological battleground" of the opposing interests within the mod- ern world capitalist system.37 These attempts to engage culture seemingly amount to a re- spectable interest on the part of international relations, and it is in- structive to consider the intellectual background of the three writers discussed. Wallerstein is a sociologist, and the essay cited above was published in a collection of sociological articles on nationalism, glob- alization, and modernity. Mazrui has always cut a distinctive path in international relations, and his concerns have had more to do with the problems of Third World justice and identity than with main- stream issues. Worsley, similarly, has been steeped in the problems of development and dependency in the Third World. We thus see that many of the perspectives that have enlivened the discipline have come from outside it and draw on different source material. Something similar may be said of R. B. J Walker. Certainly he ha ried a consideration of culture with the issues of order, power states, but his bearings have been taken from broad modernity.38 Without belaboring the point, such an analysis is very much the exception. Walker himself recognizes as much: 'This kind of literature . . . has emerged largely on the margins of International Relations as an institutionalized discipline. It remains obscure, even alien to those whose training has been primarily within the positivis- tic, realist, or policy-oriented mainstreams.'139 The contrast with postcolonialism could not be starker. Where in- ternational relations has ignored culture, or at most grudgingly con- ceded it a minor role, postcolonialism has elevated culture to an extraordinary degree. Although the understanding of culture has changed as the discourse has evolved, culture has been at the heart of postcolonialism from the outset. In the first phase of postcolonial- ism, culture was grounded in the literary context and understood very much in terms of the clash of values engendered by the colonial encounter. Following postcolonialism's move away from specific texts to a more generalized account of domination and resistance between North and South, culture has attained larger explanatory significa- tions. It has come to encapsulate the very site of struggle and differ- ence between the so-called margin and the center; the pivot upon which an emergent postcolonial identity develops. On one view, how- ever, culture has been overdone. In its attempt to be at the cutting edge of academic discourse, postcolonialism can be accused of hav- ing overstretched the analytical utility of culture. Yet such a perspec- tive underplays the significance of the cultural reorientation; it is precisely through culture that postcolonialism mounts a fundamental challenge to the epistemological bases of established regimes of thinking such as international relations. In this respect its effect has been overwhelmingly positive. To this point, the burden of our analysis has been to suggest that international relations and postcolonialism pass like ships in the night. We have highlighted possible intersections and potential sites of engagement, the idea being that both discourses might be en- riched through a process of cross-fertilization. Such enrichment would follow partly from the very fact of difference. We now want to direct attention to three key areas of difference in which engagement might have real significance, not only for each discourse but more generally for our broader concern with approaches to the North- South divide. The first relates to power and representation, the sec- ond to modernity, and the third to emotional commitment and radicalism. In the process of contestation and comparison, the hope is that we can get a better handle on understanding issues such as power and modernity as they bear upon the relationship between the North and South. Both discourses have distinct strengths and weak- nesses and bring different perspectives to bear on the issues at hand. In seeking a dialogue and making assessments about what we might learn from their diferences, we can begin to bridge the discourses to their mutual benefit.

## K -- Capitalism

### 1NC -- Thesis -- Racial Capitalism

**Racial capitalism commodifies black people – it has sustained the violent idea that black people are worth more dead than alive – empirically proven after recent protests**

Crystal **Eddins**, 8-14-20**20**, ("Racial Capitalism, Legacies of Slavery, and Social Movements," AAIHS, <https://www.aaihs.org/racial-capitalism-legacies-of-slavery-and-social-movements/>) //pk

On Friday, June 5, 2020, the Fox News cable news network aired a graphic depicting stock market performance during periods of civil unrest following high-profile killings of Black men in the United States. The graphic showed increases to the S&P 500 in the midst of racial and economic crises. It insinuated that despite social upheaval, the death of Black men was beneficial for the stock market. As the graphic quickly displayed across the television screen, anchor Susan Li reported: “Market highs despite the nationwide protests this week, historically there has been a disconnect between what investors focus on and what happens across the rest of the country. For instance, in 1968, the week after the tragedy of Martin Luther King, the S&P 500 rose over two percent, also up the week after the Rodney King ruling and Wall Street trading on the reopening instead this year in 2020.” The Fox News network is well-known for propagating conservative, right-wing ideals and misrepresenting truths to an extent that exceeds the incredulous. Even with their regular pattern of untruths and racially inflammatory broadcasts, viewers were shocked by the S&P 500 graphic. The network has since apologized for the insensitivity of the graphic and seem to have removed the segment video from the internet, but they did not recant the Dow Jones market data that Li reported. The graphic, and its explanation, imply that Black death is good for the economy. Are Black people worth more dead than alive? What can we learn about this data point and the way in which the logic of racial capitalism continues to operate? Further thought about the meaning behind this graphic, and the motivation for composing it, harkens back to the long history of commodifying Black bodies. In Saltwater Slavery, Stephanie Smallwood examined the moments captive Africans’ lives were reduced to units of exchange at coastal African slave castles and on slave ships as enslavers aimed to maximize profit at each stage of the Middle Passage. Daina Ramey Berry’s The Price for Their Pound of Flesh also traces the process by which enslavers, traders, and doctors placed monetary value on enslaved African Americans throughout the life cycle, beginning with preconception and ending with the trade of enslaved people’s cadavers. Amy Bride’s “Dead or Alive: Racial Finance and the Corpse-Value of the African American Slave Body” similarly argues that the rise of finance markets signaled a historical change in which Black bodies became more valuable dead than alive. My own research on colonial Haiti revealed a four-fold increase of captive Africans’ purchase prices between the West Central African Loango coast and the prices of sale at ports like Cap-Français (Cap-Haïtien) in the 1780s. While sugar and coffee prices climbed throughout the late eighteenth century, the price values assigned to the enslaved grew at a much slower place – representing a decline in slave values in absolute terms compared to values of the popular crops.1 The ratios of slave prices and crop prices is not only a convenient statistic, it had real life implications – especially considering the reputation of colonial Haiti as one of the deadliest slave colonies in the Americas due to excesses of labor and violence. Increased crop prices incentivized working the enslaved to death, extracting as much energy as possible before they were discarded and replaced with another cohort of captives from Africa. **Enslaved people were fetishized and commodified as property that was valued less than commodities.** It is frightening to wonder: was the data presented in the S&P 500 graphic accurate, and if so, why? What can help account for the stock market’s apparent profiteering from Black death? According to research by The Action Center on Race & the Economy, “police brutality bonds” are one avenue by which wealth is transferred “from communities – especially over-policed communities of color – to Wall Street and wealthy investors” in the wake of egregious police misconduct cases. Cities often face a fiscal crisis when they are held liable for acts of police violence and are mandated to pay out sizeable settlements and judgement costs. To borrow funds to cover these costs, cities issue municipal bonds, or what the Action Center calls “police brutality bonds,” in exchange for large amounts of money to meet their budget needs. Money market funds and other institutions or individuals purchase the bonds and loan money to the cities, and banks underwrite the bonds and gain interest and fees. The Action Center has identified several cities and counties across the United States that issue municipal bonds to cover the growing costs of police brutality settlements at the expense of taxpayers, while banks and other financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America benefit from interest and fees. Combined case study data from Chicago, Cleveland, Lake County, Indiana, Los Angeles, and Milwaukee from 2010 to 2017 showed that showed that $837.8 million in police brutality bonds were issued with banks profiting as much as an additional $891 million, costing taxpayers a total of $1.7 billion. The emotional toll of death in Black communities is only compounded when municipalities compensate the victims of police violence with funds that allow the financial sector to accumulate wealth from those very communities. As the Action Center argues, these extractive practices only exacerbate the economic hardships that poor Black communities and government entities have already faced, especially since the 2008 global financial crisis, and serve to solidify existing structures of power and racial inequality. The financialization of public funds and our everyday lives results in anti-Black outcomes and is based on historically-informed logics of global capitalism that commodifies Black bodies and extracts wealth from Black communities through failed policing, resource expropriation, and gentrification in the housing sector. The violent effects of anti-Blackness combined with capital accumulation have global implications but are most immediately felt within local communities. Most recently, lawyers representing the family of Breonna Taylor, a young Black woman killed in her home by Louisville police on March 13, 2020, allege that the “no-knock” warrant the Place Based Investigations crime unit and Louisville Metro Police Department executed was only one part of a larger gentrification project. The lawyers claim Louisville mayor Greg Fischer has championed a project called Vision Russell that entails clearing out residents of the west-side neighborhood where Breonna lived to develop “modern, futuristic looking homes, a café, an amphitheater, a state-of-the-art fitness center and more.” No arrests have been made in connection with Breonna Taylor’s death, though the FBI has recently opened an investigation into the likely civil rights violations committed by the police who killed her. The ongoing Black Lives Matter movement is now the largest protest movement in United States history. But early “Black Spring” protests also included incidents of so-called “looting” and “rioting” in major cities across the country where Black, white, and Latinx youth (as well as anarchists and provocateurs) expropriated goods and destroyed property. While many see these actions as a detriment to the credibility of peace protest movements, a more critical analysis of the variety of actions that shape insurgency through the lens of racial capitalism reveals deeper motivations and critiques of societal inequalities. Property damage may be considered a repudiation of the fundamental principle of racial capitalism that values property over Black people. These actions, in the context of an unprecedented wealth gap, mass incarceration, and environmental, political, and health crises, urge us to demystify the myriad of ways global capitalism has “looted” Black people and Black communities, and to imagine a world free from the deadly implications of commodifying Black life and valuing property over people.

#### Approaching racial capitalism through a materialist, ideological and historical framework is a necessary heuristic to combat the violence of environmental racism.

Pulido, 2017 (Laura Pulido is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and Program in American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California. She is the author of Environmentalism and Economic Justice: Two Chicano Struggles in the Southwest Progress in Human Geography 2017 Geographies of race and ethnicity II: Environmental racism, racial capitalism and state-sanctioned violence pg. 526-527 MBA**)**

**Failure on such a scale cannot be resolved by tinkering with policy. While** geographers **typically** **attribute** such dynamics **to neoliberalism** (Faber, 2008; Holifield, 2007), this is only part of the story. For instance, **what is the connection between court decisions that contract the definition of discrimination and neoliberalism**? Pellow (2007) is one of the few to combine political economy and race in his analysis of transnational pollution, although Heynen (2015) has made some important moves in this direction. I build on Pellow’s work as well as research from critical ethnic studies to argue that **environmental racism is part of racial capitalism**. Ethnic Studies scholars have long grappled with the relationship between racism and capitalism (Barrera, 1979; Marable, 1983; Almaguer, 1994). Cedric Robinson coined the term racial capitalism in Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. First published in 1983, he argued that racism was a structuring logic of capitalism. His work did not initially circulate beyond a small circle of scholars (e.g. Kelley, 1990; Gilmore, 2007), but the rise of critical ethnic studies (Ma´rquez and Rana, 2015) has introduced a new generation to it. While this is new to some (Bonds and Inwood, forthcoming; Driscoll Derickson, 2014; Ruiz, 2015), there is, in fact, older geographic scholarship that sees capitalism as deeply racial (Wilson, 1992; Blaut, 1993; Woods, 1998; Gilmore, 2002). Thus, the ideas are not necessarily new. What is new is the term, the intellectual moment, and the political urgency. **The time is ripe for a deep engagement with racial capitalism.** **A focus on racial capitalism requires greater attention to the essential processes that shaped the modern world, such as colonization, primitive accumulation, slavery, and imperialism.** As McKittrick notes, ‘**the geographic management of blackness, race, and racial difference (and thus non-blackness) hinges on a longstanding but unacknowledged plantation past’** (2011: 953). By insisting that we are still living with the legacy of these processes, racial capitalism requires that we place contemporary forms of racial inequality in a materialist, ideological and historical framework.

### 2NC -- Root Cause -- Colonialism

#### Capitalism is the root cause of colonialism – profit motives and exportation of culture created incentives for colonization

**Smiley 9** (Maurice Smiley, 12-11-2009, Accessed 7-13-2020, Abstract: Root Cause of Colonialism, Maurice Smiley Blogspot, http://mauricesmiley.blogspot.com/2009/12/there-is-little-doubt-that-colonialism.html)// Lex KK

There is little doubt that colonialism has changed the face of the planet and continues to affect postcolonial societies in a number of different ways.  Fusing of cultures, religion, economics, and language are but of few of the results of postcolonialism.  Some societies have adapted markedly well while others have fallen into abject poverty, civil war, social unrest, and in extreme cases extinction. Regardless of the outcomes, this essay examines the texts we have read throughout the semester in an effort to determine the underlying reason ,or the "why", for colonialism in the first place. The answer is undoubtedly capitalism.¶ In examining colonial Europe, the common thread found in examining the question of why colonialism happened can be seen clearly in Joseph Conrad's "Heart of Darkness", Chinua Achebe's "Things Fall Apart", and V.S. Naipaul's "The Mimic Men". These novels show how the Europeans used various pretexts for rationalizing the colonization of other countries, in order to pave the way for private enterprise to make money. Looking into more recent history, Ha Jin's story, "After Cowboy Chicken Came to Town" shows how America, a postcolonial society itself, uses capitalism as a means of spreading culture and values to other countries. Future evidence of capitalism's role in colonialism can be examined in the Neal Stephenson's "The Diamond Age". In "The Diamond Age", we see a future "globalized" world that is controlled by tribes instead of countries. In examining the relationship between the tribes and globalization, we see evidence that the most successful tribes are really technology corporations who's citizens are members of the corporate culture.¶ Pundits may argue that there were other reasons for colonialism, such as religion, and that capitalism played a secondary role. Jared Diamond's "Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies", Diamond provides evidence through historical facts that the driving force behind colonialism was completely based on capitalism.  Further evidence can be found in Juan Gonzalez's "Harvest Empire" where he explores the history behind Spanish colonialism and provides compelling evidence that colonialism is rooted in capitalism.

### 1NC -- Link -- Black Feminism

**Advocacies of black feminism result in the hypervisibility and ultimately solve nothing when violence is a product of racial capitalism**

**Lowendtheory**, 05-14-20**13** (“On Audre Lorde’s Legacy and the “Self” of Self-Care, Part 2 of 3,” Lowendtheory, https://www.lowendtheory.org/post/50428216600/on-audre-lordes-legacy-and-the-self-of)//pk

Audre Lorde didn’t die a natural death. She died an institutionally produced one, a death that was generated at the level of social infrastructure. I want us to learn to regard Audre Lorde’s death as an effect of racial capitalism—its fundamentally unequal provisioning of wealth and social goods, its ableist and productivist standards as to what constitutes a healthy person, its fashioning of health care as a private commodity rather than as a fundamental right, and its particular commingling of sexism and racism that at one and the same time materializes the constant demand that black women work and renders the work they do invisible. The conditions that produced Audre Lorde’s death, in other words, might also serve as a reminder that in the aggregate, black women bear a disproportionate share of racial capitalism’s propensity to work its workers to death. And a major feature of these death-making conditions is to be found in the ways in which it is structured so as to refuse to recognize as work what so many black women do for themselves, for each other, and for their communities—this may include but is not limited to the largely unwaged work of cooking, cleaning, raising, educating, and caring for children and adults in its myriad forms. (This is the work, to paraphrase part of the most overlooked chapter of Angela Davis’s Women, Race, and Class, that no one notices until it’s not done.) To reiterate, **these death-making conditions serve as a motor for racial capitalism not only through the erasure, devaluation, and naturalization of life-making and life-sustaining** (also called "reproductive”) work that women are expected to learn to do, to do, and to love doing,[1] but also because through the erasure of “women’s work” as work, they serve to compel and coerce workers to accept waged labor above and beyond the work they already perform. This compulsion and coercion regularly takes the form of the form of the stigmatization and surveillance of poor people and poor women especially, who use governmental assistance to survive. And again, here, black women bear the brunt of the burden of capitalism’s stigmatization of the poor (of color). "Welfare,“ as Dorothy Roberts puts it, "has become a code word for race.” By which she means: a code word for blackness. Think here of the sheer prominence of the “welfare queen” stereotype (and its deployment to make common sense out of the notion that black women who use governmental assistance are parasitic on the social body). Think here, also, how the racializing and gendering of that stereotype authorizes the constant surveillance to which welfare recipients are regularly and systematically subjected, surveillance whose purpose it is to call into doubt the ability of welfare recipients to make fitting choices in deciding how and what to feed themselves (and those that depend upon them), how and what they should consume. It matters that Audre Lorde, by virtue of a class mobility that materialized in the form of advanced degrees, international recognition and renown, and semi-stable employment with what were clearly circumscribed “health benefits,” may have been able to escape the worst of the state-sanctioned, Reaganomics-fueled state surveillance directed towards poor black women.[2] And it also matters that the racializing and gendering project of the capitalism that underwrites that surveillance also shaped the conditions in which she lived and died in ways that are too rarely recognized. We in the U.S. left are well trained to express outrage when black lives are stolen in spectacular events—not only in the assassinations of “our” Malcolms and Martins, but even in the executions of our less famed Emmetts and Oscars and Trayvons. Yet we are not always best equipped to organize against the politics that produce deaths not in spectacular (and regular), direct, face-to-face expressions of violence but rather, through other, less readily visible, rhythms and structures of everyday life. To ask that we regard Audre Lorde’s death as the outcome of a politics (and not just a disease) is both to invoke Lorde less as an exceptional figure than as a powerfully exemplary one, and to direct our attention to how the murderousness of capitalism expresses itself where it is most mundane.[3] Mundane murderousness, slow death (which may in many cases not be slow at all), has taken institutional form in part as a consequence of the consolidation of health care as a for-profit industry that defines health as the capacity to work. “Health,” in this context, is measured by the health of racial capitalism. Such a definition means that being healthy is understood as having the capacity to optimize your ability to be exploited. No medical leave, then, for the English prof who’s battling cancer. No capacity, then, to decide for herself what her health needs are and to act on that decision—the social infrastructure of neoliberalism has already coded giving its workers that much freedom, that kind of autonomy, as an unaffordable extravagance. Care as extravagance. Historically speaking, it is here, in the Reagan era, that the “self” of self-care emerged. Donald Vickery and James Fries’s bestseller Take Care of Yourself: A Consumer’s Guide to Medical Care was published in 1981, and formed part of a larger explosion of “self-help” publications that encouraged a readership increasingly clobbered by a neoliberal assault—against liveable wages, workers rights, social services, and the welfare state writ large—to take it upon themselves to manage the consequences of that clobbering. And I would argue that the “self” of self-care came into being precisely as an effect of that management, as well as of the clobbering that both preceded and accompanied it. It euphemizes as a goodwill gesture (the benevolent “take care of yourself!”) an imperative that, if elaborated, looks much more like a relation of coercion and discipline (“take care of yourself or your job will go to someone who does”; “take care of yourself lest you fall ill and get saddled with medical debt”; “take care of yourself because you have no right to expect that society will”; “take care of yourself…or else”). The self of self-care, all of this is to say, has a history that should serve as a caution toward attempts to make self-care an unqualified good. It is a self that is specifically calibrated as a defensive reaction to the combination of austerity politics with reinvigorated forms of gendered racism that cut across the entire social formation. Especially for those of us who were born and/or grew up in the Reagan and Bush I eras, the self of self-care was the form of selfhood that hegemonic institutions taught us to internalize. This is not to say that there is nothing of value to be found in the language of practice of self-care. It is to suggest, rather, that self-care is not simply a form of struggle but the outcome of various struggles that have played out on a larger scale than we tend to acknowledge when we speak of it. This struggle involved, among other things, the disqualification of initiatives by the radical labor movement to establish universal health care as a right rather than a “benefit” restricted to and contingent upon employment in certain sectors. It involved the marginalization of years of efforts by the Black Panther Party and the National Welfare Rights Organization both to establish community clinics and to redefine health care not as a commodity but as both a fundamental question of justice and a condition of community self-determination.[4] With all of this said, what do we make of this Audre Lorde quote?: “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.” It is both thrilling and affirming, I think, to sit with the possibilities of redefining self-care as though it were going on the political offensive. This may especially be the case in a context where the dominant meaning of “care” either has become industrialized in such a way that it consolidates (instead of contests) one’s'alienation from her conditions of existence, or from the means necessary to inform herself about, determine, and pursue the course of care and wellbeing that she needs. But what I think is especially important about this now regularly cited quotation is what comes before the first comma, what comes before, that is, the moment when self-care finds its euphemistic, sunny resolution as “political warfare”: the disavowal of self-care as “self indulgence.” What, after all, is wrong with self-indulgence, with stealing time to enjoy the self, to pursue ways of being and living that are not necessarily productive, even if to do so is to steal away from the justifiably voracious appetites of left political desire? Lorde’s rewriting of self-care as political warfare seems to me to be symptomatic of a philosophy of movement building that has an unacknowledged investment in surveilling the behavior of its members (and demanding that they surveil themselves), a philosophy that is so deeply committed to the idea that everything is political that it cannot see the ways it enforces that definition through the implicit demand that its members justify all their behavior on its terms. Everything is political, in other words, can be a particularly disciplinary and disciplining definition of the political because of the way that it privileges a kind of ruthless scrutiny, assessment, and justification of one’s behaviors on the basis of whether or not they generate political value. At the same time, it tends to regard the political less as a contestation over social transformation than as the sum total of “good” or “bad” political behaviors. At worst, everything is political can privilege a kind of left version of austerity logic, one that calls implicitly for the abstention from behaviors that don’t serve the Higher Purpose of generating and assessing individual behavior in the form of political value. It can only handle self-indulgence and extravagance when those things can be given a justifiable political form, when they can be commended or valorized, in other words, for how radical they are. It can only handle self-indulgence and extravagance, in other words, when they cease to be self-indulgent or extravagant at all, and claim, on the flip, to be productive and progressive. Austerity logics, whether they come from the left or the right, get articulated through the bodies of black women by making certain kinds of demands on them. An important thing to understand about these demands is that **they do not simply take the form of general devaluation**. They do not simply take the form of the welfare queen stereotype. **They can also take the form of a general overinvestment or hypervaluation**—in feelings and performances of excessive admiration, deference, and high regard. They can inhabit the expectation—an expectation that, again, can have the force of a demand—that black women embody a kind of superhuman strength, or that they inherently possess an exceedingly resolute political consciousness. Unlike the bad faith that underwrites the demonization of black women as unproductive, **this leftist hypervaluation of black women often takes the form of love.** Love: **Killing love,** perhaps. It is the kind of love **that solicits a constant performance from black women, one that demands that they be endlessly productive**, endlessly working, for the movement, even after death. It is for this reason that I spent some time in the last post attempting to contest the deification of Lorde: I want to make visible just how much work is implicitly called for in the desire for black women to be adequate to what is asked of them–which they very well may also want of themselves. The point is that any politics that seeks to celebrate the seemingly superhuman accomplishments of black women can become the unwitting collaborator with the entire field of the political that we might want to contest, a field in which the superhuman demands placed on black women are nothing short of murderous. The point is, while it may appear to honor the Audre Lordes (1934-1992) and the Barbara Christians (1943-2000) and the VèVè Clarks (1944-2007) and the Sherley Anne Williamses (1944-1999) with the demand that they rest in power, there may also be an ethics, if not also a justice, in insisting on their right to rest in peace. And the point is that our discussions about self care are particularly impoverished when they fail to engage broader questions about the structure of health care, the social distribution of wealth, and the conditions in which we live and work. This is the thread I’ll pick up in the third and final installment of this piece by addressing last year’s series of debates on self-care and community care.

### 1NC -- Link -- Discursive Focus

#### The aff’s focus on *cultural articulations* of anti-blackness in *trope*, *image*, and *discourse* de-mobilizes Black radical resistance politics and ensures co-option by *neoliberal institutions*—emphasizing *performance* as the terrain of resistance abstracts away from the concrete, material, and political-economic foundations of anti-blackness, and ensures the enduring power of *the capitalist nation-state.*

Burden-Stelly 16 – (Charisse Burden-Stelly, PhD in African-American Studies from University of California Berkeley, dissertation entitled “The Modern Capitalist State and the Black Challenge: Culturalism and the Elision of Political Economy,” pgs. 13-16)

Even though contemporary articulations of the African diaspora became abstracted from radical enunciations of Blackness, and became a form of cultural critical practice, of mutual recognition against the universality of black misrepresentation and abjection, and an articulation of the politics of identity and representation, the Black radical structure of feeling nonetheless provided the grammar and the pedagogy to critique and challenge regimes of coloniality79 that sustain the trans-spatial and trans-temporal conditions of Black abjection. It created an intellectual map for theories of the African diaspora to reflect anticolonial and antiracist grievance articulated in the conjunctural space of black radical consciousness. Unlike post-Cold War articulations of Blackness, the Black radical structure of feeling inflected a heterogeneous critique imbued with not only cultural, but also structural, anticapitalist, and anti-imperialist foundations. “New Negro Culturalism”—the Harlem Renaissance enunciation of Black radicalism—had yet to become the hegemonic mode of theorizing and asserting Blackness, so the project of constructing Black modern subjectivity became inhered in a robust theoretical framework that included structural critiques of capitalist exploitation, analyses of racialization, and the politicization of cultural production.

This dissertation seeks to comprehensively refocus the analytical frameworks dealing with black modern subjectivity through an in-depth examination of “Culturalism,” or the regime of meaning-making in which Blackness is culturally specified and abstracted from material, political economic, and structural conditions of dispossession through state technologies of antiradicalism. As Deborah Thomas explains, “Herein lies the root of the epistemological violence generated by the turn to [C]ulturalis[m]... The question of where black populations stood in relation to states... became secondary to the question of how blacks in the West were connected to roots, to Africa... the language of cultural politics... abandons the impetus within internationalism toward imagining political community. It derails a more global political economic analysis...”80 Herskovitsian cultural analysis, which asserted Black humanity and equality based on evidence of African cultural legacy,81 inaugurated the shift from political economy to “the language of moralism.”82 The focus on cultural continuity did not take into account historical conditions of forced labor, racialized oppression, colonial imposition, or capitalist exploitation;83 instead it codified the “assumption that the history and culture of peoples of African descent in the New World have to be argued out anthropologically in terms of an identifiable authentic past persisting into the present.”84 The latter was determined to be the key to citizenship and equality for Blacks. Cold War Culturalism institutionalized the hegemony of antiradical cultural politics by foregrounding cultural analyses of African retention and syncretism, cultural continuity, and comparative diasporic cultures. As the Cold War instantiated the bifurcation of the world and influenced the direction of decolonization, “diaspora became reduced to its cultural aspects... the question of origins became a question of culture.” It essentially framed connections among African descendants in terms of culture; asserted Black modernity and claims to equality on cultural grounds; and constructed culture as the domain of struggle. Culturalism divorced Blackness and the African diaspora from the material realties of governmentalized, transnational state projects that sustain racial and class hierarchies.85

The hegemony of Culturalism in contemporary theories of the Black condition and the African diaspora diverge significantly from those of the Black radical structure of feeling that conceptualized the Diaspora (thought not explicitly named at this time) through a nexus that included political economy, cultural formations, and nationalism. Conditions of Black abjection were seen to permeate both the base and the superstructure such that mobilization on both fronts was necessary to combat white supremacy. The ascendance of New Negro Culturalism as the progenitor of, and therefore the predominate structure in, post-Cold War theories of the African diaspora is the unfortunate consequence of the entanglements of anticommunism, antiradicalism, and antiblackness. The result has been a turn away from the political economy/structural critique that, in the interwar period, provided a theoretical framework to challenge American antiblack statist discourse. The marginalization of Black radicalism and political economy produced the politicization of culture as the dominant mode of organizing for Black equality, and the primary intellectual focus in African diaspora studies. Post-Cold War theories of the African diaspora became divorced from the Black radical structure of feeling and reduced to the Harlem Renaissance enunciation of black radicalism in a manner that does not sufficiently theorize the conditions of Black abjection and their connection to the material realities of Black people.

Culturalism supports the constitution and maintenance of Blackness as a category of economic exploitation and dispossession and racialized abjection in three fundamental ways. First, it reinscribes the Black on the margins of the state by accommodating Blackness in a way that maintains their subordination and subjection on cultural grounds. The foregrounding of the culture, behavior, and performance of Black people leaves the effects of inequality, increased poverty, unemployment, and structural features of the global political economy on Black people largely undertheorized. Thus, on the one hand, deteriorating conditions of Black people globally are understood as innate cultural lack or pathology. On the other hand, it is assumed that Black empowerment and equality can be achieved in the struggle over cultural representation. Both of these positions reproduce cultural specifications of Blackness that negate the role of state and capitalist structures in its production and maintenance.

Second, Culturalism creates the condition for the Black that is inscribed in the modern project to “niggerize”86 radical Blacks who present a fundamental threat to the organization of global and statist structures on the basis of racialized capitalist exploitation. Culturalism asserts a particular outlook, behavior, and set of goals for Black people,87 and those who deviate from these norms that are ostensibly shared by the entire group are cast out. In other words, culture is asserted to rationalize the marginalization of those who occupy the constitutive outside of the state because they have been construed as seditious, subversive, and dangerous. The latter are foreclosed from belonging and are therefore subjected to the violation of their civil liberties, confinement, and deportation. By severely curtailing the possibilities, potential, and forms of freedom of those who are inscribed in the modern project and niggerizing those who are not, Culturalism ultimately functions as a technology of state repression and subjection.

Third, Culturalism has the dual function of erasing political economy as a means of understanding and critiquing the Black condition, and of specifying Black articulations of freedom and equality in terms of culture:

[A]nalyses of race and class began to privilege a focus on culture over a focus on socioeconomic inequality. This had both academic and practical effects. Academically, it supported a liberal view of development that naturalized capitalist competition and that positioned the cultural... practice of middle-class white Americans as normative... practically, the cultural model... directed attention away from the overall political economy of American capitalism and of how it ‘uses, abuses, and divides its poorly organized working class’...88

Anticommunism entrenched this move away from structural analysis by criminalizing and disciplining critiques of the entanglements of the racialized social order, the spread of empire, and capitalist accumulation. Instead of challenging their exclusion from the state based on economic dispossession and maldistribution of resources, Black people in the United States began to mobilize around cultural specification, for inclusion based on liberal civil rights discourse, and/or to assert international linkages based on mutually recognized cultural enunciations of blackness. In other words, the Cold War curtailed the possibilities of challenging the state in terms of the political economy of exploitation, thus Blackness came to be understood in nationalist and cultural terms of exclusion. At the same time, decolonizing countries that sought equality in the world-system asserted their willingness and ability to adopt the culture of development, modernization, and anticommunism. This was notwithstanding the fact that their insertion into the global political economy as sovereign nations continued relations of unequal exchange, declining terms of trade, and neocolonialism.89

Culturalism is thus a function of antiradical and antiblack statist pedagogy, and after World War II, it became entangled with anticommunism as an instrumentality of surveillance and violence. Culturalism institutionalized the erasure of radical political economic critique in the theorizing of the black global condition, the disciplining of Black radicalism, and the cultural specification of African diaspora studies examined in this dissertation. The cultural specification of Blackness and the forms of Culturalism that it takes are integrally related to statist technologies that facilitate the accommodation of Black intellectual and practical challenges to the capitalist state while, at the same time, ensuring their cooptation. These are the bases for the surveillance, disciplining, and punishment of black radical critique.

#### No perms or link turn—their starting point pathologizes black materiality and gets coopted by the academy.

Burden-Stelly 16 – (Charisse Burden-Stelly, PhD in African-American Studies from University of California Berkeley, dissertation entitled “The Modern Capitalist State and the Black Challenge: Culturalism and the Elision of Political Economy,” pgs. 192-194)

By the 1980s, there was an emergent emphasis on cultural affinity and connection in Africana studies that neglected the convergence of the material experiences in the structural organization of political economy among Blacks in the United States, Great Britain, Africa, and the Caribbean in the wake of a neoliberal agenda that produced a rollback of the state and its reformulation. This was instantiated through Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and Structural Adjustment that accompanied the collapse of the socialist/communist alternative. Despite this global restructuring, popular and scholarly understandings of American and “diasporic” Blackness did not involve a critique of political economy. An explanation of this elision will shed light on the conditions through and by which Africana studies shifted from its political, activist, and community-oriented distinctiveness to a Culturalist academic project. In other words, political economy became marginalized in the process of cultural specification of Africana studies.

Such overdetermination became evident in the “debates” taking place within the discipline focused around postcolonial studies/Black British Cultural Studies (BBCS), African American studies,1 and Afrocentricity. Each perspective posed culture as the critical site of struggle for the Black without any fundamental critique of political economy. Even though the postcolonial/Black British model ultimately became the point of reference and assumed near hegemonic status, it became highly modified and challenged by American scholars who felt that the antiessentialist, decentered, and ethnicized study of Black culture distorted and marginalized the experience of African Americans and obfuscated the peculiar dynamics of U.S. racialization. In the final analysis, the ubiquity of this “debate” further marginalized radical intellectual thought and political economic critique because the latter was deemed irrelevant to that narrow and myopic conversation based on culture. As a result, Africana studies has largely produced a cadre of alienated, privatized, culture experts who are unable to critically engage with the structural and material realities out of which the Black condition is forged. The discipline has produced a “technical intelligentsia” who is generally fit only to reproduce the “bureaucratic... apparatus” and whose “rationality... is only instrumental in character.”2 For this reason, the discipline has become unable, in its fundamentals, to engage significant issues of material abjection and political economy.

According to Martin Kilson, the maturation of Africana Studies was accomplished by and through the process of its “disciplinizing” and the proliferation of its most important innovation—Black cultural studies. Constituted by the overlapping of literary studies with psychological and societal studies, Black cultural studies provided an alternative Black ethnocentrism (Afrocentrism), and served as the primary source of enrichment of Africana Studies.3 His position is part of a debate that effectively materialized into a cultural critique of the culture concept that involved the three primary factions named above. What was being disputed and contested was not the assertion that culture was the primary means of understanding Blackness and the Black condition. Rather, the debate centered on the meaning of culture and how it should be articulated; what was at stake in particular narratives of Black/African culture; and what the effects on Africana Studies epistemology would be if one method of engaging culture was chosen over another. It questioned how culture should be operationalized, what methods and analytics best served the new disciplinary specification, and how relations of power were constituted by and instantiated through culture in the lives of Black people. The impetus for this debate was the growing influence of postcolonial studies/British cultural studies in the U.S. academy generally, and particularly of Black British Cultural Studies in Africana Studies.

The institutionalization and professionalization of Africana studies essentially collapsed the discipline into the study of Black culture. This was reified by the introduction of Black British Cultural Studies into the U.S. academy. The work and analytics of Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, Hazel Carby, Kobena Mercer, and other Black Britons were central to the epistemological transformation that resulted in African diaspora studies. This served in many ways to secure its legitimacy. The shift to African diaspora studies was predicated upon the appropriation and decontextualization of the tropes, concepts, and analytics of BBCS and a move away from historically and contextually specific Black American critiques of the U.S. racial state. As discussed in Chapter Four, the existent cultural specifications of Africana Studies precluded the (neo-) Marxist critique inhered in BBCS from taking root in the U.S. As a result, and unlike BBCS, African diaspora studies was unable to make an impact on Black struggles outside of the academy and on the structural issues related to these struggles. Africana studies challenged the racial epistemologies of the academy, but it fell far short of the critique raised by BBCS that systematically and deeply engaged the ways in which cultural forms were inextricably entangled with structures of domination and capitalist exploitation. Chapter Four argued that Africana studies became based on the grammar provided by American studies and the framework provided by area studies—(inter)disciplines that emerged in the context of the post-WWII proliferation of U.S. power and authority. BBCS satisfied the “need” for theory, complexity, and capaciousness in Africana studies, which had come under increasing criticism for ostensibly focusing on “victim studies” and “oppression studies.” The ready acceptance of BBCS by the American academy, though selective and partial, was due to the ways in which its abstracted articulations fit neatly within multicultural academic discourse and state pedagogy. Its cultural focus granted the state and capital reprieve from critical engagements with the material histories of racial domination, exploitation, and dispossession.

BBCS will be examined with particular focus on its critiques of the formulation of African American Studies in the U.S. academy, to elucidate the divergences in the two projects. As a counterhegemonic project, the origins and specifications of BBCS were forged as challenges to the British State and Thatcherism. When transferred to the U.S. context it proved compatible with the multicultural pedagogy of the U.S. state and became shorn of its radical critique. The following assertion by Laura Chrisman’s is particularly relevant to Africana Studies: “post-modernist intellectual concerns with language and subjectivity... infused both academia and ‘new Left’ politics to create a dominant paradigm of ‘culturalism’ for the analysis of social relations... [while] abandoning the tents and resources of socio-economic analysis.”4 Next, the Africana Studies “culture wars” will be unpacked to explicate the ways in which a narrow focus on African American Studies, Afrocentricity, and an Americanized version of BBCS foreclosed the possibility of Black radicalism and political economy critique in the discipline. Finally, the role of Culturalism will be elucidated through a critical analysis of The Black Atlantic—arguably the most important text in the shaping of African diaspora studies— written by Paul Gilroy in 1993. I argue that Gilroy’s preoccupation with the transnational routes of Black culture decentered the nation-state while reproducing its epistemological technology: Culturalism. Stated differently, while Gilroy challenged “methodological nationalism,”5 he did so through the cultural analytic of “diaspora”/Black Atlantic that reproduced the logics of nationalism and the nation-state. This explained the wide acceptance and acclaim received by The Black Atlantic and its acceptance in the U.S. academy. While The Black Atlantic was subjected to various forms of criticism, they failed to address the problematics of Culturalism.

### 1NC -- Link -- Infoshop

#### The 1AC is just an infoshop—an organization where radicals meet to discuss ideals in the abstract—this disconnection from society precludes any possibility or revolutionary change. True politics must occur at a level of class consciousness and organizing, they just recreate new elitism and maintain the status quo.

Olson 2013 (Joel, associate professor at Northern Arizona University, “The problem with infoshops and insurrection US anarchism, movement building, and the racial order”, ‘Contemporary Anarchist Studies’, published in 2013)

An infoshop is a space where people can learn about radical ideas, where radicals can meet other radicals, and where political work (such as meetings, public forums, fundraisers, etc.) can get done. In the infoshop strategy, infoshops and other “autonomous zones” model the free society (Bey 1985). Building “free spaces” inspires others to spontaneously create their own, spreading “counterinstitutions” throughout society to the point where they become so numerous that they overwhelm the powers that be. The very creation of anarchist free spaces has revolutionary implications, then, because it can lead to the “organic” (i.e. spontaneous, undirected, nonhierarchical) spreading of such spaces throughout society in a way that eventually challenges the state. An insurrection, meanwhile, is the armed uprising of the people. According to the insurrection strategy, anarchists acting in affinity groups or other small informal organizations engage in actions that encourage spontaneous uprisings in various sectors of society. As localized insurrections grow and spread, they combine into a full-scale revolution that overthrows the state and capital and makes possible the creation of a free society.3 Infoshops serve very important functions and any movement needs such spaces. Likewise, insurrection is a central event in any revolution, for it turns the patient organizing of the movement and the boiling anger of the people into an explosive confrontation with the state. The problem is when infoshops and insurrection are seen as revolutionary strategies in themselves rather than as part of a broader revolutionary movement. In the infoshop model, autonomous spaces become the movement for radical change rather than serving it. The insurrection model tries to replace movement building with spontaneous upheaval rather than seeing upheaval as an outcome of social movements. The infoshops and insurrection models, in other words, both misunderstand the process of social transformation. Radical change may be initiated by spontaneous revolts that are supported by subterranean free spaces, but these revolts are almost always the product of prior political movement building, and their gains must be consolidated by political organizations, not the spaces such organizations use. Social movements, then, are central to radical change. The classical anarchists understood this well, for they were very concerned to build working-class movements, such as Bakunin’s participation in the International Working Men’s Association, Berkman and Goldman’s support for striking workers, Lucy Parson’s work in the International Working People’s Association, and the Wobblies’ call for “One Big Union.” (To be sure, there were also practices of building free spaces and engaging in “propaganda by the deed” in classical anarchism, but these were not the sole or even dominant approaches.) Yet surprisingly much of the contemporary anarchist milieu has abandoned movement building. In fact, the infoshops and insurrection models both seem to be designed, at least in part, to avoid the slow, difficult, but absolutely necessary work of building mass movements. Indeed, anarchist publications like Green Anarchy are explicit about this, deriding movement building as inherently authoritarian (for example Morefus n.d.). The anarchist emphasis on hierarchy contributes to this impatience with movement building because the kind of political work it encourages are occasional protests or “actions” against myriad forms of domination rather than sustained organizing based on a coherent strategy to win political space in a protracted struggle. A revolution is not an infoshop, or an insurrection, or creating a temporary autonomous zone, or engaging in sabotage; it cannot be so easy, so evolutionary, so “organic,” so absent of difficult political struggle. A revolution is an actual historical event whereby one class overthrows another and – in the anarchist ideal – thereby makes it possible to abolish all forms of oppression. Such revolutions are the product of mass movements: a large group of people organized in struggle against the state and/or other institutions of power to achieve their demands. When movements become powerful enough, when they sufficiently weaken elites, and when fortune is on their side, they lead to an insurrection, and then perhaps a revolution. Yet in much of the anarchist milieu today, building free spaces and/or creating disorder are regarded as the movement itself rather than components of one. Neither the infoshops nor insurrection models build movements that can express the organized power of the working class. Thus, the necessary, difficult, slow, and inspiring process of building movements falls through the cracks between sabotage and the autonomous zone. Ironically, this leads many anarchists to take an elitist approach to political work. Divorced from a social movement, the strategy of building autonomous zones or engaging in direct action with small affinity groups assumes that radicals can start the revolution. But revolutionaries don’t make revolutions. Millions of ordinary and oppressed people do. Anarchist theory and practice today provides little sense of how these people are going to be part of the process, other than to create their own “free spaces” or to spontaneously join the festivals of upheaval. This is an idealistic, ahistorical, and, ironically, an elitist approach to politics, one that is curiously separated from the struggles of the oppressed themselves. C.L.R. James argues that the task of the revolutionary is to recognize, record, and engage: recognize in the struggles of the working class the effort to build a new society within the shell of the old; record those struggles and show the working class this record so they can see for themselves what they are doing and how it fits into a bigger picture; engage in these struggles with the working class, participating rather than dominating, earning leadership rather than assuming it, and applying lessons learned from previous struggles (James et al. 1974).4 This is a much more modest role for revolutionaries than germinating the revolution or sparking it, and one that is clearly consistent with anarchist politics. Yet the infoshops and insurrectionary models reject this approach for a top-down one in which anarchists “show the way” for the people to follow, never realizing that throughout history, revolutionaries (including anarchist ones) have always been trying to follow and catch up to the masses, not the other way around.

### 1NC -- Link -- Colonialism

#### Postcolonial studies divorced from capitalist analysis reinforce the dominant interest that there is no alternative to the present – the resulting amnesia regarding collective political action imperils revolutionary change

**Eagleton 3** [Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, *After Theory*, 2003, Basic Books: New York, NY, p. 5-9]

Not all students of culture are blind to the Western narcissism involved in working on the history of pubic hair while half the world’s population lacks adequate sanitation and survives on less than two dollars a day. Indeed, the most flourishing sector of cultural studies today is so-called post-colonial studies, which deals with just this dire condition. Like the discourse of gender and sexuality, it has been one of the most precious achievements of cultural theory. Yet these ideas have thrived among new generations who, for no fault of their own, can remember little of world-shaking political importance. Before the advent of the so-called war on terrorism, it seemed as though there might be nothing more momentous for young Europeans to recount to their grandchildren than the advent of the euro. Over the dreary decades of post-1970s conservatism, the historical sense had grown increasingly blunted, as it suited those in power that we should be able to imagine no alternative to the present. The future would simply be the present infinitely repeated - or, as the postmodernist remarked, ‘the present plus more options’. There are now those who piously insist on ‘historicizing’ and who seem to believe that anything that happened before 1980 is ancient history. To live in interesting times is not, to be sure, an unmixed blessing, It is no particular consolation to be able to recall the Holocaust, or to have lived through the Vietnam war. Innocence and amnesia have their advantages. There is no point in mourning the blissful days when you could have your skull fractured by the police every weekend in Hyde Park. To recall a world-shaking political history is also, for the political left at least, to recall what is for the most part a history of defeat. In any case, a new and ominous phase of global politics has now opened, which not even the most cloistered of academics will be able to ignore. Even so, what has proved most damaging, at least before the emergence of the anticapitalist movement, is the absence of memories of collective, and effective, political action. it is this which has warped so many contemporary cultural ideas out of shape. There is a historical vortex at the centre of our thought which drags it out of true. Much of the world as we know it, despite its solid, wellupholstered appearance, is of recent vintage. It was thrown up by the tidal waves of revolutionary nationalism which swept the globe in the period after the Second World War, tearing one nation after another from the grip of Western colonialism. The Allies’ struggle in the Second World War was itself a successful collaborative action on a scale unprecedented in human history - one which crushed a malevolent fascism at the heart of Europe, and in doing so laid some of the foundations of the world wc know today. Much of the global community we see around us was formed, fairly recently, by collective revolutionary projects - projects which were launched often enough by the weak and hungry, but which nevertheless proved successful in dislodging their predatory foreign rulers. Indeed, the Western empires which those revolutions dismantled were themselves for the most part the product of revolutions. It is just that they were those most victorious revolutions of all - the ones which we have forgotten ever took place. And that usually means the ones which produced the likes of us. Other people’s revolutions are always more eye-catching than one’s own. But it is one thing to make a revolution, and another to sustain it. Indeed, for the most eminent revolutionary leader of the twentieth century, what brought some revolutions to birth in the first place was also what was responsible for their ultimate downfall. Vladimir Lenin believed that it was the very backwardness of Tsarist Russia which had helped to make the Bolshevik revolution possible. Russia was a nation poor in the kind of civic institutions which secure the loyalty of citizens to the state, and thus help to stave off political insurrection. Its power was centralized rather than diffuse, coercive rather than consensual: it was concentrated in the state machine, so that to overthrow that was to seize sovereignty at a stroke, But this very same poverty and backwardness helped to scupper the revolution once it had been made. You could not build socialism in an economic backwater, encircled by stronger, politically hostile powers, among a mass of unskilled, illiterate workers and peasants without traditions of social organization and democratic self-government. The attempt to do so called for the strong-armed measures of Stalinism, which ended up subverting the very socialism it was trying to construct. 8 THE POLITICS OF AMNESIA Something of the same fate afflicted many of those nations who managed in the twentieth century to free themselves from Western colonial rule. in a tragic irony, socialism proved least possible where it was most necessary. Indeed, post-colonial theory first emerged in the wake of the failure of Third World nations to go it alone. It marked the end of the era of Third World revolutions, and the first glimmerings of what we now know as globalization. In the I 9 50s and 60s, a series of liberation movements, led by the nationalist middle classes, had thrown off their colonial masters in the name of political sovereignty and economic independence. By harnessing the demands of an impoverished people to these goals, the Third World elites could install themselves in power on the back of popular discontent. Once ensconced there, they would need to engage in an ungainly balancing act between radical pressures from below and global market forces from outside. Marxism, an internationalist current to its core, lent its support to these movements, respecting their demand for political autonomy and seeing in them a grievous setback to world capitalism. But many Marxists harboured few illusions about the aspiring middle-class elites who spearheaded these nationalist currents. Unlike the more sentimental brands of post-colonialism, most Marxism did not assume that ‘Third World’ meant good and ‘First World’ bad. They insisted rather on a class-analysis of colonial and post-colonial politics themselves. Isolated, poverty-stricken and poor in civic, liberal or democratic traditions, some of these regimes found themselves taking the Stalinist path into crippling isolation. Others had to acknowledge that they could not go it alone - that political sovereignty had brought with it no authentic economic self-government, and could never do so in a West-dominated world. As the world capitalist crisis deepened from the early 1970s onwards, and as a number of Third World nations sank further into stagnation and corruption, the aggressive restructurings of a Western capitalism fallen upon hard times finally put paid to illusions of national-revolutionary independence. ‘Third Worldism’ accordingly gave way to ‘post-colonialism’. Edward Said’s magisterial Orientalism, published in 1978, marked this transition in intellectual terms, despite its author’s understandable reservations about much of the post-colonial theory which was to follow in its wake. The book appeared at the turning-point of the fortunes of the international left. Given the partial failure of national revolution in the so-called Third World, post-colonial theory was wary of all talk of nationhood. Theorists who were either too young or too obtuse to recall that nationalism had born in its time an astonishingly effective anti-colonial force could find in it nothing but a benighted chauvinism or ethnic supremacism. Instead, much post-colonial thought focused on the cosmopolitan dimensions of a world in which post-colonial states were being sucked inexorably into the orbit of global capital. In doing so, it reflected a genuine reality. But in rejecting the idea of nationhood, it also tended to jettison the notion of class, which had been so closely bound up with the revolutionary nation. Most of the new theorists were not only ‘post’ colonialism, but ‘post’ the revolutionary impetus which had given birth to the new nations in the first place. If those nation-states had partly failed, unable to get on terms with the affluent capitalist world, then to look beyond the nation seemed to mean looking beyond class as well - and this at a time when capitalism was more powerful and predatory than ever. It is true that the revolutionary nationalists had in a sense looked beyond class themselves. By rallying the national people, they could forge a spurious unity out of conflicting class interests.

### 1NC -- Link -- Anti-Institutionalism

#### Their anti-institutional politics re-entrench the power of capital—viewing the state as an arena of class struggle is necessary to prevent environmental destruction and neoliberal accumulation.

Parenti & Emanuele 15

(Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner?¶ Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into.¶ This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country. There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle.¶ When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it.¶ Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government.¶ We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government.¶ The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue.¶ Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole. More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can.¶ Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month.¶ As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital.¶ I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives?¶ It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems. A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation.¶ You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news.¶ For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this.¶ Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local. On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left.¶ Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources?¶ Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly ~~stand up to~~ rebuff them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated.¶ If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the laws in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable.¶ Part Two:¶ Vincent Emanuele: Much of the green washing, or capitalism’s attempt to brand itself as green, focuses on localism and anti-government, market-driven programs. Do you think this phobia of the state among the US left is a result of previous failed political experiments? How much of this ideology is imposed from outside forces?¶ Christian Parenti: Some state phobia comes from the American political mythology of rugged individualism; some comes from the fundamentally Southern, Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights. Fear of the federal government by Southern elites goes back to the founding of the country. The Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian positions on government are fundamental to understanding American politics. I wrote about this for Jacobin magazine in a piece called "Reading Hamilton from the Left."¶ Lurking just beneath the surface of states’ rights is, of course, plantation rights. Those plantations, places like Monticello, were America’s equivalent of feudal manors where, in a de facto sense, economic, legal and military power were all bound up together and located in the private household of the planter. Those Virginian planters were the original localistas.¶ Nor did that project end with the fall of slavery, or the end of de jure segregation in the 1960s. Southern elites didn’t want Yankees telling them what to do; how to treat their slaves, how to organize their towns, how to run their elections, how to treat the environment – none of that! The South is a resource colony and its regional elites, some of them now running multinational corporations and holding important posts in the US government, believe they have a right to do what they wish with the people and landscape. Historically, that’s a large part of what localism and local democracy meant in the South. It meant that White local elites were "free" – free to push Black people around, free to feed racist fantasies to the White working class. They didn’t want interference from the outside. So, some of that anti-statist ideology comes from that plantation tradition. Another part of it comes from the real failures and crimes of state socialism, though state socialism also had, and in Cuba still has, many successes. The social welfare record of what we used to call "actually existing socialism" was pretty impressive. But there were also the problems of repression, surveillance and bureaucratization, which were partly the result of capitalist encirclement, partly the result of the ideological hubris rooted in ideological overconfidence in the allegedly scientific power of Marxism, partly the result of simple corruption among socialism’s political class. These real problems were central themes in the Cold War West’s educational and ideological apparatus of (generally right-wing) messaging from the press and the political class. In this discourse, communism was the state, while freedom was the private sector. Thus, the United States and freedom became embodied in popular notions of the private sector and individualism.¶ Of course, the great, unmentioned contradiction in this self-fantasy is the fact that American capitalism has always been heavily, heavily dependent on the state. Modern society, despite its fantasies about itself, is intensely cooperative and collective. Look at how complex its physical systems are; that cannot be achieved without massive levels of coordination and collective cooperation, much of it provided by the rules and regulations of government. The knee-jerk anti-statism, what the folks at Jacobin call "anarcho-liberalism," is also rooted in experience. The less social power you have, the more the state is experienced as an invasive, demeaning, oppressive and potentially, very violent bureaucracy. Neoliberalism would not have gotten this far if there wasn’t an element of truth to this critique of its bureaucracy and regulation. It has also used ideas that have old cultural tractions, like freedom.¶ Such are the contradictions of the modern democratic state in capitalist society. Government is rational, supportive, humane, [and offers] redistribution in the form of Social Security, high-quality public schools, environmental regulation, the Voting Rights Act and other federal civil rights laws that have helped break hegemonic power of local and regional bigots. But government is also militarized policing, the bloated prison system, spying on a vast scale; it is child protective services taking children from loving mothers on the basis of bureaucratic traps, corrupt corporate welfare at every level from town government to federal military contracting. The racist, sexist, plutocratic and techno-bureaucratic features of the state create fertile ground for people to turn their backs on the whole idea of government. What has been the impact of the right’s ability to effectively propagandize the White working class in the US?¶ Rightist intellectuals, academics, journalists, media tycoons, university presidents and loudmouth politicians work diligently to capture and form the raw experience of everyday oppression into an ideological common sense. To be clear, I use that term in the Gramscian sense, in which common sense refers to ruling class ideology that is so hegemonic as to be absorbed and naturalized by the people. The constant libertarian assault on the radio, in newspapers, on the television, this drumbeat of anti-government discourse is an old story – but still very important for understanding the anarcho-liberal sensibility. Just tune in to AM radio late on a weekday evening and listen to the anti-government vitriol. It’s sort of wild.¶ Someone could do an interesting study, Ph.D., in unpacking the cultural history of all this. It is tempting to speculate that deindustrialization, having disempowered and made anxious many huge sections of the working class, opens the way for fantasies of empowerment. The anti-statist, rugged individualist common sense is also always simultaneously a fantasy of empowerment. White men are particularly vulnerable to these fantasies. The classic guy who calls into the batshit crazy, late night, right-wing talk radio show is a middle-aged White man. Listen closely to the rage and you hear fantasies of independence. In this rhetoric, guns and gun rights become an obviously phallic symbol of individual empowerment, agency, self worth, responsibility etc. But most importantly, we have to think about how all of this anti-state ideology is being stirred up with investments from elites. The neoliberal project is to transform the state through anti-statist rhetoric and narratives. They sell the idea that people need to be liberated from the state. But then push policies that imprison people while liberating and pampering capital. It is hard for the left to see itself in this sketch – the angry, beaten-down, middle-aged White guy calling in from his basement or garage. But I think these much-documented corporate efforts to build neoliberal consent permeate the entire culture and infect us all, if even just a little bit.¶ This is the intellectually toxic environment in which young activists are approaching the question of the climate emergency. Young activists should be approaching the climate crisis the way the left approached the economic crisis during the Great Depression. We need to drastically restructure the state. We need it mobilized and able to transform the economy. The New Deal was imperfect, of course. It left domestic workers and farm workers out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was inherently racist. It dammed rivers and was environmentally destructive. However, the New Deal was radical in its general empowerment of labor; its distributional outcomes were progressive and it achieved a modernizing transformation of American capitalism. Not to overstate the case, but the New Deal could be a reference point for thinking about the beginning of a green transformation that seeks to euthanize the fossil fuel industry. We have to precipitously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build a new power sector. That much is very clear.¶ However, let me be clear: Shutting down the fossil fuel industry – mitigating the climate crisis – is not a solution for the environmental crisis. Climate change is only one part of the multifaceted environmental crisis. Shutting down the fossil fuel industry would not automatically end overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, habitat loss, toxification of the environment etc. But carbon mitigation is the most immediately pressing issue we face. The science is very clear on this. Climate change is the portion of the overall crisis that must be solved immediately so as to buy time to deal with all the other aspects of the crisis. Because I take the political implications of climate science very seriously, I am something of a carbon fundamentalist.

### 1NC -- Impact -- Extinction

#### The impact is extinction and global structural violence

William Robinson 16, UC Santa Barbra sociology professor, 4-12-2016, “Sadistic Capitalism: Six Urgent Matters for Humanity in Global Crisis,” http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis)

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.

### 1NC -- Alt -- Communist Party

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct violent tendencies within organizing, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation.

Escalante 18. Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist. Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “Party Organizing in the 21st Century. September 2018. <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century.>

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### The alternative is not simply a theoretical exercise but is informed by actual activism and community networks like “Casa Publo’s” in Puerto Rico or organizations Asian Pacific Environmental Network in the U.S. or Oil-Free Auckland lead by indigenous New Zealand communities such as Maori and Pasifika peoples. Only a truly global anti-capitalist paradigm that is insurgent and community based can solve the modern ecocide of capitalism and genocidal violence.

De Onís 2018 **(**“ES UNA LUCHA DOBLE” Articulating Environmental Nationalism in Puerto Rico by Catalina Maíre De Onís Ph.D., Indiana University. Assistant Professor of Civic Communication and Media. MBA)

**While linking environmentalism and nationalisms allows for important recognitions about shared logics of domination that mark particular bodies (humans, water, and land) as disposable**, and **assists in broadening the concept of self-determination beyond political sovereignty**, these relationships are complex. For instance, in Puerto Rico, disputes over how much influence the federal government should have in the Big Island’s environmental decision-making process have driven a wedge between pro-independence and environmental activists. During the 1970s, some movement actors viewed US intervention as necessary for enacting and enforcing environmental laws; others saw this as a betrayal of Puerto Rico’s potential for political sovereignty.46 Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, **coalitional politics must grapple with complex movement histories, legacies, and tensions**.47 Furthermore, **enactments of environmental nationalism with respect to strategic eclipse may not always “delink,” or divest from, oppressive practices**.48 Thus, while environmental nationalism and strategic eclipse can bring people together to create more livable communities, this articulation also has the potential to alienate others and deny vital interconnections.49 One of the **ways I have tried to record and complicate articulatory movement practices involves engaging those on the front lines with a commitment to praxis. A decolonial approach to reading these movement efforts requires critically documenting the lived realities of community members, including their reflections on mobilization campaigns and outcomes**. This approach resonates with Karma Chávez’s contention that we should **“think about the courses of action that people have available to them, on the ground, as the starting points for theoretical analysis**.”50 **By accessing, assessing, and amplifying these discourses, activist scholars and other researchers can engage in praxis that values both academic and community expertise and the insights and imaginaries generated by these collaborations. A study of the pipeline defeat would be incomplete without a discussion of a negative outcome of Vía Verde’s demise—a proposed alternative “solution,” known as the Aguirre Offshore Gasport.** **While the project is currently in limbo, the local public energy utility, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the US corporation Excelerate Energy are working to approve this gas port in southern Puerto Rico**. According to Santiago, **the project will detrimentally affect fishers’ livelihoods and coral reefs and increase the territory’s dependency on another fossil fuel (liquefied gas).51 This energy proposal demonstrates that grappling with colliding economic, energy, and environmental crises also involves determining what counts as a “successful” campaign, and for whom**. In response to the disproportionate effects of energy colonialism experienced in the southern part of Puerto Rico, local community members were organizing for solar communities before the 2017 hurricane season and continue to do so. While Casa Pueblo has received attention for its commendable efforts to help distribute and implement solar devices and infrastructure, other, less well-known groups also are working hard in this area. For example, collaborators with the Iniciativa de la Bahía de Jobos have been planning Coquí Solar, a community solar project, for several years. Evincing the impure politics of colonial situations, the Sierra Club likely will fund this community project. Thus, despite the limitations of USbased organizations in Puerto Rico noted by Rosario and González, this solar project suggests that they can provide the financial resources necessary to give community members control over their own energy futures. **Given our collective, though uneven, contribution to anthropogenic climate disruption and environmental degradation, it is not hyperbolic to argue that what happens in one part of the world carries global effects. The relationship between environmental advocacy and nationalisms is crucial for imagining and enacting more just, sustainable communities within and beyond Puerto Rico.** To quote Rosario, “**We have the means to change. We need to change what’s in our heads and in our hearts.** [Life] is a creation. Let’s re-create it. Let’s start dreaming another one.” Let us, indeed.

### 1NC -- Alt -- Revolutionary Intercommunalism

**Vote neg to endorse a revolutionary intercommunalism praxis like the BBP – that analyzes the way in which racial capitalism has effected communities and is rooted in materiality**

Toni **Morrison 09** (analyzes writings of Huey P. Newton), <<QUALS>>, “To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton,” City Lights Books, 2009 //pk

The vision of the Black Panther Party is expressed in the first part of this book, and the core of the vision is Revolutionary Intercommunalism. Revolutionary Intercommunalism is an idea which emerges out of a fundamental contradiction: that America is not a nation but an empire which directly or indirectly spans the globe, that its real units are communities which are ever more visible as one goes down into the poor Third World strata of America, and that that empire and community stand in dialectical contradiction and confrontation with each other. While peoples legitimately fight for nationhood throughout the world, in a fundamental sense, nations cannot really exist for long because all nations fall somewhere on a scale from liberated to non-liberated territories. As Newton says of Cuba, The People’s Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, “they represent the people’s liberated territory.” The American empire is everywhere, even in China, a fact dramatically demonstrated by Nixon’s visit. But the struggle against that empire takes form in the growth of communities able to produce, educate, and defend themselves. And the struggle expresses the revolutionary process when these communities forge linkages among themselves within nations and reach across national boundaries to different national communities. The Third World in America can never become a part of the American nation because there is no nation. To become a part means joining the empire which for most Third World people means to do so in a menial capacity. Third World people live in communities not by choice but because they are forced to remain in demarcated ghettos. Millions of White Americans live not in communities but as atomized individuals and in households. Nothing is more natural to man than xxxii to live in a community, but nothing is so abhorrent to the doctrines of “freedom” of the empire than that man should live in a community which escapes the manipulation of the rulers. The “villages” of the world have much to teach its “cities.” “We cannot make our stand as nationalists,” for the closer one is to the center of the empire, the more illusory the idea of nationhood is for any people. “We cannot even make our stand as internationalists,” for an aggregate of citizens of the world is little more than an aggregate of bourgeois individualists. “We must place our hopes on the philosophy of intercommunalism”—only those who are by, through, and from a community can serve the great family of humankind. To go out, one must go deep. But to go deep, one must also go out. “It is our belief,” says Newton, “that the Black people in America are the only people who can free the world, loosen the yoke of colonialism, and destroy the war machine.” The revolutionary process shows that people will be liberated, that the liberation of the outer and inner Third World is the key element in that process, and the Black people of the empire’s heartland are at the center of revolutionary action. The practice of the Black Panther Party is expressed in the second part of this book. The Party is a revolutionary vehicle made up of three elements: a small but dedicated cadre of workers who are willing to devote their full time to the goals of the organization; an organized structure through which the cadre can function; and revolutionary concepts which define and interpret phenomena, and establish the goals toward which the political vehicle will work. This is one side of practice. Its other indispensable side is “the building of a community structure,” the development of basic survival programs for the people amongst whom the Party lives and serves and derives nourishment. The practice of the Black Panther Party is much like the building of base areas which the Chinese Communists engaged xxxiii in during the 1930s. Building base areas sounds romantic with dashing guerrillas going out on forays against Japanese and Kuomintang oppressors. In reality it involved hard work day after day: planting crops, educating adults and children, organizing disaster relief, tending the sick, talking with the people. But when the oppressor came into the village, all united in defense of their achievements. And when the time came to unite with distant villages and party units for the attainment of larger goals, the cadres and many of the people went forth. They now understood that the large goals and the small goals were inextricably bound together. But the cadres also understood that the large goals were meaningless unless the smaller goals could be attained. As Newton says, “. . . they have to see first some basic accomplishments in order to realize that major successes are possible.” The writings of Huey Newton also make clear that above all, the cadres and the people must know things as they are, and not just find pleasure in celestial or revolutionary rhetoric. “We always emphasized a concrete analysis of conditions.” Even when the Black Panther Party was first founded, “its dreamers were armed with an ideology which provided a systematic method of analysis of how best to meet those needs.” But concrete analysis must never be of the type done by the sociological snooper who coldly collects and assorts his data. “We are interested in everything the people are interested in.” All great revolutions, despite what bourgeois theorists with their elitist notions have written, have always succeeded where the leaders and cadres were the “vehicles” of the people, where they were able to translate into organized and effective action the things the people wanted.

**Vote neg for revolutionary intercommunlism to supports community programs and affirm community networks that have the potential to fight capitalism and reactionary intercommunalism**

John **Narayan, 2020**, “Survival pending revolution: Self-determination in the age of proto-neo-liberal globalization”, <<King’s College London, UK >>, [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0011392119886870](about:blank) //pk

This new phase of imperialism, Newton contended, would fundamentally change the nature of the geography and of capitalist production and consumption. The Second and Third World would increasingly become a site of capitalist production, technology and forms of consumption, but with an increased rate of super-exploitation. This centred on Western based multinational corporations penetrating these regions in order to create a global commodity and consumption chain. This disarticulated form of Fordism3 would see ‘advanced technologies transplanted into these areas’ but still under the control of Western interests. The result would be a new global geography of industrial production and the spreading of capitalist ideology that would eradicate socialist alternatives to capitalist market societies: The difference, however, is everybody in America has a television, a car, and a relatively decent place to live. Even the lowest of the low do not live anywhere near the level of the poor of the world. Even the average person, the average ‘nigger,’ in the United States does not live as low as the average Chinese. Those who support the so-called socialist states will begin to be swayed by the introduction of a U.S. consumer market into their socialist countries.4 According to Newton, this process would see ‘growth without development’ within the Second and Third World and increased capital flows from the Second and Third World Narayan 191 back into the First. A regime supported by self-enriching ‘comprador agents’ in nation states outside of the West would bow to the power and ideology of empire and readily oppress and exploit their own people in order to secure their own position and wealth (Newton, 2002: 302–303). Such changes in the global capitalist production would, Newton believed, have massive implications for First World populations and especially US society. Newton argued that the nature of postwar capitalism would be disrupted due to the effects of reactionary intercommunalism’s disarticulated Fordism and increased technological advancement. Moreover, Newton outlined how technological innovation (automation, robotics, cybernetics), combined with an increasing global labour arbitrage, would eradicate the need for expensive wageworkers in the First World. This would see the ‘increase of the lumpen-proletariat and the decrease of the proletariat’ and the likely dismantling of the welfare state as ruling circles sought to maximize profits and their share of income (Newton, 2002: 193). This ‘increase of the lumpen proletariat and the decrease of the proletariat’ would in turn disrupt the racial settlement of US society. Whereas Black Americans had literally been segregated from the fruits of US welfare capitalism (New Deal), in order for white society to flourish, reactionary intercommunalism would transgress such racial privilege in order to maintain and expand exploitative and profitable capitalist relations. This would not end racial capitalism5 within the US, but rather see the boomeranging of conditions and practices found in the darker nations of the Third World (and ghettos of the US), such as deindustrialization, structural unemployment, state retrenchment and super-exploitation, back into the general (white) population of the US. Newton believed that this would heighten the racial divisions and tensions in US society rather than lead to greater racial unity between white and non-white communities (Newton, 2002: 193). Newton concluded that this new phase of imperialism and the onset of a truly global form of capitalism would result in all of the world’s nation states becoming interconnected and under siege by the ruling circle of global capital and capitalist ideology (Newton, 2002: 170). This would, in turn, reduce humanity to a collection of communities who, whilst sharing different material and cultural experiences, were united by the reality of the full spectrum dominance of capital: There is an undeniable interconnection to everything among all the territories in the world. That is why we say that there are no longer nations; there are only communities under siege by the reactionaries. This is where we get the term reactionary intercommunalism. (Newton, 2002: 259) As Narayan (2017) has argued, Newton’s theorization of reactionary intercommunalism is best read as a proto-theorization of what we have come to call neo-liberal globalization. Newton’s narration of how the interests of corporate capital, technological advancement and a new geography of industrial production would lead to deindustrialization, precarious employment, welfare state retrenchment, and an orgy of profit in the First World has essentially come to pass (see Harvey, 2005); whilst his narrative of how socialism would be defeated through Western neo-imperialism, elite enrichment and the expansion of capitalist forms of production, consumption and exploitation in the Third 192 Current Sociology Monograph 1 68(2) World is also eerily prescient (see Prashad, 2013; Smith, 2016). What I want to highlight in the next section is how Newton’s pivoting of the BPP away from armed confrontation with the US state and towards the idea of survival pending revolution was rooted in his theorization of reactionary intercommunalism’s possible negation through revolutionary intercommunalism and the concept of creating ‘liberated territory’. Survival pending revolution: Saving and organizing the people We stood at a crossroads. Would we follow our original survival program and live – if necessary die – for the people, or would we join our potential for nihilism with the State’s terrific violence and kill ourselves before the government could exterminate us at their leisure? Rebuilding the organisation would be the Black Panther Party’s greatest challenge. (Newton, 1972c) Historians of the BPP have often downplayed the significance of Newton’s theory of intercommunalism on BPP praxis. In their erudite history of the BPP, Bloom and Martin (2013: 354, 467–468, n11) argue that Newton’s evocation of intercommunalism did not mark a sharp categorical shift in the Party’s ideological history and its anti-imperialist stance. They go on to suggest that the BPP’s move towards the idea of ‘survival pending revolution’ was driven by pragmatic decisions in reaction to increased government repression, falling support from white allies and middle class members of the Black community, concessions given by the US state such as affirmative action programs, the tapering down of the Vietnam War, and the soothing of US diplomatic relations with the Third World. Murch (2010: 194) and Spencer (2016: 222, n73) also question the significance of intercommunalism through highlighting a perceived disconnect between Newton’s theory and the BPP’s rank and file members. The argument here being that BPP members were driven more by concrete ideas of community control than by lofty and abstract ideas such as intercommunalism. On face value, these assertions hold true. The BPP did have to react to an ever-changing domestic and geo-political context and intercommunalism can be seen as an evolution in BPP ideology. The praxis of the BPP rank and file was also certainly not always consciously conducted in the name of Newton’s theory. Yet, these narratives seem to underplay how Newton’s theory of reactionary intercommunalism was actually formed in reaction to these changing political contexts and readily accounts for developments such as the cooling of diplomatic hostility between Third World and the US. Above all else, these positions neglect the fact, as Elaine Brown (1992: 277) makes clear, that there was the ‘ “mass line”, and there was the “party line” and then there was the “bottom line”, which was the vision of Huey P. Newton’. Indeed, as Brown goes on to outline, the BPP’s turn towards the idea of ‘survival pending revolution’, and the expanding of the BPP’s survival programs, was inherently linked to Newton’s theorization of reactionary intercommunalism and its possible negation through what he called ‘revolutionary intercommunalism’.6 Newton’s idea of revolutionary intercommunalism was founded on the belief that attempts to fight reactionary intercommunalism through forms of nationalism or even internationalism were pointless. Newton asserted that the economic, technological and political reality of reactionary intercommunalism meant that nations could not reassert Narayan 193 their former forms of sovereignty in order to practise nationalism or internationalism (Newton, 2002: 187). The only solution to a situation to such a ‘distorted form of collectively’, Newton contended, where the ‘superstructure of Wall Street’ appropriated the wealth that all global communities of ‘labour’ produced, was to liberate all of the communities of the world (Newton, 2002: 174, 236). Newton identified that the main barriers to such revolutionary intercommunalism were the material and ideological effects of reactionary intercommunalism. As we have seen, reactionary intercommunalism now meant that all nation states and their populations were becoming a ‘collection of communities’, with no ‘superstructure of their own’ other than global capitalism. Moreover, the processes of reactionary intercommunalism, such as the spreading of capitalist production and proletarianization in the Third World and the lumpen-proletarianization and state retrenchment in the First World, now led to the co-opting or destruction of the very socio-economic, cultural and political institutions (education, workplace, unions, democracy, nation state) that could facilitate revolutionary intercommunal subjectivity amongst the world’s peoples. However, Newton highlighted that there existed liberated territories in the global system of reactionary intercommunalism, such as China, Cuba and North Vietnam, which offered alternative ways of life to reactionary intercommunalism and offered examples of a path towards revolutionary intercommunalism: . . . we say they represent the people’s liberated territory. They represent a community liberated. But that community is not sufficient, it is not satisfied, just as the National Liberation Front is not satisfied with the liberated territory in the South. It is only the ground- work and preparation for the liberation of the world . . . seizing the . . . wealth from the ruling circle, equal distribution and proportional representation in an intercommunal framework. This is what the Black Panther Party would like to achieve with the help of the power of the people, because without the people nothing can be achieved. (Newton, 2002: 171) It was within this rationale of a ‘liberated territory’, which could forward the cause of revolutionary intercommunalism, that Newton sought to expand and accelerate the survival programs of the BPP in late 1970.7 Newton’s theory of intercommunalism thus reconceptualized the survival programs of the BPP as a means towards an anti-imperialist struggle for liberated territory within the belly of US empire and found common cause with anti-imperialist struggle for liberated territory in the Third World.8 The revolutionary intercommunal vision of the BPP survival programs post-1970 was made clear in Newton’s 1971 declaration of the BPP’s common cause with the anti-imperial struggle of FRELIMO in Mozambique: To achieve this end, we struggle here inside the United States to get rid of our oppression. Others struggle inside their territorial boundaries to get rid of oppression. The more territory we liberate in the world, the closer we will come to an end to all oppression . . . Today the philosophy of revolutionary intercommunalism dictates that the survival programs implemented by and with the people here in America and those same basic People’s Survival Programs being implemented in Mozambique by the Mozambique Liberation Front are essential to bringing about world unity . . . We are a large collection of communities who can unite and fight together against our common enemy. The United States’ domination over all our territories equals a 194 Current Sociology Monograph 1 68(2) reactionary (in opposition to the interests of all) set of circumstances among our communities: Reactionary Intercommunalism. We can transform these circumstances to all our benefit: Revolutionary Intercommunalism. (Newton, 2002: 236)9 Newton believed that BPP survival programs would now function with a dual purpose. Such programs would not only address the basic needs of the Black community that had been racially excluded from the spaces and spoils of US welfare capitalism and which would be further marginalized by economic and political changes associated with reactionary intercommunalism (lumpen-proletarianization, state retrenchment, super-exploitation). But also serve as a ‘necessary part of the revolutionary process’ by practically educating and politicizing community members through their participation in alternative institutional forms of community cooperation and collaboration. Survival programs were therefore seen as a ‘means of brining people closer to the transformation of society’ towards communist ends (Newton, 2009b [1973]: 357). Newton dubbed the dual-purpose strategy of BPP survival programs, which helped the community survive the material and ideological effects of reactionary intercommunalism whilst also educating and politicizing the community around revolutionary intercommunalism, ‘Survival Pending Revolution’: All these programs satisfy the deep needs of the community but they are not solutions to our problems. That is why we call them survival programs, meaning survival pending revolution. We say that the survival program of the Black Panther Party is like the survival kit of a sailor stranded on a raft. It helps him to sustain himself until he can get completely out of that situation. So the survival programs are not answers or solutions, but they will help us to organize the community around a true analysis and understanding of their situation. When consciousness and understanding is raised to a high level then the community will seize the time and deliver themselves from the boot of their oppressor. (Newton, 2002: 230) The dual purpose of the BPP survival programs is best appreciated through examining how such programs looked both to save and organize the Black community along revolutionary intercommunal lines. Survival programs such as the BPP free breakfasts for school children and medical centres inherently dealt with the racial disparities of US welfare capitalism. This brought the racial contradictions of the US state’s ideas of universalism into full view and sought to organize the Black community around these contradictions. However, a common misconception about the BPP’s survival programs is that they were solely for the Black community and not truly intercommunal. Although the Panthers embedded these programs in poor, Black working-class communities, they often offered their services to the whole of society on the basis of unity in class struggle. As New York BPP leader Carlton Yearwood explained, ‘when we provide free breakfast for school children, we provide them for poor whites and poor blacks’. This commitment to class struggle across its racial modalities could also be found in the BPP medical centres. Although the centres highlighted and focused on problems specific to the Black community, such as sickle cell anaemia, BPP-run medical centres offered services to all people no matter their colour (Bloom and Martin, 2013: 187, 292; Burke and Jefferies, 2016: 111–114; Spencer, 2016). BPP survival programs thus offered real institutional Narayan 195 glimpses of an actual true universalism that transcended the racial divisions of US welfare capitalism. The BPP survival programs did not only offer alternative institutional forms of community cooperation and collaboration that transgressed the racial division of US welfare capitalism. They also offered a critique of the political economy of capitalism and offered glimpses of alternative, anti-capitalist forms of community cooperation and collaboration. BPP survival programs inherently questioned the nature of wage-labour and profit in their organization and delivery: All our survival programs are free. We have never charged the community a dime to receive the things they need from any of our programs and we will not do so. (Newton, 2002: 230) While the Party, through its various chapters across the US, often initiated programs, the day-to-day running of them often involved the wider community, local businesses, churches and professionals such as doctors and nurses. Survival programs depended on such people volunteering their time and labour and organizations offering space and resources. Panther-run medical centres, for example, often saw white and black middle class healthcare professionals offering their labour for free and being coordinated and managed by BPP members and community volunteers (Burke and Jefferies, 2016: 111–114). This questioning of the capitalist political economy was embodied in the BPP’s approach to funding their survival programs. From 1971 onwards the Panthers shifted from an earlier blanket denouncement of Black capitalism (Black owned business) to embracing the limited merits of Black capitalism for the Black community. This saw the BPP utilize resources donated or cajoled from local Black businesses in order to fund survival programs. Newton offered an explanation of such a new approach by attempting to highlight how Black capitalism’s funding of the survival programs heightened the contradictions between Black capitalism and a (white) corporate capitalism that dominated both the Black community and Black capitalists: When the Black capitalist contributes to the survival programs and makes a contribution to the community, the community will give him their support and thus strengthen his business. If he does not make any contribution to the survival of the community, the people will not support him and his enterprise will wither away because of his own negligence. By supporting the community, however, he will be helping to build the political machine that will eventually negate his exploitation of the community, but also negate his being exploited and victimized by corporate capitalism . . . In this way Black capitalism will be transformed from a relationship of exploitation of the community to a relationship of service to the community, which will contribute to the survival of everyone. (Newton, 2002: 233) Black capitalism’s funding of survival programs, or rather the return of Black capitalism’s profits to its community, would therefore bring forth its own negation through providing a context that would allow the anti-capitalist nature of evolutionary intercommunalism to take seed: 196 Current Sociology Monograph 1 68(2) The most important element in controlling our own institutions would be to organise into cooperatives, which would end all forms of exploitation. Then the profits, or surplus, from the cooperatives would be returned to the community, expanding opportunities on all levels, and enriching life. Beyond this, our ultimate aim is to have various ethnic communities cooperating in a spirit of mutual aid, rather than competing. In this way, all communities would be allied in a common purpose. (Newton, 2009a [1972]: 178) BPP survival programs post-1970 functioned to provide practical measures to materially and ideologically survive the effects of reactionary intercommunalism but also offered examples of new ways of organizing labour and capital that offered people glimpses of transcending reactionary intercommunalism altogether. The institutional practices of the BPP’s survival programs, as Singh (2004: 205–206) has suggested, are best seen as a ‘projection of sovereignty’ that rivalled the ‘reality principle’ of the US state. This entailed a practical deconstruction of the idea of state power (policing, education, welfare), which reimagined spaces and practices along anti-capitalist and intercommunal lines of self-determination. The BPP survival programs offered alternative ways of life to the racially divisive, class exploitative and gendered10 structures of capitalist society and were aimed towards eliciting a broad spectrum of support for these alternative forms of life. The BPP survival programs thus reimagined and reorganized institutions (welfare, employment, local economy) that were being destroyed or co-opted by the processes of reactionary intercommunalism. This is made explicit by Elaine Brown’s comments, in 1972, which articulate that resisting the material and ideological effects of a new form of global capitalism was now the fundamental rationale of the BPP and its approach of survival pending revolution:

**Revolutionary intercommunalism has the capacity to fight capitalist imperialist violence**

United Panther Movement, 04-29-2016 (“Revolutionary Intercommunalism: Not Some Cool Idea,” Kevin “Rashin” Johnson, http://rashidmod.com/?p=2113)//pk

Revolutionary Intercommunalism is not just some cool idea Huey P. Newton had as in a utopian pipe dream. It is in fact the logical and necessary next step in human social evolution/revolution. Huey, and the central committee of the original Black Panther Party (BPP), arrived at this theory by applying Marxism (Dialectical Materialism) to make a fresh analysis of how the world was hooked up at that time (1970) and the trajectory of its development. This was necessary, because they were serious revolutionaries, and as Marx explained: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language.” ― Karl Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) To be dialectical means to see the duality in things, that everything exists as a unity of opposites and that there is both unity and struggle between the opposing aspects of a thing. This struggle determines the development of the thing, and one aspect is always principal. When the secondary aspect of a thing becomes the principal aspect, a revolution takes place that changes the character of the thing. Things exist in relation to other things and are affected by them, but the principal cause of change is internal to the thing. Plants grow to reach for the sunlight because internally they need the sunlight to live and to grow healthy. The struggle to survive drives the internal contradiction within the plant. In any complex set of contradictions, there is always one that is principal influencing the development of the other contradictions in a major way. In the United Panther Movement (UPM) led by the New Afrikan Black Panther Party Prison Chapter (NABPP-PC), we say the principal contradiction in the world at this time is between the need of the monopoly capitalist ruling class to consolidate their global capitalist-imperialist hegemony and the chaos and anarchy they are unleashing by attempting to do so, including the danger of instigating nuclear war. This is manifesting itself all over the world – and particularly in the Middle East and the Ukraine, and increasingly in Afrika, Latin America and Asia – and also here in the U.S., and we can see it in how the Presidential election is unfolding. Hillary Clinton appears to be the monopoly capitalist oligarchy’s choice to replace Obama, but as his Secretary of State, she is closely tied to his legacy of unleashing chaos in the Middle East, and particularly the debacle in Libya and the ongoing proxy war in Syria. She’s got a lot of blood on her hands. Bernie Sanders appears to have been tapped to pull younger, more progressive, voters back into the Democratic Party and then to close ranks with Hillary after she wins the nomination to defeat the Republican Party candidate. This seems likely to be Donald Trump, who seems to have been taped to play the role of racist-populist demagogue to rally the party’s chaotic right-wing base and alienate the moderates to switch tickets and support Hillary. After eight years of working to undermine the Obama administration and fanning the flames of racism, Trump is releasing the pent up frustration of the white middle and working class base Agnew dubbed the “silent majority.” But they are no longer the majority and if Trump is defeated, they are unlikely to be silent. If he should win, they would be empowered and able to give rein to their hate against Blacks, Mexicans, Muslims, Gays, Jews, immigrants, leftists, atheists, disabled and so on. Trump is unleashing forces he cannot control and playing with a polarization that could unleash serious anarchy and civil war. Bernie Sanders, a Jew and self-styled “Socialist,” would seem to be the logical target for their hate, but they seem to be too focused on hating Hillary and the political class of insiders she represents. Many of Trump’s supporters also consider voting for Sanders if he gets the Democrat Party nomination. Even if Sander’s supporters vote for Hillary to block Trump, they are unlikely to support her foreign and domestic policies. In any event, the polarization of the masses into “left” and right camps is likely to continue and intensify no matter who gets elected. In other words, the two party system that has stabilized the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (bush-wah-zee), or capitalist-imperialism, is pulling apart and will likely continue to do so. The Weapon of Theory “The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But, for man, the root is man himself.” — Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction (1843) The Theory of Revolutionary Intercommunalism recognizes that the World Proletarian Socialist Revolution, which began in Marx’s time, has entered a new phase as Mao Tse-tung predicted. As Mao pointed out: “At present, the world revolution has entered a great new era. The struggle of the Black people in the United States for emancipation is a component part of the general struggle of all the people of the world against U.S. imperialism, a component part of the contemporary world revolution. I call on the workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals of all countries and all who are willing to fight against U.S. imperialism to take action and extend strong support to the struggle of the Black people in the United States! People of the whole world, unite still more closely and launch a sustained and vigorous offensive against our common enemy, U.S. imperialism, and its accomplices! It can be said with certainty that the complete collapse of colonialism, imperialism, and all systems of exploitation, and the complete emancipation of all the oppressed peoples and nations of the world are not far off.” – Mao Tse-tung, “A New Storm Against Imperialism” (1968) The principal aspect of this “new era” is the global hegemony of U.S.-centered capitalist-imperialism, which makes the existence of independent national economies and political autonomy impossible. Like it or not, the only way to escape the clutches of empire is to end it. As Mao explained: “Racial discrimination in the United States is a product of the colonialist and imperialist system. The contradiction between the Black masses in the United States and the U.S. ruling circles is a class contradiction. Only by overthrowing the reactionary rule of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class and destroying the colonialist and imperialist system can the Black people in the United States win complete emancipation. The Black masses and the masses of white working people in the United States have common interests and common objectives to struggle for. Therefore, the Afro-American struggle is winning sympathy and support from increasing numbers of white working people and progressives in the United States. The struggle of the Black people in the United States is bound to merge with the American workers’ movement, and this will eventually end the criminal rule of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class.” – Ibid. In other words, Mao saw that the principal contradiction had shifted away from that between the colonial and semi-colonial countries and the imperialist countries. In summarizing Huey’s theory, Comrade Kevin “Rashid” Johnson, the Minister of Defense of NABPP-PC, pointed out: “The Party [BPP] first based itself on nationalism because, he [Huey] said, he believed, as did many, that a subjugated people could gain their freedom by forming their own independent nation states. But this proved inadequate; even for socialist nations, because Amerika had grown to become a literal world ‘empire’ and so effectively integrated and dominated the world’s economy, lands and peoples, that none could truly break away from that system to exist or develop as free and independent states. “The condition of colonialism had evolved to such a level that Amerika fed off the wealth and resources of the entire world, but without need of maintaining its own administration or settler presence inside the foreign domains, as the old colonial system had. But the concept of neo-colonialism did not adequately define this relationship either, he said, because all the old colonies were not merely ruled over by local lackeys, but rather the entire societies had been integrated into a globally interconnected system like that of so many communities, instead of as an arrangement of separate sovereign nations. He called this system “Reactionary Intercommunalism.” “Because they could not decolonize, (become independent and free nation states with control over their own economic development and institutions), nationalism and internationalism made no sense. As he noted the basis of decolonization or national independence is that a colonized people be able to reclaim or return to their previously existing stages of development or otherwise develop their own productive forces. “But he saw this world system with its interconnected technologies, cultures and communication systems as able, if brought under collective control of the masses rather than that of a small circle of super-rich administrators, to provide for everyone’s needs, solve all the world’s problems, and create a communal culture that could end the prevalence of perpetual war and social chaos. This new social order he called Revolutionary Intercommunalism, or World Socialism, and a precursor to the Communist World (a world free of oppression and exploitation) which Marxists aspire to.” – Kevin “Rashid” Johnson, “In Search of the Right Theory for Today’s Struggles: Revisiting Huey P. Newton’s Theory of Revolutionary Intercommunalism (2015) With some 900 U.S. military bases in some 153 out of 257 countries in the world, not to mention military alliances, overthrowing the U.S. empire must necessarily be a world revolution fought on many fronts. Having achieved victory and defeated the ruling class, and seized control of the basic means of production and expropriated the assets of the big bourgeoisie, it would be necessary to establish a world proletarian dictatorship to carry out socialist reconstruction of the world economy. Global people’s war must necessarily unite the world proletariat under a common banner and revolutionary headquarters. Speaking to a conference of non-aligned nations and movements in Havana in 1966, the great Afrikan revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabral stated: “It is with the intention of making a contribution, however modest, to this debate that we present here our opinion of the foundations and objectives of national liberation in relation to the social structure. This opinion is the result of our own experiences of the struggle and of a critical appreciation of the experiences of others. To those who see in it a theoretical character, we would recall that every practice produces a theory, and that if it is true that a revolution can fail even though it be based on perfectly conceived theories, nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory. “Those who affirm — in our case correctly — that the motive force of history is the class struggle would certainly agree to a revision of this affirmation to make it more precise and give it an even wider field of application if they had a better knowledge of the essential characteristics of certain colonized peoples, that is to say peoples dominated by imperialism. In fact in the general evolution of humanity and of each of the peoples of which it is composed, classes appear neither as a generalized and simultaneous phenomenon throughout the totality of these groups, nor as a finished, perfect, uniform and spontaneous whole. The definition of classes within one or several human groups is a fundamental consequence of the progressive development of the productive forces and of the characteristics of the distribution of the wealth produced by the group or usurped from others. That is to say that the socio-economic phenomenon ‘class’ is created and develops as a function of at least two essential and interdependent variables — the level of productive forces and the pattern of ownership of the means of production. This development takes place slowly, gradually and unevenly, by quantitative and generally imperceptible variations in the fundamental components; once a certain degree of accumulation is reached, this process then leads to a qualitative jump, characterized by the appearance of classes and of conflict between them. “Factors external to the socio-economic whole can influence, more or less significantly, the process of development of classes, accelerating it, slowing it down and even causing regressions. When, for whatever reason, the influence of these factors ceases, the process reassumes its independence and its rhythm is then determined not only be the specific internal characteristics of the whole, but also by the resultant of the effect produced in it by the temporary action of the external factors. On a strictly internal level the rhythm of the process may vary, but it remains continuous and progressive. Sudden progress is only possible as a function of violent alterations — mutations — in the level of productive forces or in the pattern of ownership. These violent transformations carried out within the process of development of classes, as a result of mutations in the level of productive forces or in the pattern of ownership, are generally called, in economic and political language, revolutions.” – Amilcar Cabral, “The Weapon of Theory” (1966) What Comrade Cabral was getting at here is the unevenness in development of classes and class struggle in the different countries and communities in the colonial and neo-colonial countries, and in contrast to the imperialist countries. He stated: “Another important distinction between the colonial and neo-colonial situations is in the prospects for the struggle. The colonial situation (in which the nation class fights the repressive forces of the bourgeoisie of the colonizing country) can lead, apparently at least, to a nationalist solution (national revolution); the nation gains its independence and theoretically adopts the economic structure which best suits it. The neo-colonial situation (in which the working classes and their allies struggle simultaneously against the imperialist bourgeoisie and the native ruling class) is not resolved by a nationalist solution; it demands the destruction of the capitalist structure implanted in the national territory by imperialism, and correctly postulates a socialist solution.” – Ibid Fifty years later, colonialism has almost everywhere been replaced by neo-colonialism and integration into the global economy dominated by capitalist-imperialism. “Dollar Diplomacy” and IMF “structural readjustments” have subordinated the newly “independent” countries of the “Third World” to neo-liberal policies and corporate penetration of the countries’ basic institutions. In many cases the U.S. has replaced the former colonial powers in training their military establishment as well as arming and equipping them. A national solution becomes ever more unlikely and a socialist solution ever more necessary. By developing struggle and the revolutionary movement inside the U.S., we will create more favorable conditions for anti-imperialist struggle and revolution in the neo-colonial countries and every country under the yoke of capitalist-imperialism. Building a global United Panther Movement to lead the struggle of the urban poor will have a “blow-back” effect here that will empower our struggle. Whose Lives Matter? “Black Lives Matter” is a correct slogan but not necessarily the best one. With the exception of the movement led by the original Black Panther Party (BPP), the Black movement against racial discrimination and oppression in the U.S. has historically been aimed at appealing to the rich ruling class whites, the 1%, to make concessions, whether it be integration, affirmative action, reparations or self-determination. Whether humbly begging or militantly demanding, the thrust is attempting to reform the capitalist system without altering the foundation of class exploitation and global imperialism. When the Panthers put forward the slogan “Power to the People,” they unleashed a whirlwind that resonated well beyond the Black movement. They were aiming at and appealing to all the oppressed people – in Amerika and around the world – not begging for reforms but uniting for fundamental and revolutionary change. As Fred Hampton said: “Power anywhere where there’s people. Power anywhere where there’s people. Let me give you an example of teaching people. Basically, the way they learn is observation and participation. You know a lot of us go around and joke ourselves and believe that the masses have PhDs, but that’s not true. And even if they did, it wouldn’t make any difference. Because with some things, you have to learn by seeing it or either participating in it. And you know yourselves that there are people walking around your community today that have all types of degrees that should be at this meeting but are not here. Right? Because you can have as many degrees as a thermometer, if you don’t have any practice, then you can’t walk across the street and chew gum at the same time… “We got to face some facts. That the masses are poor, that the masses belong to what you call the lower class, and when I talk about the masses, I’m talking about the white masses, I’m talking about the black masses, and the brown masses, and the yellow masses, too. We’ve got to face the fact that some people say you fight fire best with fire, but we say you put fire out best with water. We say you don’t fight racism with racism. We’re gonna fight racism with solidarity. We say you don’t fight capitalism with no black capitalism; you fight capitalism with socialism. “We ain’t gonna fight no reactionary pigs who run up and down the street being reactionary; we’re gonna organize and dedicate ourselves to revolutionary political power and teach ourselves the specific needs of resisting the power structure, arm ourselves, and we’re gonna fight reactionary pigs with INTERNATIONAL PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION. That’s what it has to be. The people have to have the power: it belongs to the people.” – Fred Hampton, “Power Anywhere Where There’s People” (1969) Comrade Fred didn’t get killed in his sleep because he was some Black racist terrorist or gangster, but because he was “Speaking Truth to Power!” The greatest fear the exploiter has is the masses of the oppressed and exploited people coming together to take back what it rightfully ours – power over our lives. Liberation is not slavery without shackles and leg irons, it is not the opportunity to become a Black capitalist or a Brown capitalist or whatever, and perpetuate this rotten system of class privilege and oppression. Liberation is getting free of all that and ending it for future generations. Liberation is revolution to achieve ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE! Create Public Opinion Seize Power Mao summed up revolution as “create public opinion seize power.” Our first and primary duty is to create public opinion in favor of overthrowing the capitalist-imperialist system, racism and police state repression. As Malcolm X summed up, “You can’t have capitalism without racism.” In combatting racism, we must confront the lie that there is anything normal about racism and expose that the very idea of separate races and racial superiority was the invention of the capitalists to excuse their many crimes against humanity, and particularly chattel slavery in the Americas. “We have to understand very clearly that there’s a man in our community called a capitalist. Sometimes he’s black and sometimes he’s white. But that man has to be driven out of our community, because anybody who comes into the community to make profit off the people by exploiting them can be defined as a capitalist. And we don’t care how many programs they have, how long a dashiki they have. Because political power does not flow from the sleeve of a dashiki; political power flows from the barrel of a gun. It flows from the barrel of a gun!” – Ibid We have to be conscious that the enemy sends his agents among us and their job is to mislead the people, misdirect the people, and play one section of the people against another. They do it in the white community, the Black community and every other community. These so called “community leaders’” job is to “dumb down” the masses and feed them racist, nationalist and in general reactionary ideology. They do on a small scale what Donald Trump is doing on a big scale right now, and we have to expose that shit for what it is. As Fred Hampton said: “So what did we do? We were out there educating the people. How did we educate them? Basically, the way people learn, by observation and participation. And that’s what we’re trying to do. That’s what we got to do here in this community. And a lot of people don’t understand, but there’s three basic things that you got to do anytime you intend to have yourself a successful revolution. “A lot of people get the word revolution mixed up and they think revolution’s a bad word. Revolution is nothing but like having a sore on your body and then you put something on that sore to cure that infection. And I’m telling you that were living in an infectious society right now. I’m telling you that were living in a sick society. And anybody that endorses integrating into this sick society before its cleaned up is a man who’s committing a crime against the people. “If you walk past a hospital room and see a sign that says “Contaminated” and then you try to lead people into that room, either those people are mighty dumb, you understand me, cause if they weren’t, they’d tell you that you are an unfair, unjust leader that does not have your followers’ interests in mind. And what we’re saying is simply that leaders have got to become, we’ve got to start making them accountable for what they do. They’re goin’ around talking about so-and-so’s an Uncle Tom so we’re gonna open up a cultural center and teach him what blackness is. And this n\*\*\*\*r is more aware than you and me and Malcolm and Martin Luther King and everybody else put together. That’s right. They’re the ones that are most aware. They’re most aware, cause they’re the ones that are gonna open up the center. They’re gonna tell you where bones come from in Africa that you can’t even pronounce the names. That’s right. They’ll be telling you about Chaka, the leader of the Bantu freedom fighters, and Jomo Kenyatta, those dingo-dingas. They’ll be running all of that down to you. They know about it all. But the point is they do what they’re doing because it is beneficial and it is profitable for them. “You see, people get involved in a lot of things that’s profitable to them, and we’ve got to make it less profitable. We’ve got to make it less beneficial. I’m saying that any program that’s brought into our community should be analyzed by the people of that community. It should be analyzed to see that it meets the relevant needs of that community. We don’t need no n\*\*\*\*\*s coming into our community to be having no company to open business for the n\*\*\*\*\*s. There’s too many n\*\*\*\*\*s in our community that can’t get crackers out of the business that they’re gonna open.” – Ibid Revolutionary intercommunalism provides a theoretical basis, based on the practice of the original BPP, to unite all the oppressed – both within the U.S. and around the world – with the common objective and strategy to overthrow capitalist-imperialism and socialize ownership of the basic means of production in the global economy. There are different forces out there calling themselves “revolutionary” or claiming to be “Black Panthers” who are promoting an ideological-political line that is opposed to Pantherism. In this period, making revolution requires a higher level of political consciousness. Nationalism doesn’t cut it. At best it is insufficient and at worst it is deliberate misdirection in the service of capitalist-imperialism.

### 2NC -- Aff Fails

#### Movement efficacy turns decolonization in practice—capitalism fuels coloniality, only a robust labor movement can break down colonial institutions.

Webber 16 (Jeffery R. - Lecturer in the School of Politics and IR at Queen Mary, University of London, 2016, “Idle No More: An Introduction to the Symposium on Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks,” Historical Materialism, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2016, p. 3-29)

Ensuring that anti-capitalism is at the core of Indigenous resurgence is the basis of Coulthard’s second thesis. ‘For Indigenous nations to live,’ he concludes, ‘capitalism must die.’ 15 Coulthard sees in recent Indigenous tactics like traffic- and train blockading an anti-capitalist impulse, rooted in the disruption of the sphere of circulation. Such actions ‘seek to impede or block the flow of resources currently being transported to international markets from oil and gas fields, refineries, lumber mills, mining operations, and hydroelectric facilities located on the dispossessed lands of Indigenous nations’. 16 Such actions are consciously built to intensify their ‘negative impact on the economic infrastructure that is core to the colonial accumulation of capital in settler-political economies like Canada’s’. 17 Although Coulthard does not highlight the connection, this strategic orientation resonates in many ways with what might be labelled the turn to circulation in much of contemporary Marxist and anarchist strategic theory, particularly in the domain of historical-materialist geography. 18 Another urgent concern of Coulthard’s anti-capitalist thesis is again one of socio-geography: ‘how might we begin to scale up these often localized, resurgent land-based direct actions to produce a more general transformation in the colonial economy?’ 19 He recognises that short of a ‘massive transformation in the political economy of contemporary settler-colonialism, any efforts to rebuild [Indigenous] nations will remain parasitic on capitalism, and thus on the perpetual exploitation of our lands and labour’. 20 A project of transformation at this level inevitably requires networks of solidarity beyond the Indigenous movement: This reality demands that we continue to remain open to, if not actively seek out and establish, relations of solidarity and networks of trade and mutual aid with national and transnational communities and organizations that are also struggling against the imposed effects of globalized capital, including other Indigenous nations and national confederacies; urban Indigenous people and organizations; the labour, women’s, gbltq2s (gay, bisexual, lesbian, trans, queer, and two-spirit), and environmental movements; and, of course, those racial and ethnic communities that find themselves subject to their own distinct forms of economic, social, and cultural marginalization. 21 An anti-capitalist strategy of Indigenous liberation, then, requires broad networks of solidarity and purposeful linkages between local battles and wider scales of conflict.

## DA -- Heg

#### Their Ks slide into the politics they criticize — their unconditional anti-Americanism lacks academic rigor and causes fascism — our alternative worse arguments are accurate.

Walzer ’18 — Michael; Professor Emeritus of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University. He received his B.A. from Brandeis University in 1956 and received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1961. 2018; “A Foreign Policy for the Left”; *Yale University Press*; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

The second shortcut, perhaps more popular than the first, is to stand up always against “imperialism”—or, a shortcut inside the shortcut, always to oppose American policies abroad. Anti-Americanism is a common left politics, which, again, sometimes gets things right and sometimes doesn’t. I believe that it got things right in Vietnam in 1967; it mostly got things right from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century in Central and South America; it got Iran right in 1953, when leftists criticized the anti-Mossadegh coup, and it got Iraq right in 2003. But that’s not enough to make the shortcut a reliable one. The defeat of Nazism and Stalinism, the two most brutal political regimes in world history, was in significant ways American work. Many people on the left supported that work, as we should have.

In 1967, Dwight Macdonald wrote to Mary McCarthy that the American war in Vietnam proved “that despite all the good things about our internal political-social-cultural life, we have become an imperialist power, and one that, partly because of these domestic virtues, is a most inept one.”37 We are still inept: in December 2005, with 100,000 American soldiers in Iraq, we organized an election there — and our man came in third. This result may be without precedent in imperial history. (It might suggest that we were less interested in imperial control than in promoting democracy, though the Iraqi politician who came in first wasn’t much of a democrat.) Macdonald’s understanding of US imperialism reflects a political intelligence and a moral balance that are mostly missing in contemporary anti-American writing.

Another often used shortcut is to oppose everything Israel does and to blame it for much that it hasn’t done, since it is the “lackey” of American imperialism or, alternatively, the dominant force shaping American foreign policy. The policies of recent Israeli governments require strong criticism — the occupation, the settlements, the refusal to suppress Jewish thugs and terrorists on the West Bank. But much of the left attack on Israel has little to do with its policies and more to do with its existence, which is taken to be the root cause of all evils in the Middle East. This view violates all the requirements of realism — by which I mean simply a readiness to see the world as it really is.

The last shortcut is to support every government that calls itself leftist or anti-imperialist and sets itself against American interests. This is different from the old Stalinist shortcut: support the Soviet Union, whatever it does, because it is the first proletarian dictatorship and the first workers’ paradise. That kind of politics is, I think, definitively finished, though it had a brief afterlife focused on China and then, with very few believers, on Albania and North Korea. The more recent version celebrates Maximal Leaders like Gamal Nasser, Fidel Castro, or Hugo Chávez; there are also short-lived infatuations, such as Michel Foucault’s affair with the future Ayatollah Khomeini. Leftist enthusiasm for populist dictatorships is one of our sad stories, which ends when resources run out, the failure to build the economy suddenly becomes undeniable, and the military takes over. But often the Maximal Leader is a military ~~man himself~~ [person themselves], and the repressive role of the army simply becomes more obvious over time. In Latin America today, the better left is represented by socialists and social-democrats in countries like Chile, Brazil, and Costa Rica who reject demagogic populism and struggle to produce economic growth, greater equality, and a stronger welfare state — and who attract less enthusiasm from American leftists than they deserve.38

There is a lot to be said for the default position. We should work in the place we know best to make things better. The improvement of humanity begins at home. This argument has special force for Americans, who live in an increasingly unequal society that is also a near-hegemonic world power. We need to be wary of adventures abroad that make our work at home more difficult.

Still, good leftists can’t avoid internationalism. We will be engaged again and again in arguments about what we should do or what we should urge the United States to do to help people in trouble or comrades abroad. Sometimes there is nothing that the United States can do, at least nothing it is likely to do right. But even when we oppose American action in other countries, we can be active ourselves — providing moral, political, and financial support to [people] ~~men and women~~ fighting in self-defense or in defense of others. There is no magic answer to the question, What should we do? But the ideological shortcuts I’ve just described, lazily adopted and rigidly held, have served us badly in the past and are almost certain to serve us badly in the future. Sticking with them means that we will get things right only by accident.

Political intelligence and moral sensitivity work much better than ideology, and they are what should guide our choice of comrades and our decisions about when and how to act abroad. Dictators and terrorists are never our comrades. We should embrace only those ~~men and women~~ [people] who really believe in and practice democracy and equality. We should act abroad only with those who share our commitments and then, only in ways consistent with those commitments. This is the politics that I want to call left internationalism.

#### Aligning with China against the US because of ‘human rights’ is academic garbage propagated by Chinese media.

Hung ’20 — Ho Fung; Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor in Political Economy at the Sociology Department and the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. They received their bachelor degree from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, MA degree from SUNY-Binghamton, and PhD degree in Sociology from Johns Hopkins. June 5, 2020; “As U.S. Injustices Rage, China’s Condemnation Reeks of Cynicism”; *Foreign Policy*; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/05/us-injustice-protests-china-condemnation-cynical/>; //CYang

Beijing’s criticism of the United States, however, differs from that seen around the globe. China’s critique does not stem from a genuine concern for universal human rights and the well-being of African Americans. The Chinese people have not been given any opportunity to protest in solidarity with Americans — or against the abuses of black residents in China itself. Anti-black racism remains rampant on the Chinese internet, untouched by censors who seek to crush opinions the government dislikes. Its motivation is simply to tell the United States, and everybody else, to stop criticizing China over its own human rights abuses. Underneath Beijing’s commentary on the U.S. unrest is a deeply cynical voice that asks: If the U.S. authorities can do it, why shouldn’t we?

Last Friday afternoon, Trump held a press conference to denounce China’s plan to devise a national security law to crack down on Hong Kong’s dissents. He threatened to end U.S. recognition of Hong Kong’s special trading status and to sanction Chinese officials hurting Hong Kong’s freedom. It is going to bring real damage to Chinese companies and wealthy elites who have been using Hong Kong as a back door to gain access to foreign capital, sensitive technology, and channels to relocate their wealth overseas.

That night, after Trump’s speech, major cities across the United States were engulfed in flames, National Guards were mobilized, and protesters clashed with riot police near the White House. The president reportedly hid briefly in a bunker. The Chinese authorities have been heavily criticized for their crackdown on Hong Kong protests, for the Uighur concentration camps, and for the arrests of rights lawyers. Beijing must be delighted to see the U.S. global reputation tarnished as its problems of racism and police brutality are brought into the spotlight. It would be surprising if Beijing did not seize the moment to criticize the double standards of the White House. This cynicism underlines Beijing’s response to criticism of its bullying behavior in the international arena. When an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines against Chinese claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea in 2016, Beijing made it clear it would not abide by the ruling. It pointed out that the United States violated international law all the time and, hypocritically, hadn’t even acceded to the relevant U.N. convention itself.

Such rhetoric has grown common over the last few decades, as the Chinese Communist Party gradually abandoned its appeal for a more just social system and world order. Instead, the party has become increasingly explicit in referring to the global domination by Western powers as a license for its own imperial ambition. Jiang Shigong, an influential official scholar who advises the Chinese government on Hong Kong policy and global governance, even wrote recently that China should “absorb the skills and achievements” of the British and American empires to construct its own “world empire” for the sake of the Chinese people and the world.

For those in the United States and elsewhere who aspire for more equality, justice, and liberty, it is a mistake to see Beijing as an exotic progressive force with which to ally. Beijing points to the violence and injustice of the United States to exonerate itself from its own egregious violence and injustices. Police brutality and racism in the United States are unimaginably horrific. But U.S. authorities today are not using these protests as an excuse to arrest dissenting legislators and professors, to wholly outlaw peaceful assembly and rights organizations, to pressure companies and universities to fire employees sympathetic with the protesters, to arrest people for criticizing the government on social media, or to lock up 1 million minorities in reeducation camps. These abuses are routine in China and becoming routine in Hong Kong.

#### Russia’s worse.

Siegle & Smith ’22 — Joseph Siegle; the director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Jeffrey Smith; the founding director of the pro-democracy nonprofit organization Vanguard Africa. May 30, 2022; "Putin’s World Order Would Be Devastating for Africa"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/30/russia-war-africa/; //CYang

But African leaders should have a more fundamental concern than these — at least, those who are committed to advancing peace and democracy. Putin is attempting to undermine the global order that has guided international relations for the better part of the last century. Building on Russia’s previous annexation of Crimea and parts of northern Georgia as well as its prior occupation of Ukraine’s Donbas region, Putin is taking a sledgehammer to the foundation of the once stable post-World War II order.

This attempt to normalize expansionist ambitions will have profound consequences for Africa. Would-be tsars across the continent — who, like Putin, have evaded term limits to stay in power indefinitely while eliminating their political opposition — are watching closely, asking if Putin can get away with this brazen overreach and flout the rules-based order, then why can’t they. It is a reasonable question to ask. At stake are established notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the independence of member states, which suddenly become more temporal, arbitrary, and open to violent contestation.

Perhaps the most eloquent defense of the existing order, premised on these foundational principles, came from Kenya’s permanent representative to the United Nations: ambassador Martin Kimani, who warned Putin and the Russian military to respect its border with Ukraine, using Africa’s own colonial past to highlight the dangers of stoking the “embers of dead empires.”

So what does a Russian-shaped international order look like for Africa?

A primary feature is the challenge to the inviolability of established boundaries. There are currently some 100 contested borders on the continent, most of them stemming from arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries. These have, for the most part, been managed peacefully by successive African governments, rooted in a respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that were enshrined in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and later reaffirmed in the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2001. Established during the postcolonial independence period, many African states were born out of a commitment to self-determination. Ironically, this is the central issue being contested today by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

If the lesson from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is that might makes right, then Africa’s political geography could be perpetually in dispute. In other words, if the overlapping security guarantees provided by both the U.N. and AU charters can be violated with impunity, then what is to stop African leaders who envy Putin’s aggressive brand of authoritarianism from following suit?

Already, we see this happening in some parts of Africa.

The volatile African Great Lakes region stands out for the fragility of its borders. The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has become a target for exploitation by authoritarian leaders in neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. Rwandan President Paul Kagame, officially in power since 2000, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, have routinely marched their troops and proxies as well as directed their allied rebel groups to seize Congolese territory, loot natural resources, and kill citizens with alarming impunity. In October 2021, Congolese authorities reported clashing with Rwandan troops, who allegedly occupied several villages before retreating. And as recently as March, the Congolese army presented evidence that the Kagame regime was actively backing a rebellion in eastern Congo. Disregarding borders is particularly precarious in the Great Lakes region because it carries with it the potential to reignite one of the most cataclysmic conflicts in recent history.

Similarly, Moscow has played a destabilizing role in Africa. Recent years have illuminated a “new scramble for Africa” as external actors seek to aggressively plant their politics, governance, and economic flags across the continent. Russia has been at the forefront of this predatory behavior by repeatedly propping up isolated and authoritarian leaders — most notably in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan — to advance Moscow’s patently anti-democratic influence.

Through the deployment of shadowy and unaccountable mercenary groups, polarizing disinformation campaigns, election interference, and arms-for-resource deals, Russia has gained influence while fostering instability and the increased human rights abuses that ultimately result from it.

Russia has also fomented — both covertly and overtly — and been quick to support the many unconstitutional seizures of power recently witnessed in Africa. The spate of coups and increasing instances of African leaders scrapping term limits, for example, better suit Moscow’s vision of remaking the international order in its autocratic mold.

That a Russian-shaped order in Africa would be more oppressive is crucial to note since most of the 16 ongoing internal conflicts on the continent have deep roots in authoritarian forms of governance. None of Africa’s established democracies, in contrast, are in conflict. More authoritarianism, then, can be expected to yield more conflict.

Tolerance for predatory interstate behavior globally, moreover, will embolden elevated forms of repression domestically in African states. After all, if the enshrined principles of self-determination and popular participation are not respected in a high-profile instance, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, then what international actors can be compelled to penalize the intimidation or jailing of opposition leaders, the shuttering of independent media outlets, and the brazen rigging of elections in Africa? Growing autocracy would do a grave injustice to the 75 percent of Africans who regularly state that democracy is their preferred form of government. The inevitable repression that will result from an unfettered international order would also lead to a spike in refugee flows and internally displaced populations.

It took the trauma of World War II to compel the international community to unite, recognize, and sign onto the principles outlined in the U.N. Charter. Intrinsic to this global system — forged from hard-learned and costly experiences — was the importance of collective security to deter and push back against authoritarian bullies in Europe and elsewhere.

The Organisation of African Unity and later the AU adopted many of these core values. Indeed, drawing on its own hard-earned lessons from colonialism, the challenges of securing peace following the brutal wars of the 1990s, and the aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, the AU rightly recognized the importance of action when faced with violations of such universal principles.

While often underappreciated and unevenly applied, the U.N. and AU frameworks provide a layer of international accountability against extralegal actions as well as a critical starting point to build the solidarity that is needed to address the challenges that the global community faces.

As Africans grapple with the more present and disastrous aftershocks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is important to recognize the threat this form of authoritarian expansion will have on the continent if it is normalized. History shows us that impunity is contagious. And apathy in the face of imminent threat is foolhardy. The clear threats emanating from Putin’s worldview defy the principles that are central to an international order that both the U.N. and AU helped foster.

#### Analyzing and rejecting hegemonic missteps is consistent with affirming hegemony as a net force for good.

Dubowitz & Schanzer ‘20 — Mark Dubowitz is the chief executive of FDD, a Washington, D.C.-based nonpartisan policy institute. Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at FDD, where he oversees the work of the organization’s experts and scholars. December 15, 2020; “Retain American Power, Do Not Restrain It”; *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*; <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/12/15/defending-forward-retain-american-power-do-not-restrain-it/>; //CYang

Today’s restrainers similarly seek to capitalize on the suffering and difficulties associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the broader fight against terrorism, when they argue for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces from these and other conflicts.11 Restrainers, however, often conflate the initial decision to intervene at all with how a conflict is subsequently managed or how eventually to withdraw. These are different policy decisions. Indeed, one can be critical of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and how the war was managed – while also believing that Washington should retain a modest U.S. military presence to help prevent a return of the Islamic State and to counter the influence of Iran.

Restrainers have also attempted to leverage the Great Recession and the current economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic to incite populist passions.12 They do this by falsely suggesting that defense spending is the primary source of the federal deficit and debt.13 Defense spending is near post-World War II lows in terms of percentage of U.S. gross domestic product and percentage of federal spending.

Restrainers consistently paint existing and potential conflicts and U.S. military deployments with the same brush, warning of another “forever war.”14 However, not every conflict leads to an interminable quagmire. Even the so-called War on Terror, despite its headaches, so far has helped prevent another major foreign terrorist attack on the United States, which many had predicted to be inevitable after 9/11.

The term “forever war” is itself curious. History, unfortunately, is a forever war — the chronicle of states’ struggles with their enemies. To be sure, one can write a truly wondrous history of human achievement. But sadly, as the Spanish writer George Santayana observed, “only the dead have seen the end of war.”15

Restrainers operate under the mistaken assertion that the world would be a safer or better place if U.S. influence would simply recede.16 The 20th century tells another story. As the historian Robert Kagan argued in his 2012 book The World America Made, the U.S.-led world order has heralded a global rise in liberalism and human rights, better education and health, greater wealth, and more access to information.17

Equally puzzling is the notion that the world’s problems and conflicts are of little consequence to the United States.18 What happens abroad inevitably affects Americans at home. Al-Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks despite America’s best efforts to steer clear of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda was and is based. The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor despite Washington’s best efforts to stay out of the fray. Isolationists initially blocked then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt from providing greater support to an embattled Britain, and millions of lives were lost from not confronting German leader Adolf Hitler sooner.19

The best way to protect American interests is to engage internationally and maintain a well-designed, forward-deployed military presence alongside allies and partners. As Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell have noted, U.S. deployments of varying magnitude along what they call the “unquiet frontier” that stretches from the Baltic Sea to the South China Sea counter the rise of revisionist powers such as China, Russia, and Iran.20 Support for U.S. allies, coupled with a U.S. military presence in forward bases, helps deter gathering threats.21

When Washington plays an outsized role in shaping and maintaining the international rules-based order, Americans and people around the world are safer and more prosperous. That is what the United States has done, for the most part, since World War II. And that leadership role has helped ensure that global conflicts such as the Cold War did not erupt into devastating military confrontations.

Admittedly, the U.S.-led international order certainly has not prevented all wars. There have been costly mistakes along the way. But responding to those mistakes by ignoring persistent threats and drawing down U.S. military posture for its own sake would be shortsighted and dangerous.

Those who welcome the retreat of U.S. power have yet to fully answer one important question: What happens after the United States goes home? When the British Empire unraveled after World War II, the United States stepped into the void, promoting an international system based on the rule of law. Who will follow the United States? The alternatives are frightening.

Russia is far less equipped to become a superpower but would be a particularly predatory, corrupt, and avaricious one under Russian President Vladimir Putin. China, for its part, actively seeks global leadership. The Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian hostility to democracy; weaponization of data;22 human rights abuses;23 support for rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan;24 threats to Hong Kong and Taiwan;25 militarization of the South China Sea;26 and massive theft of intellectual property27 should all serve as warnings about a Chinese-led world order. And let us all dispense with the fiction that the European Union could be an alternative to the United States in defending democracies.

#### US military presence is non-coercive and a force for good — allies welcome our troops because of the security and economic benefits. Large-N studies prove that hegemony ensures peace and prosperity.

Timothy Kane ‘19. JP Conte Fellow in Immigration Studies at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; PhD in economics from UC San Diego. "The United States as a Promethean Power." Hoover Institution. 6-17-2019. <https://www.hoover.org/research/united-states-promethean-power>

The global scope of American military power has been described in many ways: hegemony, primacy, and unipolarity. Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth (2012)1 cover the nuances of the terminology well, and I agree with their preference for the term “Deep Engagement” that Joseph Nye coined in a 1995 article.2 The complex patterns and nuances of engagement remain poorly understood, with a focus on conflict that ignores the preponderance of cases, where U.S. forces have been peacefully based for decades. In short, foreign policy has focused on the heat instead of the light — countless studies, essays, and books on Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq stand in contrast to the negligible attention given to countries where the U.S. maintained large-scale and long-term troop basing such as Belgium, Korea, Turkey, and Kuwait.

Is the United States an empire? We may just as well debate whether an elephant most closely resembles a Tyrannosaurus Rex or Triceratops. Some will point to the imperial characteristics that are reflected in the United States force posture. But characteristics of dinosaurs or empires (size, martial strength, breadth) really have no meaning in a world where that entire order is extinct. The 21st century is filled with a new order of nation-states, markedly different from eras prior to 1945.

American power is best understood not by its type: hard, soft, or smart, but its motivation. This is not to say the “imperial” motivation has disappeared from human affairs; self-preservation and domination are instinctive human qualities. But there is a new aspect to international relations that has been in place for more than a century, a form of altruism, illustrated by the widespread support that exists in the U.S. and other countries for universal human rights. For many decades now, nations have routinely sought to advance something beyond their narrow national interests. I call this a Promethean motivation, and America a Promethean power.

The phrase is rooted in the myth of Prometheus, the rebellious god of ancient Greek mythology who stole fire from Zeus and gave it to the human race, sparking the beginning of technology, growth, civilization, and prosperity. Zeus was the ruler of the Gods of Olympus, archetype of the emperor/king. The Gods were rulers, and humans were mere subjects. Prometheus represents rebellion, the trickster God, undercutting the authority of the imperial order. Legend has it that Prometheus tricked Zeus — repeatedly — in order to help uplift the human race.

Critics of American intervention reflexively use the term “imperial” when discussing foreign affairs. By far the dominant theme of imperialism in American foreign policy has been voiced by Leftist thinkers such as Howard Zinn, Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, and Gore Vidal. But since 1990, the end of the Cold War, neo-isolationists on the right have adopted the term as well, notably Pat Buchanan and Congressman Ron Paul. Thus the tendency is for thinkers on the political extremes — globalists on the left, nationalists on the right — to find common cause, whereas centrists tend to view American power more favorably, as do many foreign scholars.

Following the 9/11 attacks and concerns about state failure abroad, proponents of American intervention began suggesting American empire in explicit and favorable ways. Such voices included Richard Haas, Sebastian Mallaby, and Max Boot. The fullest expression of this new theme is found in Colossus, a 2004 book by Niall Ferguson3 (now a colleague at the Hoover Institution), who argued “not merely that the United States is an empire, but that it always has been an empire” and that the ultimate threat to the nation is its own “absence of a will to power.” The book is an unappreciated gem, but one wonders if Ferguson and his intellectual opponents share the same framework, which refuses to draw a line between imperial states of the 15th-19th centuries and the modern states of the 21st.

Ferguson wonderfully skewers the slipperiness of the term hegemon, which remains “the most popular term among writers on international relations.” Hegemony refers to a coercive state, like an empire, but one that aims to create mutually beneficial relationships. Trying to define the nature of state power by the distribution of benefits (exploitative or shared) misses the point. The point is: what are first principles that motivate foreign action?

America on the world stage should be understood in the context of its revolutionary founding. The republic’s anti-imperial birth and its sense of manifest destiny have colored foreign affairs from early on. Consider again Thomas Jefferson’s “Empire of Liberty,” which was more than a poetic phrase. In 1809 Jefferson wrote to his successor James Madison, “I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire & self-government.” In one of his final letters, written in 1824, Jefferson wrote, “where this progress will stop no-one can say. Barbarism has, in the meantime, been receding before the steady step of amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear from the earth.”

To simplify matters, let’s accept the framework of definitions on the Left (and also popularly understood by Americans throughout history). Define an empire as a nation that exploits foreign peoples, aiming to colonize them and/or extract their resources for the advantage of the empire and at the cost of the foreigners. And for the sake of clarity, recognize a bright line that distinguishes imperial relationships as those where subjugated peoples do not want but are forced to abide by foreign intervention. To be specific, the U.S. role in South Korea fails the imperial test, as does the post-1955 role of the U.S. in Germany and Japan. Those three countries accounted for nearly three-quarters of U.S. troop deployments since 1950. Not to mention Spain, Turkey, Taiwan, and Kuwait. All of these are voluntary alliances, and qualitatively distinct from forces based in Iraq.

For the Leftist criticism of American empire to hold, evidence of domination should be easy to see. One would expect to see the countries of the world that are occupied by American troops suffering economic decline as a result, or at a minimum a relative decline. Here the critique falls apart. The countries of the world that have hosted the greatest number of American troops since 1950 have grown the fastest economically. Furthermore, host countries have experienced faster declines in child mortality, faster increase in overall longevity, faster growth in infrastructure, and even greater improvements in the broadly measured human development index (HDI). Consider as evidence the average economic growth rates presented in table 2, reproduced from Jones and Kane (2012).4

The record shows that America’s engagement with allied nations is unequivocally beneficial for those countries. But the context is what matters for future policy choices. Public perceptions of world affairs are dominated by negatives: bombings in Iraqi cities, AIDS rampant in Africa, genocides, earthquakes. Foreign policy experts focus on negatives of a subtler nature: the dilemma over Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, the poppy trade and corruption in Afghanistan, the strategic mystery that is China. Yet despite real and looming crises, the underlying theme of the American century is a patient march of human prosperity, deepening and broadening as economic growth unfolds in the free world.

The American strategy of patient, forward deployment of U.S. troops, even and especially when it is not self-interested, has benefitted our allies and the world. America’s engagement in Asia and Europe since 1945 created a security umbrella fostering peace and unprecedented prosperity. If this model were applied to the Middle East — supporting allies rather than hunting monsters — it would reshape the region’s future for the better. On this point, Fallows might agree.

The question that haunts contemporary foreign policy is not whether the U.S. military is a force for good around the globe. It is. The question is: Can Promethean power be sustained? Does the United States have the willpower to maintain a forward force posture?

#### Russia and China’s “new world order” would be a nightmare for African decolonial sovereignty.

Mhaka ’22 -- Johannesburg-based social and political commentator (Tafi Mhaka, 4-7-2022, "Russia’s new world order is bad news for Africa," Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/4/10/russias-new-world-order-is-bad-news-for-africa, accessed 7-5-2022) -- nikki

On March 30, just a day after a Russian missile hit an administrative building in the port city of Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine, killing at least 12 people, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made the case for the establishment of new world order. In a videotaped message to his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, Lavrov claimed the world is “living through a very serious stage in the history of international relations”. He added, “We, together with you, and with our sympathisers will move towards a multipolar, just, democratic world order”. Lavrov’s sentiments echoed Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s February 4 joint statement announcing the beginning of a new era in international relations. In that statement, the two leaders not only called for a new, multipolar order but lamented the West’s “unilateral approaches to addressing international issues”, claiming such attitudes “incite contradictions, differences and confrontation” and hamper “the development and progress of mankind”. Without a doubt, this is a credible observation, especially regarding the United States’ policies across the world. For example, Washington has sanctioned Zimbabwe’s government – and rightfully so – for committing gross human rights abuses, but continues to support the equally repressive Ugandan government with military hardware, cash and training. Last month, the US Senate passed a resolution urging “international criminal courts to investigate Putin, his security council and military leaders for possible war crimes” in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Washington still refuses to recognise the International Criminal Court (ICC), or cooperate in any way with its investigation into possible war crimes committed by US troops in Afghanistan. The hypocrisy of the US is also apparent in its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite Israel’s countless, well-documented human rights and international law violations, decades-long illegal occupation of Palestinian territories, and apartheid policies against the Palestinian population, the US has blocked 53 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions critical of Israel in the last five decades. And it is not only Russia and China that are disturbed by the West’s apparent hypocrisy in the international arena. Africa too has grave concerns about the current global order, and has long been calling for the UN to undergo substantial reform to address the deep-rooted injustices in its handling of international affairs. In 2005, for instance, the African Union (AU) adopted the Ezulwini Consensus, calling for a more representative and democratic UNSC, in which Africa, like all other world regions, is represented. And speaking at the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed renewed the call for Africa to be granted a larger role in the UN. In this context, it may seem understandable for Africa to support the multipolar world order Russia claims to be building with the help of China. However, Beijing and Moscow are not calling for any reform that would diminish the enormous sway they readily have over world affairs. They are also not acting in a way that demonstrates under this new order they would hold themselves to the same standards as everyone else or that less powerful states and peoples would have better access to justice. Indeed, as recently as in 2021, China blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the military coup in Myanmar. And between 2011 and 2019, Russia vetoed no less than 14 UNSC resolutions on Syria. These great powers are evidently selective and casual proponents of democracy and human rights – just like their nemesis, the US. But African nations now appear hell-bent on ignoring the hypocrisy demonstrated by Russia and China, and eagerly awaiting the emergence of their new world order. The dangers of idolising Putin’s Russia, Xi’s China Putin’s popularity is at an outstandingly irrational and possibly dangerous high in Africa. Despite the illegality and brutality of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, Putin’s name adorns long-distance buses in Zimbabwe. And African leaders also seem reluctant to punish or even caution the Russian leader for its destructive “special military operation” in Ukraine. At the recent UN General Assembly vote on a resolution calling for Russia’s suspension from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), for example, the majority of African states either abstained – such as South Africa – or outright voted no – like Ethiopia. Meanwhile, South Africa’s influential opposition leader Julius Malema has urged Putin to “teach” Ukraine and NATO a lesson because “we need a new world order”. He has also claimed that Putin has given the Russian army clear instructions to avoid “civilian casualties” in Ukraine. This is despite the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recording 1,900 civilian casualties – with 726 people killed, including 52 children – mostly caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. In light of the disdain for territorial integrity, humanity and the right to life Putin’s Russia is currently showing in Ukraine, Africans should stop and think how the Russian leader’s proposed new world order would likely work out for them. And it is not only the carnage caused by Russia in Ukraine that should make Africa think twice about supporting the new world order promoted by Moscow and Beijing. Under Putin, Russia has been inundated by state-affiliated and state-sponsored political filth and terror. Putin’s political rivals and anyone daring to act against the interests of the Kremlin, including journalists, have faced assassination attempts both in Russia and abroad. Many, including former Federal Security Service agent Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya, have been killed. Human rights groups and independent media organisations have been targeted and shut down. Elections have been turned into a sham and private enterprise has been all but killed. Under Putin’s orders, the Russian military waged many immoral wars across the world – Russia’s indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in Syria and Georgia claimed thousands of lives. Similarly, China under Xi is a hotbed of repression. His administration has arbitrarily detained, tortured and mistreated millions of Turkic Muslims in the northwestern Xinjiang region. It has also frequently targeted intellectuals, civil rights activists and journalists and moved to restrict LGBTQ and women’s rights. Thus, Malema and other African leaders who look forward to Putin’s new world order should stop and consider what they are wishing for. An illiberal world order led by despots with blood-soaked histories cannot help Africa fulfil its democratic aspirations. Africa must chart its own path Africa does not need to subscribe to Chinese, Russian or American interpretations or manifestations of democracy and multilateralism. It simply needs to secure equal rights and representations in a genuinely progressive multipolar international system that safeguards its democratic and economic interests as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. The ill-advised and misplaced enthusiasm for Putin’s strongman politics is a sombre reflection of Africa’s failures and imprecise trajectory under the toothless AU. Almost 21 years after its establishment, the AU carries very little weight on the continent and it has almost no voice on the global stage. And while its pursuit of permanent representation on the UNSC is an extremely praiseworthy and essential exercise, it has gradually turned into an expedient and intermittently expressed soundbite. Be that as it may, Africa should focus on establishing a world order that is defined by strong, independent and democratic multilateral institutions. Undoubtedly, that is what China and Russia are eager to avoid or destroy, because they want the licence to intimidate, repress, silence and kill, both at home and abroad.

#### The best studies go aff — err on the side of a consensus of empirical research — our evidence assumes every skeptic.

Stephen Brooks & William Wohlforth 16. William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Page 103-108

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence— and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.

This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research.

General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?

Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support:

* Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3
* The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key. 4
* Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies. 5
* Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence. 6
* Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.

The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances— especially with nuclear- armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer— and protégés to seek— alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.

More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8

Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10

Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are:

* The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11
* Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17
* Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16

In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20

The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25

#### Russia’s worse.

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That Africa is the first among the world’s regions to feel the devastating human effects of climate change is now widely acknowledged. Arguably more significant than the economic boons Russia stands to realize from the aforementioned deals are the adverse environmental effects that resource mining could have on the populations of these countries.

Putin’s promise to help bring stability to the Central African Republic also invites a human approach to the analysis of Russia’s Africa policy. According to the UN, the protracted conflict has displaced more than 642,000 people. During the past year, the actions of Putin’s associate Yevgeny Prigozhin and Prigozhin’s private military company, Wagner Group, in the CAR have faced increasing scrutiny. Columbia University professor Kimberly Marten, for example, has highlighted the group’s mercenary interests in CAR’s mineral-rich mines. Discerning exactly what Putin’s promise entails therefore has a particular humanitarian urgency.

Foreign policy and domestic policy are inextricably connected. For this reason, it is important also to examine the impact of foreign policy on domestic social attitudes. Russia has a notoriously poor record on racism, particularly when it comes to African migrants, as the Los Angeles Times highlighted back in 2014. Since the country hosted the FIFA World Cup in 2018, these problems have been exacerbated by the presence of many Africans who outstayed their Fan Visas in hope of seeking asylum or finding work. In March of this year, Interior Ministry official Andrei Krayushkin confirmed that 5,500 of these individuals remained in Russia.

Mixed race African Russians also continue to face discrimination and abuse, as this Calvert Journal report shows. In the case of Russia’s “pivot to the East,” official foreign policy has fostered positive attitudes among the Russian population toward China and its people. To what extent the Kremlin’s pivot to Africa will have an analogous effect remains to be seen, but attention should be paid to whether Putin’s overtures to African leaders have any tangible effect on the lives of Russia’s own African population.

Africa is not, as Belgium’s King Leopold contemptuously called it, a “magnificent cake” that exists purely to sate the appetites of great powers—Russia among them. Rather, it is an umbrella term that includes a plethora of independent actors with their own agendas distinct from those of Moscow, Beijing, or indeed Washington. As the South China Morning Post recently reported, Russia is playing catch-up to China and the West in terms of developing economic ties with the continent. With African nations—and the continent as a whole—in ascendance on the international stage, it is time to rethink the way we analyze great powers’ Africa policies. And Russia’s policy is a good place to start.

#### Russia will interfere with African elections to support unstable autocracies.

Gathara 19, Communications consultant, writer, and award-winning political cartoonist based in Nairobi., (Patrick, “Russia has joined the ‘scramble’ for Africa”, Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/11/10/russia-has-joined-the-scramble-for-africa) //CHC-DS

However, as it seeks to reassert itself on the world stage, Africa is still seen as providing “low-cost, high-profile” opportunities to burnish its prestige.

Still, the Africa of today is very different from that of the 1970s and 1980s and while maintaining some of the tactics that were successful in yesteryears, such as the use of proxy forces in places like the Central African Republic and the sale of light and heavy weapons to regimes with dubious human rights records, Russia has evolved others more in tune with the times.

According to Proekt (The Project), an independent Moscow-based online investigative news outlet, Kremlin-linked teams have used social media “troll farms” and spin doctors to interfere in politics and elections in 20 countries on the continent, particularly in Francophone Africa, but with mixed success so far. In 2018 they failed in their attempt to engineer the re-election of President Erie Radzaunarimampianina in Madagascar and have been linked to interference in elections in Zimbabwe.

According to the Financial Times “across Africa, Moscow has deployed teams of military instructors to train elite presidential guards, sent arms shipments and assisted shaky autocrats with election strategies. It has also promised to build nuclear power plants and develop oil wells and diamond mines.”

The Guardian has also reported on leaked documents showing a wide-scale Russian effort “to bolster its presence in at least 13 countries across Africa by building relations with existing rulers, striking military deals, and grooming a new generation of ‘leaders’ and undercover ‘agents’.”

The goal of Russian efforts seems largely unchanged from the Soviet days – essentially to counter and limit the influence of others on the continent. The benefits for autocrats seeking to hang on to power on the continent is similarly easy to ascertain. However, for their youthful subjects, many of whom have little experience or recollection of the Soviet Union, the renewed Russian interest is likely to be viewed with scepticism.

#### Russia’s just as capitalist in Africa.

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Russia’s interest in Africa

It will be simplistic to frame the just-concluded Russia-Africa summit as a copy-cat jamboree organized by Russia to latch on the bandwagon of the increasingly fashionable trend of organizing and institutionalizing Africa summits by countries like China, India, Japan, France, and the United States. The truth is that, since the 2000s, there has been a noticeable re-awakening of Russia’s interest in Africa. Indeed, between 2005 and 2015, Africa’s trade with Russia grew by 185 percent, and Russia has several reasons to engage Africa more intensely.

Goal 1: Projecting power on the global stage

In supporting African countries—who, notably, constitute the largest voting bloc in the United Nations—Russia is cultivating allies in its challenge to the current United States and Euro-Atlantic-dominated security order. This strategy is not going unnoticed: Indeed, in 2018 former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton accused Russia of selling arms to African countries in exchange for votes at the United Nations, among other nefarious motivations.

Goal 2: Accessing raw materials and natural resources

Russia—just like other major world powers—also covets many of Africa’s raw materials and is creating joint projects and investments in order to access them. From the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Central African Republic, Russian companies are scaling up their activities in the mining of resources such as coltan, cobalt, gold, and diamonds. In Zimbabwe, for instance, a joint venture between Russia’s JSC Afromet and Zimbabwe’s Pen East Ltd is developing one of the world’s largest deposits of platinum group metal. In Angola, Russian mining company Alroser recently increased its stake in local producer Catoca to 41 percent, in a deal that provides the diamond giant with a production base outside Russia. Despite joint ownership with Angola, Catoca operates under Russian management. Remarkably, about one-third of Russia’s African imports are agricultural, including fruit, cocoa, coffee, and potatoes.

Goal 3: Arms exports and security

In recent years, Russia had become the largest supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for 35 percent of arms exports to the region, followed by China (17 percent), United States (9.6 percent), and France (6.9 percent). Since 2015, Russia has signed over 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African states. A Russian citizen, Valeriy Zakharov, has even been appointed to be a national security advisor to the president of the Central African Republic (CAR), Faustin-Archange Touadéra.

Russian arms are attractive to African leaders because, besides being relatively cheap, deals with Russia are not often held up by human rights concerns cited by other countries like France and the U.S. For instance, when the U.S. was dilly-dallying on selling arms to Nigeria to fight Boko Haram in 2014 upon allegations of human rights abuses by Nigerian soldiers, Nigeria turned to Russia and was able to place an order for 12 attack helicopters.

Goal 4: Supporting energy and power development in Africa through Russian companies

Lack of affordable, reliable electricity in Africa makes the region a prime and lucrative location for Russia’s energy and power industry. Several state-owned Russian companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rostec and Rosatom are active in Africa, with activities largely concentrated in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, and Uganda. So far, Rosatom has signed memorandums and agreements to develop nuclear energy with 18 African countries, including Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. In 2018 alone, Rosatom agreed to build four 1200 MW VVER-type nuclear reactors in Egypt—with construction and maintenance valued at $60 billion—with a Russian loan of up to $25 billion at an annual interest rate of 3 percent.

Russia also wants to use its mostly state-owned oil and gas companies to create new streams of energy supply. In 2018, for instance, Nigerian oil and gas exploration company Oranto Petroleum announced that it would be cooperating with Russia’s largest oil producer, Rosneft, to develop 21 oil assets across 17 African countries. Several Russian companies have also made significant investments in Algeria’s oil and gas industries and in Libya, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Egypt.

#### The U.S. has been the cause of anti-imperialism globally — four waves of empire building, and dismantlement are intrinsically US driven.

Ikenberry & Deudney ‘15 — John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Daniel Deudney is an American political scientist and Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. August 2015; “America’s Impact: The End of Empire and the Globalization of the Westphalian System”; *Princeton Scholar*; [http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf; //CYang](http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf;%20//CYang) **[\*\*NOTE\*\* — this card was the subject of an ethics challenge in a college debate because the original cutting (original card cutter unknown) omitted paragraphs — this card was then recut from scratch]**

In contemporary debates, this argument undercuts, modifies, and qualifies characterizations held by so many of the United States as essentially imperial, and the American order as an empire. In our rendering, the United State is not the last Western empire, but the first anti-imperial and post-imperial great power in the global system. Our argument is thus focused on the consequences of American foreign policy for the evolution of the international system, and we do not in this confined treatment offer an explanation for the origins of U.S. foreign policy. In short, we offer an argument about impacts rather than the sources of America’s antiimperial and pro-Westphalian role.

Empires and State Systems: Historical Patterns

Empire has been the historically predominant form of order in world politics. Looking at a time frame of several millennia, there was no global anarchic system until the European explorations and subsequent imperial and colonial ventures connected desperate regional systems, doing so approximately five hundred years ago.7 Prior to this emergence of a globalscope system, the pattern of world politics was characterized by regional systems. These regional systems were initially very anarchic, and marked by high levels of military competition. But almost universally, they tended to consolidate into regional empires which had fairly limited interactions with polities outside their regions.8 Thus, it was empires – not anarchic state systems – that typically dominated the regional systems in all parts of the world.

Within this global pattern of regional empires, European political order was distinctly anomalous because it persisted so long as an anarchy. Despite repeated efforts to consolidate Europe into one empire – or what the Europeans referred to as “universal monarchy” – this region remained a plural, multi-state political order. After the Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirties Year War, this plural anarchic system, the Westphalian system, and was sustained by a rough balance of power among its autonomous states and the weakness of the claimants of European empire. This Westphalian system was based on a roughly equal distribution of power among its major units, sustained by various balancing practices that thwarted a succession of regional European empire-builders, and had an elaborate system of public international law and ideological justification.9 While this system rested on a balance of power, it was juridically crystallized into a system of mutually recognized sovereigns.

Outside of Europe, however, the European states, including those that were most active in preventing empire within Europe, were extraordinarily successful in conquering and colonizing vast areas across oceanic distances.10 The Europeans did not invent empire, but they were spectacularly successful at empire building on a global scope, largely because of the imbalance of power that stemmed from European innovations in technology and organization.11 The Europeans conquered and dominated empires, states, and peoples in every previously loosely coupled or isolated regional system across the world. The Europeans also successfully planted numerous colonies of settlers, mainly in the temperate zones in North and South America, Oceania, and the southern tip of Africa.12 States from the Western European core of the Westphalian system thus brought into existence a global-scale political system made up of vast multi-continental empires of conquered peoples and a scattering of colonial “new Europes.”13

This pattern of European empire building was different from its predecessors, not just in its global scope, but also because the European states were continuously warring against one another for dominance within Europe. These struggles between states within Europe against empire in Europe were fought on a global scale. Thus the first “world war,” defined as a war fought across multiple continents, occurred in the later 18th century. In this struggle Britain sought to thwart French attempts to dominate Europe and the battle lines were in Europe, North America, South Asia, and across the global oceans. This pattern of the globalization of intraEuropean warfare continued in the 20th century with the wars triggered by German efforts to dominate Europe. The growing imbalance of power between the Europeans and the rest of the world during the 18th and 19th century enabled the Europeans to easily expand their empires at the expense of non-Europeans. But during the same periods, the Europeans found it very difficult to conquer each other within Europe. Thus vast armies wrought great destruction fighting over tiny parcels of land in Europe, while comparatively small European imperial expeditionary forces readily mastered non-European armies in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Thus a balance of power underpinned the Westphalian system in Europe, while an imbalance of power between Europe and the world underpinned imperial expansion.

Anti-imperial and anti-colonial rebellions and resistance are as old as empires, but successful rebellion against European imperial rule outside Europe began in the 18th century with the revolt of the colonial settler colonies in the Americas – first in North America and then in South America. This first wave of settler-colony rebellion marked the end of what historians refer to as the “first British empire,” as well as the first great European empire in the Americas, that of Spain. The success of this first wave of anti-imperial rebellion in Spanish America was crucially facilitated by the weakening of Spain during the Napoleonic wars for domination within Europe.

In the later-19th century, European empire building outside of Europe entered a second wave, enabled by the new industrial technologies that further amplified the imbalance of power between Europeans and non-Europeans, which in turn allowed the Europeans to extend their imperial domination into the large interior spaces of the continents, particularly in Africa and Asia.14 In the 20th century, further wars among the core European states weakened Britain, France, and Holland, the leading European colonial powers, thus creating opportunities for antiimperial independence movements in Asia and Africa. Paradoxically, the fact that the Europeans were continuously fighting one another fueled their imperial ambitions and successes, while at the same time, such wars weakened them and helped enable the success of rebellions against their empires.15 Thus as the British empire was reaching its territorial zenith in the early years of the 20th century, Britain was critically weakened by the world wars in Europe and Asia against the aspiring German and Japanese empire builders.

The territorial aggression of the Axis Powers constitute a third wave of empire building which was short lived and thwarted by the successful mobilization of the “United Nations,” a coalition led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. A fourth wave of empire building, by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement in the second half of the 20th century, was thwarted and dismantled by the United States and its allies.

The Pattern of American Anti-Imperial, Anti-Colonial, and Pro-Westphalian Impacts

Against the backdrop of this evolution of the international system and the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, it becomes possible to see more clearly the many ways in which the United States played important anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and pro-Westphalian roles. 16

In each of the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, the United States had an impact. The United States was the first “new nation” to emerge from a rebellion against European imperial rule during the first wave of modern empire. The United States also supported the independence of other European settler colonies throughout the Americas and, with the Monroe Doctrine, helped sustain their independence against European efforts to recolonize parts of the Americas. In the second wave of late 19th century empire-building, the United States, despite its great relative power, did not establish an empire of its own of any significance or duration. And during the latter part of the 20th century, the United States pushed European decolonization, thus facilitating the breakup of second wave empires. In the great world wars in the 20th century, the United States played an important role in thwarting a third wave of imperial projects of Germany, Japan, and Italy. In the second half of the 20th century, the United States played decisive roles, both ideological and military, in thwarting the fourth wave of empire building, the expansion of the communist great power, the Soviet Union, as well as communist coups and revolutions in many weak and small independent states.

The United States also played a variety of important roles in building and strengthening Westphalian institutions, moderating inter-state anarchy, and facilitating the ability of states to survive as independent members of international society. From its inception, the United States was precocious in its support for the law of nations, the institutions of the society of states, particularly the laws of war and neutrality, and public international law, as a means of restraining war and aggression. In both the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States, first regionally and then globally, inspired and helped legitimate anti-colonial and anti-imperial independence movements and national liberation struggles among peoples struggling against empires all over the world. In the 20th century, the United States led the efforts to institutionalize Westphalian norms of non-aggression and sovereign independence, first with the League of Nations and then with the United Nations Charter. In the second half of the 20th century, the American-led liberal international order institutionalized free trade and multilateral cooperation, thus providing the infrastructure for a global economic system, thus enabling smaller and weaker states to sustain their sovereign. Also in the second half of the 20th century, the American system of military alliances contributed to the dampening of violent conflicts among allied states, particularly in Europe and East Asia, thus protecting the Westphalian system from the return of violent conflict and empire-building.